

# Social Research

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY  
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

---

VOLUME FIFTEEN · DECEMBER 1948 · NUMBER FOUR

---

The Economic Position of Israel	<i>Alvin Johnson</i>	395
Limitations of Keynesian Economics	<i>William Vickrey</i>	403
Pluralist Democracy—The Swedish Experience	<i>Gunnar Heckscher</i>	417
The Origins of Scientism	<i>Eric Voegelin</i>	462
Language	<i>Kurt Riezler</i>	495
Book Reviews		511
Table of Contents and Indexes for Volume Fifteen		
	<i>after page</i>	520

---

Copyright, 1948, and published quarterly at 374 Broadway, Albany, N. Y., for the New School for Social Research, 66 West Twelfth Street, New York 11, N. Y. All rights reserved. Contributions to SOCIAL RESEARCH may not be reprinted without the permission of the editors. Subscriptions, \$3.00 a year, \$1.00 a single copy; Canadian and foreign subscriptions, \$3.50 a year. Entered as second-class matter June 13, 1944, at the post office at Albany, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Indexes of SOCIAL RESEARCH are published annually in the December issue; the contents are also indexed in the INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICALS, available in most libraries.

## EDITORIAL BOARD

FELICIA DEYRUP

..DOLPH LOWE

BRYN J. HOVDE

CARL MAYER

ERICH HULA

HANS NEISSER

ALVIN JOHNSON

KURT RIEZLER

LEO STRAUSS

## SOCIAL RESEARCH

is published in March, June, September and December, by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, in cooperation with the Institute of World Affairs

### EDITORIAL AND GENERAL OFFICE

66 West Twelfth Street, New York 11, N. Y.  
Dr. Alvin Johnson, Chairman, Editorial Board  
Dr. Leo Strauss, Associate Editor  
Janet Rosenwald, Managing Editor  
Doris Schiff, Editorial Secretary

All correspondence concerning manuscripts should be addressed to Dr. Felicia Deyrup

### SUBSCRIPTION PRICE

\$3.00 a year, \$1.00 a single copy  
Canadian and foreign, \$3.50 a year

# THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF ISRAEL<sup>1</sup>

BY ALVIN JOHNSON

**H**ow viable is the State of Israel, within the boundaries fixed by the partition? Can it defend its frontiers against hostile incursions from the neighboring Arab states? Can it control the movement of population and trade across its frontiers? Can it feed its population, not only as presently constituted but as it will develop under free and unlimited Jewish immigration? The answer to all these questions is in the negative, if one consults the ex-officials of the former British Mandate, the Arab leaders,

<sup>1</sup> It must be noted that I assume the territorial settlement of the UN Assembly Commission with minor modifications, not that of the Bernadotte proposal. Israel needs the Negeb not only for its agricultural possibilities, which are by no means negligible, but for access to the Dead Sea and the potash and other minerals to be had from its waters, and for access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the navigation of the Red Sea. At present Israel depends for its oil upon the British pipe line to Haifa, where in the past Israel has been heavily discriminated against in supply and price. In case of need, Israel, holding the Negeb, could supply herself by tankers through the Red Sea. In the great days of commerce under David and Solomon, Hebrew domination extended to the Gulf of Aqaba, over territory inhabited by Ammon as sparsely as it is now.

As Lowdermilk and Robert Nathan inform us, Jordan water could be brought to the Negeb if full development of the Jordan Valley under an authority were practicable. It is not politically practicable at the present time, with the interests of Transjordan, Arab Palestine, and Israel clashing. The time will come, I believe, when a confederation of the Levant, including not only those three states but also Syria and Lebanon, will be practicable. Under such a confederation the Lowdermilk plan of drawing off the waters of the Jordan for irrigation and letting into the Jordan Valley an equivalent flow from the Mediterranean would be feasible. In the meantime, agriculture in the Negeb will be limited to irrigation by deep wells. There is much water in the depths, accumulated through the ages, not too costly for intensive agriculture.

While Israel can make a valuable asset out of the Negeb, that area has only a political value for the Arabs. Egypt wants it, to head off Transjordan from the Mediterranean. Abdullah wants it, I suspect with a view to granting an air base to Britain and thus cementing more firmly the Anglo-Abdullah alliance. These are interests incomparably inferior to those of Israel.

the Irgun, and many Zionists throughout the world. But it is only in negativism that these parties are in agreement. The Arabs conclude that the only solution is an Arab state including all of Palestine; Irgun and the militant Zionists, a Jewish state including all of Palestine and Transjordan—or at least the Jordan Valley up to the tableland.

I shall not discuss at length the problem of defense. No country can defend itself by means of frontier guards. Air warfare has rendered frontier defenses obsolete. No country can control completely the movement of population and trade across its frontiers. The United States cannot wholly block off such movements over its northern frontier, though enjoying the full cooperation of the Canadian government. Roads and irrigation canals must cut across Israel and Arab territory. Similar problems arise on our boundary with Canada. Thus we use the water of the Milk River for irrigation in Montana. The Milk River rises in our Glacier National Park, makes a long loop through Canadian territory, and returns to Montana. We impound the flood waters at St. Mary's, in Glacier Park, and release them when needed, to flow through many miles of Canadian territory to our thirsty Montana lands.

All this is practicable because we are on good terms with Canada. The Palestinian problems of irrigation canals, highways and railways, movement of trade and population can be solved if relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be placed on a friendly footing.

My chief concern is with economic viability. Can Israel feed herself from the limited area granted by the partition? She cannot feed herself from her own soil. And this point appears crucial to "political" economists, both Irgunist and Arab. A realistic economist will reflect, neither can Britain feed herself from her own soil, yet she remains great. Neither can southern California, in a way the closest analogue to the State of Israel, as I shall develop later. Yet southern California is immensely prosperous.



Economically it is to be regretted that Babylonia was not chosen for the homeland of the Jews. There lie vast deserts awaiting the fertilizing waters of the Euphrates and Tigris, now flowing wastefully to the sea. On those Mesopotamian lands grain could be produced sufficient not only to feed the maximum possible Jewish population, but to make an important addition to the international flow of wheat. But Babylonia was the land of captivity, Palestine the land of Hebrew freedom and glory. Sentimentally, there could never have been a choice.

Agriculturally, the land of Palestine, both Israeli and Arab, is unpromising. Aaron Aaronson proved to the satisfaction of many scholars that Palestine and Transjordan were the original home of wheat. However that may be, wheat does miserably in its homeland. Of all forty-six countries reporting on wheat production, Palestine presents the lowest average—some six bushels per acre, of which two bushels must be reserved for seed. In northern Europe the averages spot around thirty bushels.

Since six bushels of bread grain per capita are needed for a modest standard of living, the three million acres of possible wheat land in all Palestine could barely produce bread enough for the existing population of two millions, Arabs and Jews. There could be no native bread for the millions of Jewish immigrants Shertok talks about. There is no solution for this problem through annexing more of Palestine to Israel. The lands now assigned to the Arabs can produce no more wheat than suffices for their semistarvation diet. And there is no program for deporting the Arabs of Palestine to other semistarved Arab territory.

To this point the "political" economist will have followed me with indignation. I have overlooked irrigation, the key to Palestinian agricultural development. I have been an irrigation enthusiast all my life; but here I am considering the wheat problem. For that problem Palestinian irrigation is irrelevant.

For the sources of water in Palestine are costly—too costly for an ordinary staple like wheat. Irrigation from deep wells costs

from fifty to a hundred dollars an acre annually. In the Palestinian climate twenty bushels would be a good crop on irrigated land. The cost for water alone would be two and a half to five dollars a bushel. A limited supply of water can be had by tapping the Jordan above Lake Huleh. Led by contour canals and deep cuts and tunnels this water could be brought to the coastal plain. It would be costly. There is much more water at Lake Tiberias and below, where the drainage of the Transjordan tablelands flows in sporadic floods into the Jordan. But Lake Tiberias is six hundred feet below sea level and another thousand feet to surmount the divide would make the problem of water supply economically impossible.

I am aware that Robert Nathan, in his masterly study of Palestine, found possibilities in an immense engineering development that would provide water even for the Negeb, at an annual cost of fifty dollars an acre. I have never heard of an irrigation project that did not cost twice the engineers' estimate. But let the fifty-dollar estimate stand. It is too much for wheat or any other bread grain.

But fifty or even a hundred dollars is not too much for citrus fruits, melons, or winter vegetables, if a paying market can be found for these. It is not out of the question for sugar beets, or alfalfa for dairy cows, if milk commands a good price.

Agriculturally the position of Israel is analogous to that of southern California. Neither can southern California profitably produce staple foods, except alfalfa for high-priced milk, and sugar, although water from the Colorado and the Owens River is much less costly than Jordan water. Citrus fruits, winter vegetables, melons, and the like, are produced in immense volume. The only limit on production is the market, the vast market of the United States. Israel can produce within its limited domain as much of these specialties as it can find markets for, even when Europe rises to a standard of living comparable with the present American standard. Israel will, to be sure, have to compete with Italy, Algeria, Morocco, and Spain, all nearer the most important

European markets. Southern California likewise has to compete with the Gulf Coast and Florida.

Aside from agriculture there are close analogies between the position of Israel and southern California. Neither region is rich in raw materials. Southern California has oil, but there are indications of oil in the Negeb. Coal is dear in both regions, but oil is cheap. When the Near Eastern situation settles down, Israel will be able to buy oil as cheaply at Haifa as Los Angeles buys it at the local pipe lines. Neither region has much hydroelectric power available or in prospect, and oil-burning plants cannot produce power so cheaply as coal-burning plants near rich mines. Both regions can have power cheap enough for light industry. Neither will ever be suited to heavy industry.

It is light industry that adds the greatest value to limited raw materials, that produces maximum employment. Los Angeles is a city of rapidly multiplying light industries. So is Tel Aviv. Someone has enumerated more than a thousand light industries already established in Israel.

Southern California is fortunate in having a highly intelligent, skilful, and resourceful population. Who would hesitate to apply the same characteristics to the Israeli? Southern California eases her balance of trade through the steady influx of families who have come to live on fortunes accumulated in Keokuk and Weeping Water. Given conditions of independence and peace, will there not be tens of thousands of Jews, from all over the world, who will migrate with their fortunes to Israel, to lie at rest in the end in the land of their great forefathers?

No one can assign limits to the population southern California can maintain. There is no assignable limit upon specialty agriculture and light industry. They meet occasional limits in the market, but in the long run the market is indefinitely expansible. Exactly the same thing holds true, or could hold true, for the State of Israel.

Both regions have to buy their staple foods—bread and meat: six bushels of wheat per capita, costing twelve dollars; a hundred

pounds of meat, costing, in ordinary times, twenty-five dollars. Much machinery will have to be imported into Israel, and raw materials, and fuel.

To pay for these things Israel must export the products of its industry and agriculture. And that is a difficult problem so long as total production is too small to justify up-to-date transportation. Citrus fruits, for example, and winter vegetables need refrigerated ships. These require quantity to pay. Many products of light industry would find a market in New York, if available in sufficient quantity to justify the costs of shipment over great distances.

Southern California has a high-standard hinterland to absorb its product, but it has to share this hinterland with northern California and the eastern states. Israel has an immense low-standard hinterland that need not be shared with any other regions except England, Italy, and Japan, all remote geographically and culturally.

Granted conditions of peace, Israel could utilize the resources of joint Arab and Israeli trading and development companies penetrating the Arab world. The Arab world is at present wretchedly poor. It need not be. The Arab lands have natural resources upon which a brilliant prosperity could be based. Israel could serve as a lighted torch of economic development in the dim twilight of the Levant.

But all this depends on peace, and friendly cooperation between the Israeli and the Arabs. Both sides have everything to gain by cooperation. The Arab states remain in a semif feudal condition, a few rich landlords, a few well-paid officials ruling over masses of miserably poor fellaheen and town proletariat. It is an unstable situation, in an era when communistic and anarchistic ideas run current wherever men have tongues. The only security for the Arab upper class, in the long run, lies in a development of production that will gradually lift the masses to a living standard. For this the Arabs need the commercial and organizing capacity of the Israeli.

And the Israeli need the Arabs. There can be no stable future for the State of Israel except through industry and trade. So long as European industry remains crippled by the events of the world war, Israel can sell its light industry products in London and New York. It can pick up its raw materials anywhere. But sooner or later the competition of Europe and Japan will become formidable.

Behind Israel lie Arab Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, all countries with materials Israel could use. All this region is adapted to the production of the finest wools. It is for lack of a market that the noble herds of old have been allowed to degenerate into the present stock of long-legged coarse-fleeced sheep. Israel needs the goat skins and sheep skins of the hinterland, now improperly dressed and unsystematically collected, for want of well-organized trade. As in the days of Solomon, Israel needs the cedars of Lebanon for her housing developments. There are hundreds of products Israel could buy, producing means of payment for what she has to sell.

Can Israel and the Arab nations cooperate for mutual benefit? They can, if Israel can be assured that the Arabs do not look beyond the present truce to a renewed assault on the independence of Israel, and if the Arabs can be assured that Israel is a nation among nations, seeking to live in peace with her neighbors, not a spearhead of a supposed world Zionist imperialism, aiming at the recovery of the whole area once nominally subject to King David. If Israel repudiates all dreams of territorial aggrandizement and undertakes to develop to the utmost her industrial and commercial possibilities, the question of Jewish immigration loses all relevance to Arab policy. It becomes merely a question with the Jews how large an influx Jewish industry can maintain. Given peace and cooperation with the Arabs, it could be a very large influx.

There is hardly a situation in the world where two neighboring peoples are under such heavy compulsion to cooperate. The greatest potential asset of the region, the water and power of the

Jordan, can only be realized under a Jordan Valley Authority, operated jointly by Israel, Arab Palestine, and Transjordan. The region can be equipped properly with highways and railways only by joint authority. So too of the ports and the customs administration.

It cannot be believed that two such intelligent, peace-loving peoples as the Israeli and the Arabs will long permit their friendly relations to be beclouded by conflicting sentiments without relevance to reality. Peace and cooperation would mean the beginning of an era of development capable of restoring the ancient glories of the Levant, cradle of western civilization.

# LIMITATIONS OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS<sup>1</sup>

BY WILLIAM VICKREY

THE tools of analysis developed by Keynes have had such a profound influence on economic thinking that it is probably safe to say that today few economists of note are without some degree of indebtedness to Keynes. And of those who still refuse to make use of the Keynesian apparatus, many neglect it only because they do not understand it. Thus, if using the Keynesian apparatus makes one a Keynesian, most economists today are Keynesians.

There is, however, considerable divergence among the conclusions reached by different groups who make use of this apparatus. In the narrower sense of the term, the more specifically Keynesian economists can be distinguished by the emphasis that they place upon fiscal policy—that is, the variation in governmental deficit or surplus—as the crucial element in any program for the overall stabilization of the economic system. Over against these extreme Keynesians stand those who would place chief reliance on monetary measures, such as control of reserve ratios, changes in rediscount rates, and the purchase and sale of government bonds on the open market. These are the methods that were considered to be proper by respectable economists before the advent of the Keynesian era, and which Keynes showed to be, under certain conditions, inadequate to produce the desired results. The object of this paper is to show in what circumstances each of these two policies can be relied on, in what circumstances each is likely to prove ineffective, and, in those cases where both may be effective, the relative advantages of the two policies.

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this paper was delivered before the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, at the New School for Social Research on May 9, 1948.



*The Monetary and Fiscal Elements of Policy*

At the outset, we should have fairly clearly in mind the difference between fiscal or budgetary policy, on the one hand, and monetary policy, on the other. Fiscal policy in its purest form consists of changing the deficit without changing the quantity of money or the level of governmental expenditures. A stimulating pure fiscal action would consist of reducing taxes and simultaneously selling a corresponding amount of government bonds, while preventing the expansion of bank credit. A sedative fiscal action would consist of increasing taxes and either buying bonds or selling fewer than would otherwise be necessary. In effect, individuals hand over the same amount of cash to the government to enable it to carry on its activities, but in one case they are given in exchange a tax receipt, and in the other they are given a bond. The stimulating effect comes from the fact that individuals will spend more freely on consumption goods if they have bonds in their strong box than if they merely have tax receipts that do not call for any future payment by the government. There is no change in the amount of money outstanding, nor is there any change in government outlays.

The simplest form of pure monetary stimulus is provided by printing money and buying bonds with it. The process of buying the bonds tends to raise their price and lower the interest rate. If the interest rate can be lowered in this way to an extent sufficient to encourage investors to borrow at the low rates and purchase capital goods, the stimulus will be effective. There may also be a slight tendency for individuals to spend more on consumption if their assets consist more largely of liquid cash than interest-bearing securities, but ordinarily this is deemed negligible; a person's desire to add to his assets rather than to spend on consumption is commonly thought to be little affected by the type of asset accumulated. Possibly also the reduced rate of interest may induce more spending now rather than saving for later on, since giving up consumption in the present will yield less purchasing power for the future than it did when interest



rates were higher. It is usually felt, however, that interest has little influence in this direction, and that the influence may even be the reverse. For example, it seems rather unlikely that the increase in life insurance premium rates that might result from a fall in interest rates would actually lead to a decline in the aggregate amount that individuals choose to devote to the payment of premiums. A 10-percent increase in premium rates would probably produce less than a 10-percent decline in the face value of policies taken out, so that total premiums might even increase.

In the reverse case, a purely monetary sedative can be applied most simply by selling bonds and destroying the cash received from the sale. This will tend to drive interest rates up, reduce the desire of investors to borrow money and buy capital goods, and so abate the competition for goods and curtail inflation.

The same stimulus may be applied more indirectly if the government negotiates loans from banks, buys bonds with checks drawn against the deposit thus set up, and so raises the market price of bonds, thereby lowering interest rates. In the process the deposit created by the loan is transferred to the credit of individuals. Or still more indirectly, banks may be induced to expand their loans through the lowering of reserve requirements, through reducing rediscount rates, or by a general relaxation of restrictions on the making of loans. In these cases the money is created by the banking system rather than by the government, and additional interest payments to the banks are involved. From the point of view of the economy at large, however, the effect is exactly the same as if the money had been simply printed, and accordingly in what follows we will speak in the simpler terms of printing or destroying the money. One way of expressing this concretely is to assume that banks are on a 100-percent reserve basis and are required to have cash on hand equal to their demand deposits.

Thus we have two distinct elementary operations by which a stimulus or a sedative may be administered to the economy. The classical monetary operation consists of the substitution of cash for bonds or vice versa, and the Keynesian deficit operation con-

sists of the substitution of bonds for tax receipts or vice versa. If we add a third elementary operation—a simultaneous increase in taxes and expenditures with no change in deficit or money supply—any program of government action can be expressed as a combination of these three elements. But since this third or expenditure element by itself has only relatively minor effects on aggregate activity and the general price level, we will consider only the monetary and deficit elements. Any program not involving a change in government outlays will consist of a combination of these two elements, and its effects can be analyzed accordingly. The analysis is greatly simplified if we keep these two contrasting elements distinct.

### *The Roles of the Two Elements*

We may now ask what limits the effectiveness of the monetary operation. In the first place, the terms on which funds are actually available to business respond only with some sluggishness to the prices quoted for bonds on the open market, or to rediscount rates of reserve banks, except in those cases in which a businessman actually owns some bonds or similar securities himself and is able to sell them and obtain funds directly. Much more important, however, is the fact that under our present economic institutions there is a limit below which the interest rate cannot be driven by monetary measures; this limit may not be low enough to permit investment to be stimulated to the level needed to produce full employment. This is particularly likely to be true if at the beginning of the operation the interest rate is already low. Obviously the interest rate cannot be pushed to negative values. In fact, even with an interest rate considerably above zero, individuals begin to be rather indifferent whether they hold their capital in the form of cash or low-interest securities; large quantities of cash could be substituted for corresponding amounts of bonds in the hands of the public without driving them to offer to lend at much lower rates of interest, and without driving the price of bonds much higher. Before an adequate

stimulus to investment could be produced, the amount of cash issued might well be so great as to be a serious threat to the stability of the economy; if an upturn were eventually induced, it might easily become an unmanageable boom. And even if such operations were conducted on an extremely large scale, there would be no assurance of producing an upturn.

Even assuming that interest rates could be lowered substantially, there would still be the possibility that investment might be relatively unresponsive. Rapid obsolescence and general uncertainty are likely to loom large in the eyes of the prospective purchaser of capital goods, and reductions in interest rates, especially when the rate was small to start with, are unlikely to be very effective in inducing increased purchases or construction of capital equipment. For example, if an item is expected to be worn out or obsolete in ten years, so that depreciation must be charged at 10 percent, a reduction in interest rates from 3 percent to 2 percent is likely to have a relatively unimportant influence on the decision whether or not to make this outlay.

Thus the success of monetary expansion in providing a stimulus depends on three links: the increase in money holdings must lead to a willingness to lend at lower interest rates; these lower rates must be made effectively available to potential purchasers of capital goods; and purchasers of capital goods must have their decisions affected by the change in interest rates. If any one of these links is broken, monetary policy loses its effectiveness. There is, to be sure, a possible alternative to the interest rate-investment link, and that is the possibility that with lower interest rates and the substitution of cash for other assets held, individuals will save less and spend more on current consumption. In practice, however, a substantial effect of this sort is sufficiently unlikely that we may leave it out of account.

To turn now to budgetary policy, the success of an expansionary operation, consisting of lowering taxes and selling bonds, depends on the willingness of individuals and businesses to spend their stock of money more rapidly without drastically increasing

the rate of interest at which they are willing to make loans. For obviously if the volume of money and demand deposits is held constant, then an increase in the volume of trade must mean a decrease in the number of days of outlays that is kept on hand on the average in the form of money and demand deposits. Now, having a certain minimum number of days' outlays on hand in the form of cash or deposits is a practical necessity. Having somewhat more than this on hand is of some added convenience, for which individuals are willing to forgo something in the way of interest that they might be able to obtain by giving up cash in exchange for interest-bearing assets; also, having a certain reserve of cash may enable individuals to take fuller advantage of opportunities that arise than would be possible if they could not pay the cash deposit required immediately but had first to sell some of their other assets to obtain cash. Thus, in general, as the interest rate declines and the cost of holding cash diminishes, individuals tend to turn over their cash more and more slowly, and to keep on hand an amount equal to the outlays of a longer period. As the interest rate rises, individuals will keep more of their assets in interest-bearing form and less in the form of cash, until at very high rates of interest their cash holdings are reduced to barely more than the minimum necessary to carry them from one lump payment to the next.

At low rates of interest, the velocity of circulation tends to be low, and there is considerable room for speeding it up. Individuals will be willing to lend their cash without requiring a much higher rate of interest in return for the sacrifice of liquidity. In these circumstances, fiscal policy can be effective, in that the amount of government bonds held by individuals will be increased, the interest rate raised only slightly, private investment diminished only slightly, individual consumption increased substantially, and the velocity of circulation of the fixed money supply increased.

On the other hand, if interest rates are high, and the velocity of circulation is already pushed close to its maximum, there is

little  
Ind  
of  
offe  
ern  
defi  
Hig  
the  
unr  
will  
equ  
sma  
spor  
rise,  
will  
will  
stru  
depe  
stan  
way  
affect

To  
mon  
whic  
a sim  
be e  
mari  
of pr  
effect  
of re  
woul

Th  
mon  
is ine  
with

little room for further increase in the velocity of circulation. Individuals will not be willing to economize further in their use of cash unless there is a fairly sharp increase in the interest offered them to compensate for the loss of liquidity. The government will be able to sell its bonds in pursuit of an expansionary deficit policy only by offering much higher rates of interest. Higher interest rates will in turn curtail private investment. In the extreme case, where the velocity of circulation is entirely unresponsive to changes in the rate of interest, the net result will be that the government deficit will be exactly offset by an equal reduction in private investment (or possibly by a slightly smaller reduction in private investment coupled with a corresponding increase in individual savings); the interest rate will rise, and the total income and employment of the community will remain the same. More of the resources of the community will be devoted to current consumption, and less to the construction of capital equipment. Thus the success of fiscal policy depends on the demand for cash being responsive, in some substantial degree, to changes in interest rates (or, to put it the other way around, on interest rates being unaffected, or only moderately affected, by the supply of cash).

To be sure, even at high interest rates where the demand for money responds but little to changes in interest rates, a policy which combined fiscal and monetary measures, as for example a simultaneous printing of money and reduction of taxes, would be effective. But the effectiveness of such a policy is due primarily to its monetary element, and a purely monetary operation of printing money and buying bonds would be almost equally effective in stimulating the economy, though the resulting division of resources between current consumption and capital formation would be different.

Thus at high interest rates and low elasticity of demand for money, monetary policy is effective but a pure deficit policy alone is ineffective in controlling the level of the national income and with it the volume of unemployment or the degree of inflation,

as the case may be. On the other hand, at low interest rates and an elastic demand for cash, monetary policy by itself is impotent and fiscal policy is required for the stabilization of the economy. As a restrictive policy, monetary control can always be made effective, for if at the outset interest rates are low and cash demand elastic, monetary contraction if carried far enough will first raise interest rates to the point where demand for cash is inelastic and monetary policy becomes effective, and further monetary contraction will then exert its effect on the national income. To be sure, in extreme situations, monetary contraction may produce subsidiary results that may be awkward. For example, if abatement of the present inflationary pressures were attempted by curbing bank credit expansion, selling bonds, and retiring from circulation the money and deposits received, it would probably be necessary to proceed until the interest rate was forced quite high. Short-term interest rates might have to be pushed as high as 10 or even 15 percent, but a businessman who is not deterred from purchasing capital equipment by grey market prices would probably not be greatly discouraged by any less drastic increase in interest rates. Long-term rates would probably not have to be pushed nearly so far, but even so, the value of present long-term low-interest government obligations would be pushed down. Twenty-year 3-percent bonds might well sell for as low as 70. This paper loss in value might easily create difficulties in individual cases. The amount of interest to be paid on the national debt would start to rise gradually as more and more of the debt is refinanced at the new rates. This would mean a need for increased taxation in order to keep the deficit at the same level and to avoid being indirectly pushed into an inflationary budgetary policy. But these tax increases would be neither as large nor as immediate as those required by a deflationary budget policy. The increased interest rate would mean increased property incomes and would tend to increase the concentration of income, though to some extent this would be offset by the losses in the market value of long-term bonds. Thus inflation can be con-

trol  
con  
incr  
nec

T  
poli  
on a  
back  
orde  
bon  
supp  
it is  
the i  
by m  
such  
stim  
othe  
is cap  
natio  
mon  
press

Or  
situa  
Or if  
lengt  
need  
an ex  
incom  
to sp  
will r  
it and  
suffic  
to bo  
out o  
nessm



trolled by monetary policy alone, if we are willing to bear the consequences. Budgetary policy, whether achieved through increased taxation or decreased expenditure, is not absolutely necessary.

There is a danger, however, in trusting entirely to monetary policy. If monetary curtailment overshoots the mark it may bring on an incipient recession. A reversal of policy, through buying back bonds and lowering the rate of interest, would then be in order, of course. Indeed, an alternate buying and selling of bonds, accompanied by expansion and contraction of the money supply, might be able to keep the economy on an even keel. But it is very likely that at some point in the process we would find the interest rate down at the lower limit of what can be achieved by monetary policy, and the economy still on the downgrade. In such an event, monetary policy would be powerless to do more to stimulate the economy, and a depression would set in unless some other means of control is resorted to. In effect, monetary policy is capable of imposing powerful downward pressures on the money national income and of keeping inflation within bounds, but monetary policy alone can exert only a moderate and uncertain pressure upward should employment begin to sag.

On the other hand, budgetary policy alone may in the present situation be relatively ineffective against inflationary pressures. Or if it is effective, it may be adequate only when carried to such lengths as to have very serious repercussions. What would be needed would be for the government to increase taxes to such an extent that the sum of what people want to spend out of the income remaining to them after taxes, plus what businessmen want to spend on capital equipment, at existing low rates of interest, will not exceed the productive capacity of the country. Or to put it another way, the government must redeem through taxation a sufficient quantity of securities so that the funds thus returned to bondholders, plus the amount which people are willing to save out of their disposable incomes, will equal the amount that businessmen want to use, at the present low interest rates, for the

expansion of their capital plant. To do this on the required scale is likely to have consequences even more serious than those resulting from monetary contraction.

The political difficulties of getting an increase in taxes on the scale required are familiar to all. The economic difficulties are no less serious and more deep-seated. Fundamentally, arresting inflation through budgetary policy and low interest rates, rather than through monetary policy and high interest rates, means that a larger fraction of the national resources will be used for additions to capital and less for individual consumption. Curtailment of the resources available for individual consumption in order to leave to businessmen as much as they want for additions to capital plant and equipment will mean, in general, a lower standard of living for the poorer classes. Those with large incomes will probably not be driven to curtail their consumption expenditures very much by such tax increases as are likely to be adopted. If a smaller proportion of the national resources are to go to consumption, and the wealthy do not decrease their consumption, the living standards of the poor will have to suffer. This is the obverse of the often-heard statement that the tax increases that are most deflationary are those that fall upon the lower-income classes, and that the taxes on the wealthy come primarily out of savings and have relatively little deflationary effect.

In addition to the problem of the living standards of the lower-income classes, there is the fundamental question whether, as a matter of broad national policy, we should devote as large a proportion of our resources to capital formation as would be the result if budgetary methods are relied on for inflation control. With devastation and need abroad, it would seem that the expansion of our own capital plant might be placed a bit lower on the priority list. And the attempt to make up in a short period for the time lost during the war is likely to lead to an overexpansion in capital goods industries that may well lead to grief later on. At the very least these are matters that should consciously be considered before deciding whether to employ the Keynesian



budgetary policy or the classical monetary policy as a means of controlling inflation.

Thus, for the time being at least, budgetary policy has a strong competitor in monetary policy for the role of exercising general control over the economy. There is a shortage of capital equipment, which produces a high profitability of new investment; this in turn, by proper monetary measures, could be placed in equilibrium with a high money rate of interest, which would give monetary control a substantial margin in which to work.

### *The Administration of the Two Elements*

In terms of the present division of authority, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board between them can put into effect almost any monetary policy that is needed. Indeed, within limits, either agency operating alone can exert a substantial influence in controlling the amount of money and demand deposits in circulation, and together it appears likely that without further legislation they have the power to take monetary action that would be sufficient to control inflation. On the other hand, fiscal policy is to a large extent in the hands of Congress. The administration is almost completely powerless to adjust tax revenues on its own initiative, and the degree of possible adjustments in the rate of expenditures is severely limited. Thus, though it may be admitted that the Treasury and the Reserve Board together could check inflation—and that checking inflation by monetary action is desirable in spite of the resulting disturbances to bond markets and the check that high interest rates would place on certain lines of investment, notably housing—even so, as long as there is no assurance that Congress stands ready to adopt the correct fiscal policy on short notice should the monetary action overshoot the mark, there is considerable justification for the use of great caution in the application of monetary measures, especially since so little is known about how to determine what degree of contraction is required to produce a given result.

To use a crude analogy, the monetary authorities may be com-

pared to the man in charge of the gas release valve of a balloon that is rising somewhat too rapidly. He knows he can check the ascent by releasing gas (contracting the money supply), but also that should he release too much, so that the balloon begins to descend, he can do nothing to correct the situation, but must rely on the man in charge of the sandbags (Congress) to release some of the ballast (increase the deficit or reduce the surplus). If the gas valve man is uncertain whether the ballast man is prepared to release ballast quickly should the occasion arise, he may well hesitate to release any large amount of gas for fear that if he overshoots the mark and causes the balloon to descend, the balloon may get into serious difficulty before the ballast man gets around to acting. This is especially so if he does not know the sensitivity of his valve.

To complete the picture, one might supply the valve man with a gas generator with which he may replace the gas released (re-expand the money supply) except for the fact that the generator sometimes refuses to work properly, especially when the balloon is low or falling (expansion of money supply merely increases cash balances without lowering interest rates sufficiently to expand investment and production); on the other hand, the ballast man has a means of taking on more ballast, for example, by condensing atmospheric moisture (increasing the surplus or reducing the deficit), except that this becomes difficult at higher altitudes when the balloon is rising. Thus while either acting alone can to a degree control the balloon, the most effective control requires that they supplement each other's actions, with the valve man (monetary policy) playing the dominant role at high altitudes or during the ascent (prosperous or inflationary periods) and the ballast man (fiscal policy) being prepared to take over promptly at lower altitudes or during a descent (periods of deflation or recession). The immediate requirement, therefore, is for strong monetary policy coupled with a preparedness on the part of Congress to take proper fiscal action if the need should arise. As monetary policy is considerably more flexible than fiscal policy,

this.  
gran

*Econ*

But  
that  
capit  
be e  
effec  
are f  
devel  
ment  
ance  
decli  
tion  
much  
power  
in tin  
return  
to be  
satisf

In  
requir  
by the  
compl  
tion o  
decide  
need t  
to wh  
ernme  
ions m  
accord  
would  
degree  
on the

this, for the time being, would seem to be a fairly satisfactory program, if the proper coordination of elements could be achieved.

*Economic Policy, the Role of Government, and the Social Heritage*

But what of the longer-run outlook? Many observers have argued that there is a long-term tendency for the needs of the economy for capital to become saturated, and for the rate of return which can be earned by new capital to fall. If this is so, then after the effects of the present emergency have worn off, we will find, if we are fortunate enough to enjoy a substantial period of peaceful development, that the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable prices, on the one hand, combined with a balanced budget (or a moderate surplus), on the other, gradually declines until it approaches the level at which the liquidity function is very elastic, and the monetary authority no longer has much room for further reductions in the interest rate. Thus the power of monetary policy to exert upward pressure on the economy in times of incipient slump will diminish. Eventually, then, a return to the Keynesian budgetary methods of control appears to be required. And from some points of view this would be a satisfactory result.

In terms of broad economic policy, however, a mechanism that requires that the budgetary deficit be adjusted entirely as dictated by the requirements of maintaining full employment seems not completely satisfactory, in that it imposes an unfortunate limitation on our freedom of action. One would like to be able to decide upon the amount of government expenditures, not by the need to preserve full employment, but by a judgment of the extent to which resources can be utilized more effectively through governmental agencies than through private enterprise. That opinions may differ widely on this issue is no reason for not acting according to some reasonable consensus, or average opinion. One would also like to determine the budgetary deficit, and with it the degree to which resources are to be used for capital formation, on the basis of a deliberate choice as to how much of a social heri-

tage should be left for future generations, and not merely according to the needs of the moment for keeping the economic mechanism working smoothly. If we have to determine the deficit by full employment considerations, then either the decision as to the size of the social heritage or the decision as to the relation between government and private activity will have to give way. But if we can somehow retain the effectiveness of monetary control, these decisions can be made on their own merits. Are there, then, methods by which the effectiveness of monetary control can be maintained and the resort to budgetary control avoided?

The complete answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. For the present it may suffice to suggest two possible methods of avoiding the eventual recourse to budgetary policy. The first method is the imposition of a tax on holdings of cash and demand deposits at a rate of from 3 to 10 percent per year, as suggested by Arthur Dahlberg.<sup>2</sup> Here the cost of holding cash would be the loss of interest plus the cash balances tax, so that even at a zero rate of interest, cash holdings would remain small and the velocity of circulation of money kept up. Even negative rates of interest would be possible. Monetary policy could then maintain a steady flow of income without recourse to budgetary policy. The other method would be the adoption as a permanent policy of allowing a "creeping inflation" at a rate, say, of 5 to 10 percent a year, with nominal interest rates correspondingly higher and all long-term contracts modified in the light of such an expectation; the promise of steadily rising prices would be a stimulus to investment and a penalty for holding cash. There are difficulties involved in both of these schemes; they are mentioned merely to show that the eventual resort to the use of budgetary policy as the principal means of overall stabilization is far from inevitable.

<sup>2</sup> See Dahlberg, *When Capital Goes on Strike* (New York 1938). This plan is to be distinguished from the more usual "stamped scrip" plans by the more moderate rate of tax, which would be sufficient to keep the velocity of circulation fairly high, but not sufficient to induce individuals to forgo the convenience of using money in favor of other possible media of exchange not subject to tax.

(Columbia University)

# PLURALIST DEMOCRACY<sup>1</sup>

## *The Swedish Experience*

BY GUNNAR HECKSCHER

### I

**T**HEORETICALLY, if not in practice, European society in the Middle Ages was largely static. Ideas of evolution and development were, on the whole, foreign to the church, in whose eyes this world was but the transient residence of souls preparing for the one really worth-while existence in the hereafter. This attitude, however, applied not only to society as a whole—or, more correctly, to Christianity as a whole—but almost equally to relations among men. God had given to each of them his station in life, and it was regarded almost as presumption on his part if he tried to move into another.

It is natural that an ideology of this kind should be very favorable to the development of group organization. The semireligious character of guilds is only one illustration of this fact; others, and perhaps more important ones, can be found in the history of feudalism. Corporative organization was in many states one of the most characteristic traits of medieval society, and it is well known that central political authority frequently found it difficult or even important to maintain its power against the vested interests represented by these corporate entities.

In Sweden, however, neither the guild system nor feudalism as a whole was ever strongly developed. The backward character

<sup>1</sup> The problems under consideration in this article are discussed in greater detail in my book *Staten och organisationerna* (Stockholm 1946). For basic data and sources, as well as for some of the facts of general social development explaining the specific character of group organization in Sweden, I must refer to the materials accounted for there. In attempting to present the problem to an English-speaking public, I am indebted for helpful criticism and suggestions to Dr. Edward Shils and Dr. Hans Morgenthau, both of the University of Chicago.

of the country's economic structure, in which cities played a very subordinate part, and the maintenance of peasant independence prevented the development of a social order such as that of Germany or even of Denmark. It is true that the representative system was based on the four estates—nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants—with their own representatives sitting in four separate houses. But these estates were, on the whole, nothing but media of representation without any corporate capacity of their own, and even the nobility was in Sweden, as in Great Britain, a comparatively open class, receiving frequent additions from individuals and groups rising to importance in the service of the state. This was true even in the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, when development in other parts of Europe had passed far beyond the medieval stage and Swedish economy was gradually becoming more diversified. Thus, when conservatives in the nineteenth century advanced corporative ideas in defense of the existing representative system or in favor of its reform according to traditional principles, their arguments were—and would always have been—without any firm basis in social realities.

In European countries following the general line of evolution, on the other hand, it was chiefly through developments during the ages of mercantilism and beginning liberalism that society lost its corporative character. Industrialism, especially, was much too dynamic to permit the maintenance of fixed group organizations. The new ideology, which superseded the traditional one in existence since the Middle Ages, was that of liberalism, which at that time meant—as, to a great extent, it still does in European terminology—the same thing as individualism. Competition between individuals with at least theoretically equal opportunities became the order of the day, and organization was felt to be somewhat superfluous. Even the state itself was regarded as something to be kept within the strictest possible limits, and corporative organizations within the state were felt to be both unnecessary and disadvantageous not only to society as a whole, but also to their own members. It should be noted that most English liberals who



avored the repeal of the combination laws in the early nineteenth century had no belief whatever in labor unions: if the workers wanted to organize, it was no business of the state to prevent them, but they could be expected to find out for themselves the futility of any such activities.

It is characteristic of social and political debate during this period that these arguments spread rapidly to Sweden, where no corporative organization of importance had ever existed, but where, on the other hand, industrialism did not develop until very much later. In the long discussion preceding Parliamentary reform, which in 1866 brought the four estates to an end, the Liberal party argument was not that the estates never had and never would become corporate entities of any importance, but that such corporate entities had outlived their usefulness: in the modern state, it was maintained, the individual needed no middleman in his relations with the state, and therefore no other organization than that of the state itself was necessary. Under the Liberal party system of free competition and a minimum of state interference, every citizen would enjoy sufficient opportunities to defend his rights and improve his position.

In the light of later experience, it is obvious that this argument was no more realistic than that of conservatives, either for the western world as a whole or for Sweden in particular.

To begin with, economic development itself required concentration of capital, particularly after industrialism had passed through its first stages. This, of course, was one of the bases of Marx's criticism of the Liberal system, but Marx did not make it clear and indeed probably did not quite realize that concentration of wealth in the hands of a few capitalists did not necessarily follow. A combination of great numbers of "capitalists," investing their money in shares, bonds, or simply in banks which in their turn could invest or grant credits, served the purpose just as well or even better. The term "corporation," which is used almost exclusively west of the Atlantic to describe these large economic entities, is sufficient to place them in context. In Central Europe,

"corporation" meant guild or another organization of the same traditional type.

Furthermore, liberty and equality did not thrive as they had been expected to do. Swift and vast material improvement during the nineteenth century proved beneficial to all classes of society, but competition and economic freedom for entrepreneurs served only to emphasize fundamental social inequalities. The idea that employer and worker were equal in bargaining, and that the latter could choose his employer just as freely as the former could choose his employee, was purely academic. It was equally unrealistic to assume that the small consumer was the equal of the small town's only storekeeper, or that the peasant selling his livestock in town could bargain freely for the price, or that the man in the street had as much individual influence in political or social questions as a member of the traditionally ruling classes, or that the poor man had the same opportunity to give his children an education as his well-off neighbor, or that women were the social equals of men. Equality before the law was a valuable thing indeed, a great stride from the fundamental inequalities of earlier times, but it did not bring fundamental *social* inequalities to an end, and even before the law equality was not always very real, so long as lawsuits were expensive and therefore a thing to be studiously avoided by those who could not afford to pay. Altogether, equality for the individual was often just a sham, a fact which became the more distasteful as more education helped him to understand the actual situation.

These experiences formed the basis of growing class feeling. It would be meaningless to discuss here whether classes exist or ever existed in modern society; the psychological fact cannot be denied that they were *felt* to exist, and that the feeling was stronger the more oppressed the individuals in question *felt* themselves to be—but not necessarily the more unsatisfactory or threatened their position actually *was*. Thus, in receding groups like that of European farmers, class feeling developed early, regardless of the fact that in the western countries most of their members were



at that time reasonably well off, compared with either their ancestors or contemporary industrial workers.

In discussing these views of nineteenth-century conservatives and liberals, however, we must not forget that there is a third attitude toward organized groups within the state. It is not the view of orthodox Marxist socialists, who expect groups as well as states to disappear with the perfection of social revolution, but rather that of syndicalism and guild socialism. Indeed, these ideas can be traced back to the so-called Utopian socialists, especially Fourier in France and Owen in England. According to this school, social problems will be solved not by the creation of an omnipotent state, nor by individual enterprise and freedom of competition, but by the formation of comparatively small, more or less self-sufficient cooperative groups of productive citizens. Clearly this view is no more in accordance with actual developments than that of the other two schools. The existing groups are neither small nor self-sufficient, but great, specialized organizations, working within a highly developed society, and often favored by attempts at economic planning on a national or international scale.

Actually, it was largely class feeling, combined with the necessity of outweighing individual inequality by superior numbers, that fostered the trend toward organization in popular movements. There were also other reasons. Migration from the companionship of small rural communities to the loneliness of industrial or commercial centers also drove men and women to seek new group contacts and to combine for social purposes as well as those of social reform. But even these community organizations tended to combine on a national scale, and in democracy today the growth of large and powerful groups wielding moral and economic power comparable to that of the state itself has become a fundamental problem. Each of these organizations generally represents a minority only, though a large minority, of the total body of citizens; thus conflicts with democratically elected parliaments and governments can be envisioned. Each of them, on the other hand, may command the allegiance of its members even against such

parliaments and governments, and certainly against other groups and organizations. If no spirit of compromise prevails, these minority groups can be viewed as a force contributing to the break-up of society, or, as an alternative, to driving the legally elected authorities in the state to action of such violence as to result in the substitution of totalitarianism for democracy by depriving minorities of their rights as active citizens, including the possibility of becoming majorities.

## II

The most powerful of these organizations, of course, was and is the labor movement. In Sweden, labor organized simultaneously along two lines—the unions and the Social Democratic party. Between the two there was close cooperation from the beginning, in contrast to the case in England, and before the creation of a central organization for the unions, which took place in the nineties, the party to a great extent filled its place. Even the development of left-wing socialist or communist parties after World War I did not put an end to cooperation. With the exception of a local or two, the union movement is still safely dominated by Social Democrats; it supplies funds to the party's war chest and has always been represented by one or more cabinet ministers in all Social Democratic governments.

The union movement started in the eighties and gained early success. As early as the following decade, one employer after another was forced not only to admit the right of his workers to organize, but also to grant to the union terms that had formerly been refused to individual workers, and this at a time when most workers did not even have the right to vote and could certainly not count on any sympathy from Parliament, government, or the dominating political parties. The bargaining inequality seemed on its way to being remedied.

Indeed, employers took the view that labor unions had more than succeeded in restoring bargaining equality. The unions were nationwide, if still far from their goal of complete coverage, but

they bargained with each employer individually—just as was the case in the American automobile industry in a crucial part of the period between world wars. Thus, in many cases they were in a position to play on competition among employers, none of whom dared risk a prolonged strike or lockout for fear of losing the market. Also, those union members who were working could help pay strike subsidies to those individuals who were engaged in the fight.

After trying to break up the unions in their early stages and failing to do so, employers took the consequences, and created organizations of their own. This development, which began as early as the turn of the century and spread quickly, was of just as fundamental importance as the growth of unions. From the employers' point of view, the advantages were obvious. Employers as well as union members could subsidize colleagues exposed to labor conflicts and could obviate the threat of lost markets. But they could—and did—go a step further. It was on their initiative that conflicts and also bargaining became nationwide. If there was a strike in one plant, the employers' association would answer by calling a lockout for the whole industry, thereby making the financial burden on the union incomparably heavier and, presumably, speeding up negotiations. Actually, the one general strike in the history of Swedish labor to date, that of 1909, was caused by action of this kind. When union leaders found that the original conflict had grown as a consequence of employers' action to such an extent that it was beyond the financial capacity of the labor movement in any case, they adopted the desperate expedient of enlarging it to the limit of their power. The result was a complete failure. The general strike as well as the initial conflict had to be called off, and the Federation of Labor (Landsorganisationen) lost nearly 50 percent of its total membership.

The union movement was down, but it was not out, and employers did not push their victory to the extent of concerted action against freedom of organization. This moderation was

probably due, at least in part, to the exigencies of the political situation of the day. The year 1909 saw not only an abortive general strike, but also the introduction of manhood suffrage, which for the first time gave political power to the working classes. In Sweden as in England the growing Labor party cooperated closely with the Liberals, and when a Liberal government came into office in 1911, it relied heavily on that support. Thus, if employers had tried to push their victory to the utmost, they might well have found themselves in a most dangerous conflict with the political powers in a growing democracy.

While the creation of employers' associations was a definite impediment to the unions in their attempts to raise wages, it had its advantages even for them. It proved a guarantee for freedom of organization and an incentive to collective bargaining. Not only could employers hardly deny to labor the right of organization which they claimed for themselves—and which was implicitly recognized by the state in the creation of the conciliation service in 1906—but they found themselves actually needing the unions for a collective bargaining system which was the only possible road to any kind of labor peace. It should be remembered that the first decades of the nineteenth century constituted the period during which Swedish export industry grew apace and became the fundamental factor in the national economy. These results, of course, were won in competition with the industries of other nations, and a protracted labor conflict might have meant the loss of markets not only to an individual employer, but to Swedish industry as a whole. The labor market organizations grew on both sides, but to an increasing extent they became instruments of bargaining, not of strife. Mutual respect grew with mutual acquaintance, and parties became used to sizing up each other and the possibilities of a situation, preferring an agreement on the conditions which might be expected to result from a conflict to the conflict itself. These results were not gained at once, nor did they mean that complete labor peace was established or even desired, but, by the 1930's, at least the unnecessary conflicts

were  
side  
T  
cally  
rega  
Esto  
emp  
for  
the  
unu  
or a  
unk  
to k  
cult  
the s  
thre  
acter  
not  
work  
Or  
vario  
also

<sup>2</sup> For  
lective  
(1936)  
*Labor*  
bility  
a cont  
they t  
indiv  
striker  
on fai  
termin  
action  
prohib  
central  
unions  
dues a  
by wor

were being studiously avoided by central organizations on both sides.<sup>2</sup>

Today manual workers in industry and commerce are practically without exception organized. An unorganized worker is regarded as no more than a curiosity, and when refugees from Estonia and Latvia came to Sweden during World War II, the employers took it on themselves to explain to them the necessity for entering labor unions, as being in the best interests of both the workers and the employers. Union shop agreements are unusual, but they are not even necessary. Closed shop agreements or attempts to reach such are, on the other hand, practically unknown in most fields, and union leaders have been most anxious to keep their unions open to all bona fide applicants. In agriculture, organization of laborers is less complete, the reason being the small size of farms, where in most cases no more than two or three hands are employed, and their consequent patriarchal character—patriarchal also in the sense that laborers are as often as not the sons of farmers, if not of the farmer for whom they are working.

On the side of employers, organization is less complete. For various reasons, not only the state and cooperative enterprises but also certain other important employers stand aside, while small

<sup>2</sup>For an excellent study of the two fundamental labor relations acts, the Collective Contracts Act (1928) and the Freedom of Association and Bargaining Act (1936), and the practice based on them, see J. J. Robbins, *The Government of Labor Relations in Sweden* (Chapel Hill 1942). A fundamental fact is the responsibility of the unions for any damage caused by wildcat strikes during the term of a contract. Not only are unions and locals responsible for illegal strikes which they themselves have called, but in order to avoid liability for illegal action by individual members, they may even have to prove that they have tried to persuade strikers to go back to work and, as a last resort, threatened them with expulsion on failure to do so. This, of course, applies only to illegal strikes; after the termination of a collective contract individual workers are just as free to take action as the union itself. Also, it should be mentioned that while no legislation prohibits closed shop agreements, the unions themselves—and particularly their central organization, the Federation of Labor—carefully uphold the principle that unions should be open to all workers employed in their respective fields. Union dues are comparatively high, but they are paid only after admission and only by workers who are actually employed.

employers sometimes find it too expensive to pay their fees or too risky to follow the practice of their financially stronger colleagues. On the whole, however, organization is the rule on this side too, and in any case the Swedish labor market as a whole is governed by collective contracts, mostly nationwide and entered upon under the auspices of the central organizations, the Federation of Labor and the Employers' Association (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen).

This, however, is true only, or at least chiefly, of manual labor. Collective bargaining for white-collar employees was much more difficult to establish and for a long time was not considered desirable by either employers or employees. The foremen or white-collar workers were regarded as being in positions of trust, not to be reconciled with strikes, lockouts, or collective bargaining, and their qualifications varied too much for the establishment of general rules for wages or conditions of employment. Until the 1930's they remained largely unorganized.

But their position was by no means secure. With rising payrolls for manual labor, employers were not as a rule particularly anxious to raise the wages also of their nonorganized white-collar employees. On the other hand, if those employees had chosen to join the labor unions, they would always have found themselves in a minority and could hardly have expected much sympathy with their demands for higher wage scales than those of the majority.

The answer to the question, again, was found in organization. In 1936, legislation was passed to guard the right of organization and bargaining—long recognized by usage and contract where manual labor was concerned—and the act was so drafted as to offer special advantages to organizations with peaceable intentions, such as those of white-collar employees. This was by no means unintentional. While the law made no distinction between different types of employees and indeed safeguarded the right of organization and bargaining for employers as well, it was openly admitted that its main object was to further the interests of the intermediate groups. It may be questioned what importance the law



actually had for the furtherance of their organizations, but in any case employer opposition was once and for all got rid of, and the following ten years saw a great increase in the membership of white-collar unions and the fusion of two competing central organizations, so that employees of public agencies and private concerns now march together.

They do not, however, march together with organized labor. Though the chief executive officer of the Federation of White-Collar Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) was formerly an officer of the Federation of Labor, it is felt that their interests are still best furthered by separate organization and separate action. Indeed, their methods differ from those of the labor unions. Not only are strikes practically unknown (though they have not seldom been threatened), but collective contracts are far less detailed and frequently do not even include any provisions on the crucial question of wages, limiting themselves to governing conditions of employment.

But there is still another group, which regards itself as standing again a step higher: professional people, like doctors and lawyers, who under the Swedish system are largely in state or municipal employment; teachers in public high schools; civil servants, and the like. Their problem includes a further aspect—the need for higher professional training—for which they maintain they should be compensated by higher salaries. While public authorities neither deny the need for university training nor the principle that salaries should be higher than those of employees with a different background, opinions nevertheless differ widely with regard to actual figures and, in the case of doctors, as to whether public employment should exclude other sources of income. These groups, too, have their organizations, and very militant ones. In fact, something very much resembling strikes has been not only threatened but even put into effect on one or two occasions by these organizations. So far, however, no definite answer can be given to the question whether it is even possible for very small if important minorities such as these effectively to defend their

interests through the means of vocational organizations. They have undoubtedly been successful in some instances, particularly in keeping up the requirements for training and preventing foreigners from getting licenses to practice on the basis of their original training, but so far no conclusive test of strength has taken place.

For this group, of course, the question of equality takes on a quite different aspect from what it had in the case of labor unions. In some respects, it can be argued, and sometimes is argued, that the organizations of professional men aim at conserving, not abolishing, social inequalities. On the other hand, in so far as they act for public employees, they definitely have to deal with inequalities in bargaining which are emphasized by the fact that there can be little or no competition on the employer's side, and that the growth of political democracy has made public authorities increasingly inclined to disregard claims based on the necessity for professional education.

On the whole, labor relations have become comparatively peaceful. In the 1920's, the number of strikes was great, and many days were lost. During the following decade, a different trend developed, and during World War II and the postwar period, few open conflicts have arisen, and only one of them of really great importance. This is due to a spirit of compromise and of realism rather than to superior force on either side. Employers and labor leaders are able to calculate in advance what results they might attain by a strike or a lockout, and they prefer to reach the same result by negotiation. The rank and file are sometimes more optimistic, but they usually prove willing to follow their leaders, if somewhat ungraciously. On both sides, unions have come to be regarded as instruments for attaining immediate material benefits. They have become less and less declamatory in their public activities; on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that they have also come to indulge more and more in something not unlike secret diplomacy.



## III

Consumers' cooperatives in Sweden have been largely publicized, particularly through the works of Marquis Childs. And undoubtedly their success has been signal. The movement started at about the same time as the trade unions and originally had the same social basis—industrial workers. Just as these workers felt the inequality in bargaining on the labor markets, so they felt their incapacity to hold their own as consumers. Very often, they had to deal more or less directly with the same capitalist in both fields: many plants maintained their own shops, where the workers could buy on credit, though not at particularly favorable prices, or the employer even paid part of the workers' wages in kind. The cooperatives put an end to credit buying, but lowered prices. About the turn of the century, they formed a central organization for wholesale buying and selling to individual cooperatives, and this organization (*Kooperativa Förbundet*) later started production on its own in fields where private monopolies made it impossible for them to get supplies at reasonable prices. In several cases, they had to fight those monopolies under conditions where only the loyalty of their members made success possible. As late as the end of World War I, however, the financial position of many cooperatives was precarious, and it was only in the period between the two wars that it was finally consolidated.

The success of the cooperative movement was caused chiefly by the fact that it was the first to make consistent use of the advantages of large-scale organization in retail trade. While the local cooperatives have always been independent in principle and are not obliged to send their orders to the central organization, the movement as a whole has in practice operated on the lines of a large chain store. This was a completely new development in Sweden, and the advantages were such as to permit considerable lowering of prices simultaneously with financial consolidation and the accumulation of capital. Although the cooperatives are, of course, run on a nonprofit basis, they have not been particularly anxious to increase the dividends paid to members (on the

basis of their purchases), but instead have been inclined to use current profit for further development and further lowering of prices. On the whole, members have complained very little of this policy.

During the half century of its existence the movement has undergone considerable change in social structure. As late as 1910, manual workers in industry and commerce formed the great majority of members. This is no longer the case. Farmers and agricultural laborers came in when they realized that the farm could no longer be a self-sufficient entity, and middle-class groups joined in the period between the two wars, when petty saving became a necessity for them as much as for labor. These changes have influenced the movement in certain important respects. In the first place, together with the rising standard of living of the workers, the inclusion of new groups has made for greater diversity in the goods supplied by the cooperatives, where nowadays not only the necessities of life but also a considerable amount of luxuries can be bought; it has caused them to sell, in rural districts in their general stores and in the cities in more specialized stores, such things as clothes, furniture, glassware, toys, and the like. In Stockholm, the cooperatives have even taken over a large department store. The ideology of the movement has also undergone a subtle change. No more do the cooperatives regard themselves as representatives of a suppressed proletariat, but rather as the standard-bearers of a particular form of economic liberalism, beneficial in itself. And, finally, the fact that consumers' cooperatives (including building) cut across class lines is important from the point of view that they have come to be respected by different political groups as an independent factor in economic policy and also that they provide opportunities for contact and cooperation among individuals with different social allegiances.

The cooperative movement is today one of the economic forces of the country. It definitely ranks with the biggest industrial corporations, such as those producing ball bearings (SKF), electrical machinery (ASEA and L. M. Ericsson), or Swedish steel.

On the other hand, it does not outrank them, let alone own production plants of comparable size or importance. As a social force, it is more important than most other organizations, the main exceptions being the labor unions and employers' associations. It covers about 10 percent of the total retail trade of the country, and much more for certain commodities—in no case, however, as much as 50 percent. In many small communities, the cooperative enjoys a virtual monopoly, there being no other stores. This is naturally not contrary to the wishes of the cooperative movement, but it is not an important objective. In the cities, and also in larger rural districts, they face competition from private stores—in recent years quite often from chain stores.

It is important neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the strength of the cooperatives in Sweden. They have gone a long way toward complete success in their immediate aim, that of safeguarding the small consumer from neglect of his interests by producers and salesmen. In doing so, they have proved the possibility of successful management in a firm based not on capital supply from a few powerful hands, but from hundreds of thousands of members, each with very limited resources. On the other hand, complete reform of Swedish economic life according to the ideas of the cooperative movement—or even of Swedish cooperative leaders—is as remote as ever. The idyllic views of social and international problems characterizing the first and in many respects the only generation of cooperative theoreticians are generally forgotten or at best elicit a shrug of shoulders. Leaders of consumers' cooperatives have succeeded as businessmen, but failed as prophets.

The building cooperatives are in a slightly different situation. They are independent of the rest of the consumers' cooperatives, but they have achieved equally marked success in practical matters. Here, however, state and municipal authorities have made important contributions, and it is difficult to say to what extent participation of these cooperatives in the realization of modern housing programs has been a prerequisite for their own success.

It is sometimes alleged that politics have entered into the matter, too, since Social Democratic majorities in the national government and particularly in the municipal councils and boards have favored the cooperatives over private builders.

Inasmuch as it was business skill rather than ideology that brought about the success of consumers' cooperatives, it is also dangerous to assume that producers' cooperatives in agriculture represent but another side of the same cooperative tendency. There, ideology was extremely important; but it was by no means the same ideology as in the consumers' movement. There are many indications that the success of labor unions rather than that of consumers' cooperatives was the strongest incentive to the reorganization and strengthening of farmers' associations in the twenties and thirties, and for many years the two types of cooperatives met not as friends but as bitter enemies, fighting over the prices of necessary foodstuffs, a matter of supreme importance to both, but also one where their interest ran in diametrically opposite directions.

The similarity between consumers' and producers' cooperatives can be found chiefly in their methods. The farmers' cooperatives, as the consumers', strove to eliminate "middlemen," to rationalize distribution, and to create greater equality among their members. The last-named consideration was in many cases less important to the farmers' movement, though ultimately the small farmer was probably the greater beneficiary, and the inequalities remedied had to do with such matters as the different distances to cities, which made it possible for one farmer but not for another to sell his produce directly to the urban consumer. It should be remembered, however, that there was another inequality more like those attacked by the consumers' movement, namely, the farmers' difficulties in bargaining with economically powerful wholesale dealers in the cities. On the other hand, another dissimilarity must also be emphasized, the more so since it seems rather paradoxical. Consumers' cooperatives, whose members at one time predominantly, and always to a great extent,

must have voted with the socialist parties, were always opposed to state interference, while farmers' associations, the majority of whose members always were politically nonsocialists, have not only willingly accepted and even strongly advocated state action to exclude competition, but have always been very much dependent on such action. It is a moot point whether even now they could maintain their position in the face of state inaction, but in any case it is unquestionably true that they would never have reached this position if the state had not stepped in to subsidize and control agriculture in the thirties.

Producers' cooperation in agriculture, of course, dates back much earlier than that; some organizations boast more than fifty years of experience. For a long time, however, it remained comparatively weak, and it is particularly interesting to note that the small farmers did not join to any considerable extent. This was popularly explained by the traditional individualism of Swedish farmers but was the more remarkable in view of the fact that, politically, farmers' parties had existed ever since the Parliamentary reform of 1866; in fact, the farmers' party in the new Parliament of 1867 was little more than a perpetuation of the fourth estate. Even the economic crisis that threatened Swedish agriculture after the end of World War I had small consequences in the field of economic organization. When, however, Parliament and the government came to grips with the new agricultural crisis, which developed just before the general economic landslide around 1930, relief measures were so drafted as not only to encourage but even to require the growth of nationwide cooperative organizations, and it was at this stage that response finally developed. The ten years before World War II saw an almost complete abandonment of the "traditional individualism," and cooperative organizations grew and consolidated a membership including practically all farmers in the country. Today, an unorganized farmer is almost if not quite so rare as an unorganized industrial worker and much more unusual than an unorganized employer. This brings to light another fundamental difference

between consumers' and producers' cooperative organizations: the latter openly demand a monopoly both in the sense that they regard it as the duty of every member to give his custom exclusively to the cooperative organization, and in regarding it as the duty of every right-minded landowner to join. Particularly in the latter respect they have followed the lead of labor unions.

One more point should be emphasized here. The farmers' cooperatives are by definition a class movement. There would of course be no sense in inviting members of any other group to join. But it represents a dwindling not a growing class. The agricultural population of Sweden is declining, not only in relation to the industrial, but absolutely. This fact is keenly felt by farmers, who for generations were accustomed to regarding themselves not only as an important section of the people, but as almost identical with the people itself. This attitude has sometimes been a reason for a conservative stand on social and political questions, but it is particularly instrumental in building up a defensive and sometimes resentful attitude toward city population in general. Thus the farmers' movement differs fundamentally from both labor organizations and consumers' cooperatives, which are full of hope for the future.

It should not be supposed that the development of consumers' and producers' cooperatives has been without effect on the "middlemen" in domestic trade. In particular, the methods whereby consumers' cooperatives won success have been largely copied by private entrepreneurs in the retail trade. Again, cooperation was found to be the best means of restoring what these groups felt was the desirable equilibrium. Through collective wholesale buying of commodities and other means of rationalizing distribution, individual retailers gained for themselves the same advantages enjoyed by the cooperative societies through their central organization. There is undoubtedly much truth in the contention, often advanced by the spokesmen of the cooperatives, that their work has favored not only their own members but also the customers of private retailers. Competition with the



cooperatives has compelled private business to reduce prices and adopt more modern and effective methods of operation.

But retailers' organizations also have other objectives. They have been compelled to accept competition from the cooperatives, but the same methods formerly used with scant success to kill this competitor are still being used to reduce competition among themselves. By pressure on wholesalers and producers, they have on the whole successfully worked to limit the number of retail firms, in order to avoid what they regard as unnecessary and dangerous overburdening of the market. At one stage they even demanded state control to achieve this result, which would have meant the reintroduction of the guild system. Parliament and government did not accede to those demands, but the organizations themselves have not given up the struggle, and while experience shows that it is by no means impossible to overcome their resistance to the founding of new business entities, it is admittedly often difficult to do so and more convenient to try to reach an agreement. This should not be construed to mean that organizations or their members would try to extort bribes from those who want to start in business, but it does mean that they want to have their say with regard to the necessity for, and the location and general character of, the proposed venture. The fact that Swedish retail business is far more specialized than that of American cities, for instance, is both partly a consequence of these tendencies and a factor favoring their further development.

This brings us to a question which can only be touched upon lightly here—the part played by trusts or cartels in Swedish economic life. The former type of private monopoly is comparatively rare, except in the form of economic integration: machine industries own steel works, steel works own mines, or a shoe factory sells its shoes through the medium of its own chain stores. Cartels, on the other hand, while not easily recognized, seem to play a more important part, although it should be noted that their activities are concerned almost exclusively with prices and only rarely with markets. Also, the development toward cartels is of

comparatively recent date and has lately been favored by the scarcity of raw materials as well as by other abnormal wartime and postwar conditions.

To sum up—in the labor market as well as in retail trade, in wholesale trade, in agriculture, and in industry, the drive toward strong and sometimes almost complete organization has been the result of definite economic contingencies. In some cases, the main objective has been to gain economic advantage or remove economic inequalities through large-scale collective bargaining. In other cases, it has simply been rationalization. While the question of ideological influences will be dealt with later in this article, it can at this point be stated that the collective organization of Swedish economic life, with few exceptions, has not been the outcome of a conscious or consistent policy either by groups or classes or even less by the state. It has come as the seemingly best practical solution to practical problems.

#### IV

With regard to another group of organizations—those which are not engaged in economic pursuits but rather in the attempt to realize more or less completely idealistic aims—the situation is different. Popular movements of this kind are also characteristic of the Swedish social fabric, and have been so for a long time.

Leaving aside the political parties, the most important of these movements would seem to be the dissenting religious associations, or "Free Churches," and the temperance movement, the women's organizations, educational and sports organizations. Of these, the first three have exercised more or less considerable influence in political life, whereas the latter two are largely self-explanatory; their interest, in so far as this article is concerned, lies in certain traits of social structure.

To understand the growth and importance of the Free Churches, it is necessary first to realize that in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth the Established

Church of Sweden (Lutheran) was largely influenced by the rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment. Philosophical discourses rather than sermons were preached in church, and sometimes parish clergy saw it as a more important duty to study the possibilities of improving agricultural techniques than to minister to the spiritual needs of their flock. While these developments were applauded by the intellectuals, there was a strong reaction on the part of the common people. Influence from British and later from American religious movements reached Sweden at about the same time, and the result was that groups of parishioners in many parts of the country began to meet together in conventicles for prayer and study. Out of these meetings, which were not only frowned upon by the church but actually declared illegal by the state, sectarian movements evolved, some of which attached themselves to sectarian movements in other countries and on occasion received preachers and religious tracts from abroad.

For our purposes there is no need to study in detail the history of these congregations, which is rather complicated. It should be sufficient to state that they grew all through the nineteenth century, and in some parts of the country came to dominate religious life. The ban on conventicles was lifted around the middle of the century, and it was also made permissible to leave the Church of Sweden for another recognized religious community. Thus freedom of religious thought was safeguarded, though it is still not possible to leave the church without belonging to any religious community at all. New legislation in this field, however, is under consideration. It is an interesting fact that most of the Free Churches have chosen *not* to take their members out of the Established Church, but remain technically within it. This is true, for instance, of Baptists, who form the most important unit quantitatively of all these religious movements.

No particular explanation seems to be necessary for the growth of these religious communities. They represent a worldwide tendency to deepen religious ties, a tendency which has largely influenced the Established Church as well. For a long time, it could

be said that they drew their support from broader strata of society than the church, and while differences of this kind have become less important, they have not disappeared altogether. There are also certain local limitations; in certain parts of the country the Established Church was able to retain its grip despite competition from the Free Church movements. Their political importance lies in the fact that for a long time they formed the backbone of the Liberal party which grew up at about the turn of the century, just as in England dissent was said to be the backbone of nineteenth-century Whiggism.

The temperance movement shows a growth which up to a point paralleled that of the Free Churches; indeed, their membership largely coincided. Disregarding the abortive temperance movement sponsored by the upper classes around 1840, it seems possible to distinguish three stages of development. During the first, temperance societies saw it as their main goal to save the unfortunate individuals who had fallen victim to excessive use of alcohol. This could be done by showing them that it was possible to get along altogether without it; in fact, that an abstemious life was much to be preferred. The social life of temperance societies was of paramount importance in this connection; with a certain oversimplification, it can be said that the idea was to offer a choice between coffee and dancing at the temperance society or just drinking in the pub. The emphasis was put on the individual who should be saved—just as in the Free Churches.

During the second stage, the temperance movement began to see its problems from the point of view of general social development, sometimes losing sight of the individual. Excessive use of alcohol or, rather, any use of alcohol, was seen as *the* fundamental social problem, the main cause of poverty, crime, and unhappiness in general. A society purged of alcohol would be, almost by definition, a happy society. And the means was as simple as the aim—prohibition. For one decade after another, the temperance movement worked to bring about first the local veto and then general prohibition, and in their campaign to that end, they allied

themselves, just as did the Free Churches, with the Liberal party. In 1922, the question was brought to a consultative referendum—the first, and to date the only, referendum in Swedish history—but to the surprise of most people, the majority answered in the negative. The result was a break-up of the Liberal party, and also final shelving of the prohibition idea. With the effects of prohibition in Norway, Finland, and the United States before their eyes, the opposition of the Swedish public became more and more definite; and the temperance movement entered on its third stage, after serious losses of membership.

In this third stage, the prohibition idea has been dropped, at least for the moment. Instead, the policy is to raise liquor prices by heavy taxation and to abolish the system of rationing, which, it is alleged, invites people to buy up their allotment. It has been jestingly said by critics of the movement that it regards rich people as so bad that they can drink themselves to death without any harm done, but that the poor man should be warned off by excessive prices. In addition to this, popular propaganda is designed to make people realize the dangers of alcohol. The intellectual leaders of the movement, however, go beyond these astonishingly simple ideas. They have realized that alcoholism is not so much the cause as the result of other social inequities, to be solved only through social reform in general. Thus the movement is losing something of its individuality and becoming just another part of the sweeping movement for social reform characteristic of modern Sweden in general.

The two powerful popular movements just mentioned differ fundamentally from those discussed in the earlier sections of this article. They are not particularly characteristic of Sweden, but represent general tendencies. They do not set out to remedy economic inequalities through organization. And though democratic and somewhat sectarian in character, they provide no particular machinery for the use of democratic government, but have, on the other hand, functioned during certain periods as powerful pressure groups.

The Free Churches and the temperance movement form rather clearly defined groups. To no small extent they have the same members, and their political affiliations have been more or less identical, especially in the early twentieth century. On the other hand, the social character of their membership is not easily designated, and very definitely cuts across the groups formerly mentioned. Workers and employers, farmers and townspeople, retailers and cooperative employees can be found in the same church or the same temperance lodge. Actually, employers belonging to a Free Church congregation or a temperance society often prove anxious to find employment in their businesses for their fellow members. The geographical limitations on the spread of these organizations might even be said to some extent to emphasize this lack of congruity between their membership and fundamental social stratification.

The educational and athletic movements are neither media of economic activity nor sectarian in character, nor do they act as pressure groups. On the contrary, their interesting characteristic is that they are on principle all-embracing. The educational movement has suffered some setbacks through the general rise in the standard of education and through competition from the press and the radio. Its most successful branch today is its work in close collaboration with the trade unions and to some extent with the political parties and the temperance movement; its best method seems to be the study group. A characteristic feature of the structure of the athletic movement is that it has no particular social affiliations; university students take part, but members of the industrial and farming classes form the majority just as in the people as a whole. Organizations are important here, but chiefly for propaganda purposes, and the avowed aim is to make every Swede an active sportsman in some field, whether he is good enough to perform publicly or not. This, of course, does not dispose of the problem of professionalism; on the contrary, this problem becomes the more difficult of solution when athletic stars are drawn from all classes of society.

var  
Sw  
he  
fun  
mo  
per  
per  
con  
is n  
her

The  
grad  
It c  
all p  
prob  
colla  
but  
Farn  
the  
Cons  
posit  
mem  
that

3 Or  
memb  
Emple  
1948,  
9:507  
(Svens)  
the Sw  
numbe  
been c  
1947, I  
the Es  
nically



Finally, there are the innumerable associations existing for various other interests. From his early youth, practically every Swede, male or female, is drawn into more organizations than he can remember belonging to, and will, if not abnormal in some fundamental respect, ultimately reach a position of trust in one or more of them. By the age of twenty-one no less than about 10 percent of the young men have reached such a position; about 50 percent belong to one or more organizations. Practically every conceivable interest has an organization of its own. Again, this is no uniquely Swedish trait, but it seems to be more emphasized here than in most countries.

## v

The system of Swedish organizations outlined above has grown gradually until it has become not only widespread but permanent. It comprises most of the population. Industrial workers are for all practical purposes completely organized, and the same will probably be true in a few years' time of public and private white-collar employees. The organization of employers is less complete, but it is quite sufficient to dominate their side of the labor market. Farmers' cooperatives have reached a membership where even the owners of very small units are almost invariably included. Consumers' cooperatives have not attained the same dominant position, nor have they as yet seemed to aim at it, but with a membership of nearly one million households it can be estimated that they serve not much less than half the population.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> On December 31, 1947, the Federation of Labor (Landsorganisationen) had a membership of 1,194,000; in October 1948, the Federation of White-Collar Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) had 251,000 members; in April 1948, the Swedish Employers' Association (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen) had 9,507 members, employing 553,177 workers. The Swedish Dairy Association (Svenska Mejeriernas Riksförening) had 260,701 members on December 31, 1947, and the Swedish Meat Producers' Association (Sveriges Slakteriförbund) 277,305. The number of farmers belonging to one or another of the farmers' cooperatives has been estimated at over 300,000, while consumers' cooperatives on December 31, 1947, had a membership of 876,625. In 1930, religious communities other than the Established Church had 236,753 members, of whom 219,052 remained technically members also of the Established Church.

The membership of most organizations remains the same year after year; of course, new members are added and old members die, but change comes slowly, and it is comparatively unusual for a member to resign, except (in the case of labor unions, farmers' cooperatives, and the like) because of a change of status. This is a sign of strength in the organizations; and it is obvious that such strength depends on solidarity. Clearly, then, feelings of group solidarity are strongly developed in Swedish society—a situation that bears some analysis.

In the case of the Free Churches and the temperance movement as well as the political parties (which in Sweden show the same permanence as most other organizations), it is a question of solidarity on ideas—religious, social, political. In the case of labor organizations, cooperatives and the like, on the other hand, solidarity seems to be based mainly on economic interest. There is reason, however, to doubt whether such distinctions are actually quite realistic.

To begin with, individual self-interest clearly does not explain the members' allegiance to a labor union, a farmers' cooperative or any other organization of this kind. On the contrary, membership often entails considerable sacrifice. This was particularly true during the earlier period of development. To belong to a union and take part in a strike in those days meant not only a substantially diminished income during the conflict, but often even the risk of future unemployment. Even now, unions are never able to pay their striking members anything like a normal wage, and it should be noted that labor conflicts have by no means arisen solely over the question of wages, but over other, less material conditions of employment as well. Also, a farmer who sells his milk to the cooperative, instead of retailing it directly to consumers in the city, thereby accepts a much lower price than he could otherwise get. Even an employer who remains loyal to his association during a conflict might in so doing forgo considerable economic advantage to himself; and on some occasions members of consumers' cooperatives have preferred to buy at higher prices

in co  
comp  
noti  
mom  
view  
cases  
then,  
desce  
tion  
sacrif

Bu  
Ofter  
rather  
union  
works  
his en  
labor.  
caps i  
Than  
consci  
tions

Act  
with r  
serious  
one qu  
their c  
their a  
tives a  
farmer  
howev

On  
relate s  
ing to

<sup>4</sup> Stefan  
one of th

in cooperative stores rather than take advantage of price-cutting competition from their adversaries. This, it can be argued, means nothing more than foresight and a capacity to reject pressing momentary benefits that might be dangerous from the point of view of the future. Actually, however, future advantage in many cases is very far off—sometimes generations off. The individual, then, makes his sacrifices in order that not he himself but his descendants (if he has any and they remain in the same occupation as his) should benefit. In other words, he makes personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group to which he belongs.

But not only the material interests of the group are in question. Often the most important object is a recognition of equality rather than immediate advantage. The theoreticians of the labor union movement have been anxious to develop this idea: whoever works for a wage in the service of somebody else is the equal of his employer only if he is able really to influence conditions of labor. "It is no longer characteristic of workers to carry their caps in their hands in front of their superiors in the plant . . . Thanks to the union, the worker at his place of work has become conscious of his own value . . ."<sup>4</sup> Solidarity in economic organizations definitely has its basis in concepts of public morals.

Actually, of course, this fact is more or less obvious to everybody with regard to his own organization, though he is apt to question seriously the public spirit of others. Labor leaders, such as the one quoted above, are inclined to doubt that employers also have their conceptions of society, which they attempt to realize through their associations; and the leading men in consumers' cooperatives are not prone to recognize the idealism inherent in the farmers' movement—and vice versa. This very natural tendency, however, cannot affect our general argument.

On the other hand, solidarity based on public morals cannot relate simply to an organization which you can join or leave according to your fancy. If solidarity is to be regarded as a public duty,

<sup>4</sup> Stefan Oljelund, *Arbetarna och företaget* (Stockholm 1936) p. 20. Oljelund is one of the more interesting theoreticians of the Swedish labor union movement.

your membership in the organization generally becomes a duty also. This is true to a certain extent of associations such as the Free Churches or the temperance movement: you should be a Baptist or a Methodist, because salvation lies nowhere else; or it is your duty to be an organized teetotaler so as to furnish a good example to the poor wretches who are in danger of becoming alcoholics. But it is even more forcefully emphasized in the case of labor unions or farmers' organizations. There, it becomes a question of allegiance, not only to an organization or even to an idea, but to your class—to the group to which you must belong whether you want to or not. With the increasingly static character of Swedish economic life, the concept of class solidarity has in some respects gained rather than lost in power over public opinion. In the eyes of many people, even if you manage to improve your position so as to alter your status, it is your duty to preserve your allegiance to the class into which you were born. In any case, such changes of status apply only to a minority, and for the rest, the rules are simple. You owe allegiance to your class; it is therefore your sacred duty to belong to the organizations representing it, and to remain loyal to those organizations regardless of personal interests and opinions. Needless to say, the fundamental corrective lies in the fact that the organizations are democratically governed, thus giving you an opportunity to work for those interests and opinions within their framework.)

If you fail to recognize your allegiance, you are a traitor to your class. The unlimited hatred and contempt which organized labor holds in reserve for strikebreakers—or rather, *held*, for strikebreaking is out of date in Sweden—found a more recent counterpart in the farmers' associations, where especially those who did not sell their milk to the cooperative dairy were often regarded and treated as outlaws. The argument is simple: your organization works for the good of your class as a whole; therefore, if you remain outside you will still benefit from it, while refusing to accept the responsibilities and sacrifices involved; and this obviously is not a morally acceptable standpoint. It is inter-

est  
thi  
fro  
not

A  
wor  
soci  
of l  
in  
fun  
reg  
the  
farm  
such  
econ  
erat  
for  
thei  
mor  
its v  
nom  
cons  
mov  
nom  
resul

But  
can l  
as a  
sister  
ish e  
towa  
dema  
so in  
with

<sup>5</sup> An

esting to note that the consumers' cooperatives, who could advance this argument as well as any other group, have so far refrained from doing so, presumably because this is a movement which does not feel bound up with any particular group within society.

And, finally, organizations and their members look at their work from the point of view of a contribution by their group to society as a whole. When the union makes the worker conscious of his own value, this establishes the value also of manual labor in itself; and surely, the union maintains, such a concept is fundamentally beneficial to society. 'The farmers' cooperatives regard it as their duty to establish respect for the farmer and at the same time to preserve the existence of a class of independent farmers, otherwise threatened by ruin; and they maintain that such a class is a stabilizing factor in society, quite apart from the economic importance of its contribution.' The consumers' cooperatives are proud of their record in effecting lower prices not only for their own members, but for the general public, and one of their leaders has described their work as carried on by "a powerful moral movement, recognizable in all civilized nations," and "on its way to creating completely new concepts of the aims of economic life."<sup>5</sup> In view of such statements, which at least are not consciously hypocritical, it is definitely impossible to regard these movements as the result exclusively or even principally of economic self-interest on the part of their members, or even as the result exclusively of the economic self-interest of groups.

But from this point of view it is also obvious that organizations can hardly avoid the assumption of responsibilities toward society as a whole. In principle, group solidarity is by no means inconsistent with, for example, national solidarity, and in fact, the Swedish experience demonstrates the possibility of indirect solidarity toward a higher unit: cooperatives or labor market organizations demand solidarity of their members, but they have sometimes done so in order to maintain compliance with national legislation or with national economic policy during a crisis, or simply in order

<sup>5</sup> Anders Örne, *Kooperativa idéer och spörsmål* (Stockholm 1924) p. 7.

to maintain civil peace and production.<sup>6</sup> The importance of this policy is particularly evident when group memberships cut across each other. A man may be a member of a labor union, a consumers' cooperative, a building cooperative, and a temperance society; he owes loyalty to all of them, but since their membership is far from identical, majorities in each group may pursue totally different policies.

What, then, becomes of individual liberty, if you are born into a class and are thereby bound to join, honor, and obey its organizations? Obviously, this is a very fundamental problem, for while union members, at least, are with few exceptions socialists of one type or another, the idea of liberty has always been very basic in the Swedish labor movement in all its forms. On the other hand, "liberty" is a word often used to cover rather different conceptions. The Federation of Labor about fifteen years ago gave a truly Marxist interpretation: "In modern society, the right of free self-determination is but a fiction, particularly where the working classes are concerned. The economic fate of every individual worker is necessarily bound up with that of the working class as a whole in its organized struggle for better conditions of existence. Without this community of interest, the individual could do nothing but submit unconditionally to the dictates of employers."<sup>6</sup> Another interpretation, written about the same time by one of the more liberal (though still Social Democratic) leaders in the movement, is slightly reminiscent of Rousseau: "As a union man, the worker is no more free in the sense that he does not decide on what conditions and at what times he should seek and accept employment . . . 'The free working man' has submitted to the 'constraint' of belonging to the union in order to attain the greater freedom of gaining some influence on his own conditions of employment. Therefore, he will wear his chains uncomplainingly, if he is a wise man. The price which workers had to pay when they created their unions in order to attain influence over condi-

<sup>6</sup> *Statens offentliga utredningar*, 1934:10 (Stockholm 1934) p. 180; compare *Statens offentliga utredningar*, 1934:30, p. 160.



tions of employment was that they lost their right of personal decision, a loss, however, which should be easy to bear, as personal decision in this case meant a choice between work on the conditions offered, and starvation."<sup>7</sup>

The resemblance between the latter of the two arguments and Rousseau's argument in favor of the general will actually forms an introduction to the second part of the problem: what is the difference, if any, between the allegiance due to these organizations and that demanded by the democratic state from its members? This, as will be shown later, is no entirely academic question, since it is related to some rather important practical developments, but it is also a theoretical question of great interest, in so far as this is the point at which the idea of sovereignty enters the picture. To what extent can the democratic, nontotalitarian state claim sovereignty over these organizations?

Jean Bodin's definition of sovereignty—"summa in cives ac subditos legibus soluta potestas" (supreme and legally unlimited power over citizens and subjects)—was rather unreservedly accepted for a long time. There seemed to be general agreement that the power of the state is or should be supreme (there is no appeal from it) and unrivaled (no other organization exercises power of equal strength). In so far as this concept has been criticized, it has been so from the point of view of the Catholic church, by advocates of an international organization in favor of which the states might relinquish more or less of their sovereignty, and by the group of social scientists called pluralists, of whom the best known was Harold Laski (in his early works). As a matter of fact, liberals (in the European sense of the word) have tended to regard the direct relationship between the state and individuals more as a guarantee of individual freedom than otherwise. But this argument seems to be fallacious. Recent experiences have shown that the freedom and safety of individuals is generally bound up with the existence of powerful organizations, as far as possible independent of the state. Hitler and Mussolini recog-

<sup>7</sup> Stefan Oljelund, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff.

nized the necessity of breaking up all organizations other than their own in order to establish complete dictatorship. They spoke of corporative organization of the state, but they allowed the "corporations" of their states not one iota of independent existence. To force individuals into an immediate relationship with the state has proved a safe method of crushing their liberty of action, speech, and thought.

This, of course, shows no more than a capacity on the part of autonomous organizations to soften the impact of state control over the individual. It might still be argued that the state differs from all other organizations by virtue of its compulsory character, in that membership is obligatory and that it is able to use force.

In these two respects, however, some of the organizations discussed above do not differ from the state to the extent one might expect. It is true that individuals are born citizens but not labor union members. But when organization has reached such completeness as in Swedish society, actually all persons working in the fields where unions are active do belong to those unions. The only practical means of avoiding union membership is a change of occupation, which is not always a very real possibility. On the other hand, citizenship of a state can be escaped by emigration, which is often just as easy as a fundamental change of occupation within the same state.

It is also true that labor unions and producers' cooperatives do not actually use physical force either to compel membership or to enforce their accepted rules of conduct. But they do use extremely strong moral pressure—strong enough to be effective for ninety-nine individuals out of a hundred. In the democratic state, also, the moral obligation to abide by laws and regulations is in most cases sufficient, without recourse to physical force.

The final test, of course, seems to be what happens in the case of a conflict of allegiances, that is, if one line of conduct is required by the laws of the state and another by the policy of the organizations. Can the state compel obedience in the face of determined opposition from, for example, labor unions; and if so, by what means?

There is little doubt that such obedience can be secured; on the other hand, the means might tend to be of a somewhat desperate character, entailing a permanent threat to the maintenance of a peaceful democratic society, and for that reason the authorities in the state might prefer to give way rather than use their power.

No conflict of such magnitude has ever occurred in modern Sweden. At one time, however, there was a labor dispute that resulted in some discussion of the questions at issue here. As a rule, Swedish labor conflicts have been comparatively peaceful, and there has been little difficulty in maintaining public order by peaceable means. The one important exception dates from 1931, when a local conflict took place in Ådalen between an unorganized employer and unionized workers. When no agreement was reached, the union called a strike, and as was usual at that time required and received the support of transport workers, who proclaimed a blockade against the plant in question. The employer thereupon employed professional strikebreakers to maintain transportation of goods from the plant. Demonstrations took place, and the strikebreakers were stoned. The local police declared itself unable to maintain order, and the military was sent to its support. In the course of another demonstration, the military found itself threatened and fired rifles. Five persons were killed. This occurrence aroused enormous indignation, and a nationwide general strike of one day was called and took place on the day of the funeral. The strike was symbolic only, and it was arranged that it should not result in the interruption of essential services. The governor of the county stepped in—too late, in the eyes of the public—and took the responsibility without legal warrant of enjoining the employer from further use of strikebreakers. The employer complied with his order.

Naturally, a debate took place in Parliament. Not only all speakers from the nonsocialist parties but even some representative Social Democrats emphasized the duty of the authorities to safeguard life and liberty even for persons who acted against the rules of class solidarity. But other opinions were also expressed. The

President of the Federation of Labor, known as a very moderate man and in fact most indignant against the communist elements that had fomented disorder in Ådalen, said: "Forms of society vary, and the laws of Sweden should conform to the development which has taken place." Another leading Social Democrat, Mr. Wigforss, maintained that this was a conflict between different concepts of right and wrong, which could not be solved by a simple reference to the idea of maintaining public order. No vote was taken; in any case there was a nonsocialist majority in Parliament at that time. But the Liberal government upheld the illegal though sensible decision of the county governor, and also appointed a commission of investigation, not into the disorder itself, but into the action of the police and the military. The most far-reaching results were that employers have since refrained consistently from using strikebreakers, and that it has been made illegal (unless in very exceptional circumstances) to use military forces to maintain public order.

The 1931 experience at first seems somewhat inconclusive. There was no real test of strength at the time, and since then all three parties—the state, the unions, and the employers—have done their best to prevent a recurrence.

Yet it is not without interest. It should be remembered that the labor movement in 1931 was definitely a minority, if the strongest minority, in Swedish society. When its leaders claimed that "the laws of Sweden should conform" to its concepts of morals, that was in effect an attempt on the part of a minority to compel or prevent legislative action by the majority. The possibility of extremely serious conflicts was obvious.

But the solution was a compromise. Labor did not press any demands for legislative action against strikebreakers, and employers tacitly agreed not to use strikebreakers. Government and Parliament upheld the duty of public officials to maintain public order in the face of action by any organized interest, but legislative changes were made to obviate the necessity for using military personnel instead of police for the purpose. This series of com-

promises is typical of how the Swedish problem has developed and how it has been solved. In one instance after another, powerful Swedish organizations have proved their adherence to the idea that compromise is the essence of democracy.

It is impossible here even to attempt to trace the causes of this spirit of compromise. One of them may be the concept of indirect national solidarity and the existence of strong groups cutting across each other's memberships, as mentioned before. Other causes may be found in specific characteristics of Swedish economic development: the basic industries are not clearly urban in character, thus making possible the maintenance of decentralization in the Swedish population even after the advent of industrialism; and industrialism came to Sweden late, when discussion of its dangers was already in full swing, thus permitting Swedish society to profit from the experience of others. The personalities of leaders on both sides also enter the picture, as well as the national and religious homogeneity of society, which precludes a number of social conflicts. And finally, one factor of fundamental importance is undoubtedly the speedy and fortunate economic development of a country which has been spared the devastations of two major wars and has profited much more than it has suffered from the growth of industrialism. Compromise is perhaps not altogether difficult to obtain when circumstances permit considerable gain to both parties in the dispute.

## VI

Clearly, no criticism of the concept of sovereignty can go so far as to deny the necessity for legislation in fields influencing the activities of organized groups within the state. Just as in the case of any other legislation, the primary problem is simply to what extent such legislation will have to conform to recognized concepts, in this case, the basic ideas of organizations, and to what extent it is possible to change such ideas by state action in the form of legislation. Another problem, largely connected with the first, is whether and to what extent the state can take upon itself the

responsibility for protecting individuals against organized group compulsion without warrant in principles recognized by the state itself.

Swedish law recognizes three main types of associations: corporations, or limited liability companies (*aktiebolag*); economic associations, without personal liability for members or with limited liability (*ekonomiska föreningar*); and noneconomic associations (*ideella föreningar*). To the second group belong, among others, consumers' cooperatives, building cooperatives, and farmers' cooperatives; not only religious congregations, temperance associations, and political parties but also all labor market organizations belong to the third group. Organizations belonging to one of the first two groups are required to register with public authorities and to conform to certain definite rules in order to gain legal personality. For the last group, no legislation has been enacted, but in legal practice they have been recognized as having legal personality as soon as they have adopted bylaws (any bylaws) and elected officers. The distinction between the second and third group is not altogether clear, and in some cases an organization is free to choose one form or the other as it desires.

The laws on economic associations have on the whole been welcomed by the organizations concerned. They have solved a rather difficult problem of legal personality and leave to the discretion of the organizations themselves most questions of internal structure, safeguarding chiefly the public interest in their economic integrity. Legislation on noneconomic associations has frequently been proposed, but never enacted, owing to the opposition chiefly of labor unions (partly also of temperance societies) who particularly fear the necessity for registration. Since their legal personality is recognized in any case, they have little to gain from legislation; moreover, the central organizations of most important associations within this group have been anxious to guarantee reasonable structural rules on their own responsibility. There is currently no demand for further legislation in this field.

On the other hand, especially with regard to the labor market,



other legislation influencing the position of organizations has been enacted. The law of freedom of association and bargaining has already been mentioned in passing; its most important provisions invalidate any collective or individual agreement interfering with the right of employees or employers to organize (it should be noted that there are no antitrust laws in conflict with this provision) and compel both parties to negotiate, if so required, with organizations on the other side, although of course not to reach an agreement. The Collective Contracts Act (1928) was passed some years earlier; it outlaws all strikes and lockouts to compel changes in an existing contract or to influence the bargaining over a new contract until the existing one has lapsed, and gives both parties the right to sue for damages in case of violation of this rule, for any other breach of a collective contract, or to solve a dispute over the interpretation of collective contracts. An interesting provision is that suit should always be brought by the organization in the first place, individuals being permitted to sue only if it refuses to do so, and that whenever suit is brought against an individual, the organization must always be cited as a corespondent. This legislation was passed over strong labor opposition but afterwards quickly gained the respect of both parties. It should be noticed that both laws here mentioned did nothing but codify existing practice, at least in so far as manual workers were concerned.

Another attempt at legislation mainly influencing labor market organizations was barely defeated in 1935. It dealt with what was called "means of economic warfare" and was chiefly intended to safeguard the interests of neutral third parties during a conflict. It was, however, found to be extremely difficult to define a neutral third party, and although political opposition came chiefly from labor, there are definite indications that neither farmers' organizations nor even employers were particularly anxious for legislation in this field.

There is, of course, nothing at all surprising in the fact that labor unions or other organizations thus influence the action of legislative bodies. This is only another instance of the phenome-

non internationally known as pressure groups—organized groups, often of minorities, influencing the political parties by holding their support in the balance. On the whole, this seems to be rather less characteristic of Sweden than of several other countries, owing to the fact that Swedish parties generally have very definite social affiliations and that there is usually not very much movement within the electorate from one party to another; at least, this is true with regard to the gulf separating socialist and nonsocialist parties. Not only does an industrial worker rarely vote with a nonsocialist party; the Social Democrats seem to be losing support in middle-class groups, and farmers, formerly rather evenly divided between the three nonsocialist parties, tend to concentrate in one of them, the Farmers' Alliance. In these circumstances, the question becomes less one of parties outbidding each other to get the support of important pressure groups than of such groups working frankly through their own parties.

In the 1930's, such observations in many countries in Europe brought about sympathy for what used to be called "corporative" ideas—largely influenced by fascism, but in many cases more sincere than those of Mussolini and Hitler. It was felt that when powerful organizations dominated politics in any case, it was better to let them do so openly through their elected representatives, and that this would make it possible to weigh important group interests against each other, regardless of the number of members in each group. The fallacy of the argument was, of course, twofold: in the first place, such weighing could be nothing but arbitrary, and in the second place, the arrangement could be expected to intensify rather than reduce the influence of more powerful groups compared with that of smaller groups and individual citizens. In Sweden, while these ideas were not entirely unknown, they exercised little influence, partly because of experience in the period of so-called interest representation before 1866.

In another sense, however, corporativism can well be called characteristic of Swedish development. To a surprising extent, it has been found expedient to use great organizations directly or

indiv  
in it  
and  
men  
regar  
Fi  
than  
given  
Ther  
know  
the C  
decid  
any  
them  
Fede  
nom  
man  
tatio  
empl  
actua  
with  
to m  
insta  
tions  
econ  
of re  
Labo  
tiona  
the w  
TH  
of le  
field  
sickn  
and  
beco

indirectly as organs of the state, cooperating with the state, acting in its interests, and generally supporting the policy of Parliament and government. Here again the question of solidarity is fundamental, not in the sense of threatening conflicts, but rather with regard to the possibility of cumulating allegiances.

First, in Sweden as in many other countries, but earlier here than in most of them, great independent organizations have been given representation on administrative or even judicial bodies.] There are many instances of this, dating as far back as 1917. Best known is the case of the Labor Court, created in 1928 to apply the Collective Contracts Act of that year. On that body, which decides its cases immediately and without possibility of appeal to any other, four members are appointed on presentation, two of them designated by the Employers' Association and two by the Federation of Labor (one of the latter can be supplanted by a nominee of the Federation of White-Collar Employees), the chairman and two other members being appointed without such presentation. As a rule, decisions have been unanimous; in some cases, employers' or union representatives have dissented, but it has actually occurred that the "impartial" members have been faced with a majority of union *and* employers' representatives, anxious to maintain the existing balance on the labor market against, for instance, syndicalists. During World War II, various organizations were represented in the authorities administering wartime economic legislation, but there are also some cases of this kind of representation on permanent administrative bodies, such as the Labor Market Board (*Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen*) and the Vocational Training Board (*Överstyrelsen för yrkesutbildning*). On the whole, the experience has been generally regarded as favorable.

The use of voluntary organizations for the direct administration of legislation or other comparable measures has occurred in the field of social insurance, where both unemployment insurance and sickness insurance have been organized exclusively in this way, and may remain so organized even when sickness insurance becomes compulsory. The unemployment insurance societies, in

fact, can be regarded as but another side of labor unions. The system of milk regulation introduced in the early 1930's was based entirely on dairy cooperatives; it came into force solely on the demand of an organization representing no less than 60 percent of the milk delivered at dairies, and that organization not only was empowered to collect the milk tax from nonmembers as well as members, but was also given a monopoly of the subsidized butter exports.

In the administration of wartime and postwar regulations, the support of organizations has been more indirect. They have not taken part in administration except through their representatives on state organs, but it has been acknowledged that their support has been invaluable in securing observance of a legislation which might otherwise have been easily eluded—as, indeed, was the case to a great extent during World War I. Farmers' cooperatives placed at the disposal of state organs their detailed knowledge of the production of each particular farm and enforced their demands for monopoly of supply just as jealously as in peacetime, thus making any important black marketing almost impossible. Consumers' cooperatives and retailers' organizations exercised corresponding control over the retail trade; and all organizations wholeheartedly endorsed the propaganda against illegal sales. Even the price control legislation was, on the whole, given full support by these and other organizations involved. Organizations of the press were extremely loyal—in the opinion of some critics, overly loyal—in assisting the government to enforce restraint on legal but “dangerous” publicity.

The most interesting type of cooperation between the state and the organizations, however, seems to be found in cases where governmental authorities have stepped out in order to leave regulation of burning problems entirely to the organizations themselves. This has occurred chiefly in the labor market, where groups on both sides are extremely jealous of state interference.

In the middle of the 1930's, the Federation of Labor and the Employers' Association began negotiations on certain labor mar-

ket  
was  
to a  
mar  
incr  
men  
Lab  
unic  
colle  
plac  
func  
adop  
the  
the  
neu  
appl  
prob  
duri  
poli  
relie  
to t  
The  
far  
Both  
the  
legis  
estim  
have  
part  
exist  
view  
that  
thro  
er's  
final

ket problems. It was expressly stated by both parties that this was done in order to avoid the necessity of state action with regard to allegedly unsatisfactory conditions in certain fields. The primary result of these negotiations, apart from a considerable increase in mutual understanding, was the so-called Main Agreement of 1938. This agreement is binding on the Federation of Labor and the Employers' Association, but not on particular unions on either side, unless specifically included in their own collective agreements. Such inclusion, however, has already taken place to a great extent, and even where that is not the case, the fundamental principles of the Main Agreement have been tacitly adopted. The agreement includes most of those provisions of the proposed legislation on economic warfare which had not been the subject of political contention, including some in favor of neutral third parties, and it creates its own machinery for the application of these rules. A provision of great interest is that prohibiting action against anyone on the grounds of his activity during a past dispute, or by reason of his opinions in religious, political, or other comparable questions. The first provision relieved former strikebreakers from the stigma hitherto attached to them—at a time when strikebreaking was tacitly abolished. The guarantee against religious or political persecution has so far not proved very necessary, but circumstances may change. Both provisions, of course, apply equally to both sides. Since the formulation of the Main Agreement, no further demands for legislation on economic warfare have been heard, which is interesting also for the reason that the legislation proposed would not have applied only to the labor market; indeed, the unions were particularly eager to point out that the need for legislation, if it existed, was perhaps greater in other fields. From the point of view of labor, on the other hand, the most important gain was that the Main Agreement made it possible to initiate negotiation through the central organizations regarding an individual employer's use of his right to hire and fire, though not to enforce any final decision against him in that respect.

During World War II, the parties in the labor market solved independently of the state another serious problem, which in most countries was found to require legislation—that of wages and inflation. An agreement was reached for a sliding wage scale linked to changes in the officially recognized cost of living index, providing however that only partial compensation should be given. By virtue of this agreement, no public wage control was found necessary, and the inflationary effect of rising wages was avoided at a time when a shortage of labor was already obvious. With the end of the war, however, bargaining returned to normal, and there are some signs that there was a stronger reaction than would have been the case if the Federation of Labor had shown less public spirit in wartime.

At the end of the war, the question of industrial democracy was again broached, after having been shelved since the early 1920's. Again a solution was reached by the parties concerned without state interference. In the autumn of 1946, an agreement was made creating factory advisory committees. The realization of this plan, however, was not immediate; in the first place, the agreement between the Federation of Labor and the Employers' Association as usual embodied only recommendations to be acted upon by their member unions, and in the second, both parties were conscious of the difficulties of the scheme and the necessity for deliberate action. While such committees have now been introduced in practically all industries, it is still too early to draw any conclusions with regard to their success.

## VII

There is general agreement that the powerful organizations described above have, on the whole, performed very good work and constitute an important element in Swedish society. No modern employer would like to deal with his workers without the medium of unions, and while it is more difficult to find a corresponding measure of unanimity with regard to other organizations, it can yet be confidently stated that they have won general



approval. It is felt that they have reduced rather than increased the danger of social conflict, and that they have thus played a great part in securing the success of Swedish democracy as a whole. Indeed, there seems to be a certain tendency to speak with unnecessarily romantic feeling about "popular movements" and to believe that all and sundry questions must necessarily be solved by recourse to committees and authorities representing as many groups as possible, even at the cost of individual ability.

One important aspect of the organizations is their capacity to introduce an element of direct democracy into a society where the representative system is otherwise completely dominant, both referendum and popular election of executive or judicial officers being practically nonexistent. Labor unions, cooperatives, and the like give the ordinary citizen an opportunity for responsible and important work which would otherwise be largely missing, particularly where the stability of the party system is such as to reduce the amount of rotation in office even where municipal government is concerned. This is important from the point of view of training for democracy, at least in training leaders of democracy, but it is equally valuable as a means of decentralization which softens the reaction against "regimentation" in contemporary economic life. Regardless of political opinions, practically all groups have been compelled to accept a great increase in government activity, and Swedish experience tends to show that this becomes more acceptable to individuals when their group allegiances are directly utilized for purposes of administration.

It must not be assumed, however, that this development has taken place without also creating new problems. Success has been achieved not by small local organizations, but by large, nationwide units. The new responsibilities accepted have necessitated a more rigid system of government within each unit, the placing of more authority in the hands of their central executive committees, the employment of specialized personnel—in short, what is usually called bureaucracy. The problems of democracy apply not only to municipal and national government, but equally

to group organizations within the state. As a consequence, members are losing interest in the practical work of their associations, even when they still retain confidence in them. They very often do not take the trouble to go to meetings, where the most important item on the agenda is the election—generally re-election—of officers rather than actual decisions on questions which the experience of an ordinary member enables him to understand. It is undoubtedly not a very healthy sign when labor unions, cooperatives, and political parties have to announce entertainment features at their meetings in order to make members attend—often without much success. Tendencies such as these are dangerous not only because they suggest the possibility of disaffection in a crisis, but even more because the members of central committees and organization employees may end by not representing membership opinion any better than do other groups of representatives, for example, Parliament, in which case the devolution of power and authority on independent organizations may become a sham.

Moreover, collaboration with the state involves obvious difficulties in the relationship between an organization, such as, for instance, the Federation of Labor, and its own members. We have seen that these organizations were formed to further definite economic interests by collective action. Almost invariably, also, the effect of this situation is an attitude of suspicion toward other groups. When the state values the support of organizations because of the special allegiance they command from their members, the fundamental reason for that allegiance is that members expect their organization to work in their interests—exclusively in their interests—and therefore believe that it is in their interests to follow the bidding of their leaders, even when the stipulated policy is actually based on public rather than particular interests. But there are obvious limits to these possibilities. Once members begin to suspect that their special interests are being permanently compromised, they will lose confidence in their leaders or, in some cases, even in the organization itself. The outcome will be a revolt or the disappearance of their allegiance to the organiza-

tion  
state  
T  
uni  
give  
auth  
coop  
zatio  
pend  
war,  
tion  
that  
Fede  
infla  
draw  
was  
from  
unio  
respo  
As  
a nu  
super  
favor  
tain  
of liv  
attain  
in so  
rather  
power  
migh  
ish ex  
giance  
solved  
public  
(Univer

tion—not because it comes in conflict with their allegiance to the state, but precisely because there is no such conflict.

This is undoubtedly rather clearly realized by the leaders of unions, cooperatives, and other organizations in Sweden, and has given them reasons for great caution in their dealings with public authorities. Actually, the latter are today more than willing to cooperate, but particularly since World War II, Swedish organizations have been extremely anxious to safeguard their independence. As has been mentioned before, immediately after the war, or even before the cessation of hostilities in Europe, a reaction set in among union members, who were told by communists that they had been sold out by their leaders. Consequently, the Federation of Labor has been very unwilling to continue its anti-inflation policy of wartime days, even to the extent of not withdrawing support during the metalworkers' strike in 1945, which was regarded by most responsible union leaders as unfortunate from the point of view not only of the country but even of the unions. Since the war, the Federation has refused to make itself responsible for any forcible restraint on member unions.

As a matter of fact, it may well be that the successful solution of a number of difficult problems in the 1930's was the result less of superior wisdom or of the excellency of a social system than of favorable economic conditions. It is undoubtedly easier to maintain social peace in a period of abundance and a rising standard of living than in the opposite situation. Even so, the results attained have undoubtedly been valuable for the future, at least in so far as they have established the principle of negotiation rather than recourse to force in both the mutual relationships of powerful organizations and their relationships to the state. It might be argued that the main lesson to be learned from the Swedish experience in this field is that the problem of divided allegiances—and thus of sovereignty—is capable, if not of being solved, at least of being left unsolved without detriment to the public interest.

*(University of Stockholm)*

# THE ORIGINS OF SCIENTISM

BY ERIC VOEGELIN

BY "scientism" we shall understand an intellectual movement of which the beginnings could be discerned as early as the second half of the sixteenth century. It is a movement which accompanied the rise of modern mathematics and physics. The splendid advance of the "new science" became the cause of an elation with far-reaching consequences, which, through the centuries, have had a wide range.<sup>1</sup> They began in a fascination with the new science to the point of underrating and neglecting the concern for experiences of the spirit; they developed into the assumption that the new science could create a world view that would substitute for the religious order of the soul;<sup>2</sup> and they culminated, in the nineteenth century, in the dictatorial prohibition, on the part of scientistic thinkers, against asking questions of a metaphysical nature.<sup>3</sup> The results of this development lie before us today in the form of the scientistic creed which is characterized by three principal dogmas: (1) the assumption that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which all other sciences ought to conform; (2) that all realms of being are accessible to the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all reality which is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary. The creed implies two great denials: it denies the dignity of science to

<sup>1</sup> The term *nuova scienza* occurs as early as 1537 as the title of a treatise on gunnery by the Italian mathematician, Niccolò Tartaglia.

<sup>2</sup> This phase was reached as early as the middle of the seventeenth century; see Pascal's reaction against it in *Pensées*, no. 72, Brunschvicg ed. (Paris 1904).

<sup>3</sup> The prohibition of metaphysical questions was pronounced by Comte in 1830 in the *Cours de philosophie positive*, vol. 1, First Lecture. Marx issued the same prohibition in *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* (1844), in *Marx-Engels historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, First Series, vol. 3 (Frankfurt 1932) pp. 124 ff. Marx's prohibition is followed by his definition of "socialistic man" as the man who does not ask metaphysical questions (*ibid.*, p. 125).

the quest for substance in nature, in man and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and, in the more radical form, it denies the reality of substance.

We have sharpened the issue to the antithesis of sciences of phenomena and sciences of substance. On this point we follow the example of Giordano Bruno who first formulated the issue. In his reaction against undue preoccupation with the mathematizing sciences, he wrote: "Substance and being are separate and independent of quantity; and consequently measure and number are not substance but incidental to substance, not essence but incidental to essence." "That which is multitude in things is not their essence, not the thing itself but only the appearance presented to the senses, and only at the surface of things."<sup>4</sup> "He who tries to know the infinite by his sense is like a man who wants to see substance and essence with his eyes; he who would deny everything that is not perceptible to the senses would have to deny in the end his own being and substance." "The truth starts *from* the senses, but only as from a weak and very small starting point; it is not *in* the senses. . . . In the object of the senses it is as in a mirror, in reason it is in the form of argument and discourse, in the intellect in the form of principle and conclusion, and in the spirit it is in its proper and living form."<sup>5</sup> "Thus differs the vision of the eye from the vision of the spirit, like a seeing mirror from a mirror which does not see; for the spirit is an illuminated and informed mirror, it is both the light and the mirror, and in the spirit the object and the subject of perception are one."<sup>6</sup>

The core of the problem as discerned by Bruno, that is, the issue of science of phenomena versus science of substance, is still the core of the scientistic problem today. Scientism, defined as the attempt to treat substance (including man in society and his

<sup>4</sup> Bruno, *De la causa, principio et uno*, Fifth Dialogue, in *Opere Italiane*, vol. 1 (Göttingen 1888) pp. 285, 282.

<sup>5</sup> Bruno, *De l'infinito universo e mondi*, in *Opere Italiane*, vol. 1 (Göttingen 1888) pp. 307 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Bruno, *De compositione imaginum*, I, 13, in *Opera Latina*, vol. 2: 3 (Florence 1889) p. 119.

tory) as if it were phenomenon, is a decisive ingredient in modern intellectual movements like positivism and neopositivism, and, in particular, in modern political mass movements like communism and national socialism. If we read, for instance, a sentence like Lenin's to the effect that the meaning of history consists in the dialectical transformation of "the thing-in-itself into the thing-for-us, of the essence of things into phenomena," we have almost to the letter the scientistic inversion of Bruno's restorative distinction between phenomena and spiritual substance.<sup>7</sup>

We have thus defined the theoretical issue of scientism. We can now turn to our special problem—the social relevance of scientism as an intellectual attitude, which, first, draws for its social effectiveness on the prestige of mathematized science, and second, uses this effectiveness in the service of antispiritual revolt and for the purpose of civilizational destruction. The importance of scientism in this light has not gone unnoticed.<sup>8</sup> But we are still far from a full comprehension of the social and political disaster that scientism has worked and still is working, and we are equally far from a full understanding of the sources from which the movement draws its strength. It is intended to explore in the following pages one of the most important sources of scientistic effectiveness, that is, the prestige which has accrued to the scientistic position through the Newtonian system. We shall discuss the scientistic implications of Newton's concept of absolute space and the philosophical reaction of Berkeley and Leibniz against it. In particular, we shall discuss the debate between Leibniz and Clarke because it had the prototypical result of a theoretical victory for the philosopher and a social victory for the scientist. And finally, we shall apply the result of our analysis to an interpretation of the later course of scientism.

In order to prevent misunderstandings let us stress that we are

<sup>7</sup> Lenin, *Karl Marx* (1914), in *Sochineniya* (Moscow-Leningrad 1926-32) vol. 18, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, F. A. von Hayek, "The Counter-Revolution of Science," in *Economica*, vol. 8 (February, May, August 1941), and "Scientism and the Study of Society," in *Economica*, vols. 9-11 (August 1942, February 1943, February 1944).



studying only *one* of the theoretical sources of scientific effectiveness, though it may well be the most important one. We are concentrating on the problem of absolute and relative space. The same type of analysis, obviously, would have to be pursued with regard to the categories of time and substance.

*Relativity from Copernicus to Leibniz*

The problem of absolute and relative space did not begin with Newton. As a matter of fact, it has been a perennial problem of philosophy since Hellenic antiquity. For our analysis of the Newtonian problem of absolute space, however, we need not go farther back than to the Copernican assumption of the sun as the center of our planetary system. In the theory of Copernicus we can discern the tendency to assume an absolute space of which the sun is the ontologically real center; but this tendency is secondary to the predominant motivation of simplifying the mathematical description of planetary movements. The problems of scientific description and of ontology were clearly distinguished.<sup>9</sup> The issue was well understood in the sixteenth century and it was carried to its systematic solution before the century's end. Copernicus justified the revolutionary shift of his system of coordinates from the earth to the sun by explaining the relativity of movement; he made it clear that the "real" movement of two bodies which move relatively to each other is in no way affected by the assumption of one or the other as the origin of the coordinates which are used for the description of the movement. From the counterposition of a philosophy of politics, Bodin took up this problem in his late work. He saw the point with equal clearness and drew the conclusion that one might as well shift the coordinates back to the earth. Astronomers might prefer the sun as a center because the assumption allowed for a simpler mathematical description; he, as

<sup>9</sup> Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (Nuremberg 1543). The motive of mathematical simplification dominates the Praefatio, "Mathematica mathematicis scribuntur"; the ontological absolutism is strong in I, 10, fol. 9 vo. On the question see Alexandre Koyré, "Nicolas Copernicus," in *Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America* (July 1943) pp. 25 ff.

a philosopher of politics and nature, preferred the earth as a center for systematic reasons of his own. Relativity must be taken seriously; if the theory of space as an absolute extension around the earth is a fallacy, the theory of space as an absolute extension around the sun is no less a fallacy.<sup>10</sup> The problem, finally, received its systematic elaboration through Giordano Bruno. Space was for Bruno phenomenally infinite because this infinity is a projection of the form of the human mind; ontologically, in the mind of God, the universe is one and the celestial worlds are not embraced by this oneness, as by a space, for they in their turn embrace oneness as every part of the soul embraces the soul.<sup>11</sup> Bruno's theory distinguishes between an empirical analysis of space and the infinite form of space which is due to the form of the human mind (the later Kantian transcendental analysis); neither empirical nor transcendental analysis, however, exhausts the problem of space; both must be supplemented by cosmological speculation as the theoretical instrument for its complete formulation. Bruno's solution needs elaboration and reformulation, but it can hardly be improved on in principle. On the level of empirical science, it has been carried out and confirmed by the theory of relativity with Einstein's assumption of an unbounded, curved space that runs back into itself.<sup>12</sup> As far as the Copernican problem was concerned, Bruno drew the conclusion that an infinitely closed space has no absolute center; its center is everywhere and nowhere; the choice of the place for the origin of coordinates is arbitrary.<sup>13</sup>

The correctness of the relativistic position still impressed itself on the contemporaries of Newton. Leibniz developed the problem perhaps furthest in the course of his phoronomic studies.

<sup>10</sup> Bodin, *Apologie de René Herpin pour la république de Jean Bodin* (s. l. 1608). We have used this edition; the first edition, however, is dated 1581. The argument is specifically directed against Copernicus, *op. cit.*, I, 6, fol. 6 ro. Bodin resumed the discussion in *Universae naturae theatrum* (Lyons 1596) p. 633.

<sup>11</sup> Bruno, *De la causa*. . . (cited above) p. 281.

<sup>12</sup> Albert Einstein, *Über die spezielle und allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*, 3rd and enlarged ed. (Braunschweig 1918) §§ 30-32.

<sup>13</sup> Bruno, *De la causa*. . . (cited above) p. 281.

Geometry as the logic of mathematics should be supplemented by phoronomy, a general theory of motion, as the logic of physics. The first principle of motion, however, is that the movement of a body can be observed in relation to another body which is assumed to be resting. Movement is a mutual and invertible shift of position of material parts. In any system of bodies which are in relative movement toward each other we can choose one of the bodies as being at rest and refer the movement of the other to the coordinates originating in the "resting" body. Such choice of a resting body for the purpose of description Leibniz calls a "hypothesis"; one of these hypotheses may render a simpler description than the other, but its simplicity does not make the hypothesis "truer." On principle, all such hypotheses are "equivalent." The "general law of equivalence" is Leibniz' formulation of the problem of relativity.<sup>14</sup> The meaning which Leibniz attached to this principle may be gathered from the fact that he wrote a memorandum with the intention of inducing the Curia to admit the Copernican system. He argued that from the point of view of logic there is no opposition between the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems; the choice of heliocentric or geocentric coordinates is equivalent; the greater descriptive simplicity of the Copernican system does not imply the proposition that the movements as described by it are real in an ontological sense.<sup>15</sup>

#### *Newton's Assumption of Absolute Space*

The trend toward a theory of relativity, however, could not unfold at the time because the various aspects of the problem were not yet sufficiently clarified by philosophical analysis. These various aspects are (1) the objectivity of science, its "truth," which is

<sup>14</sup> Leibniz, Letter to Huyghens, of June 12-22, 1694, in *Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie*, Cassirer ed. (Leipzig 1903) pp. 243 ff. See, in the same volume, Cassirer's introduction to the correspondence.

<sup>15</sup> For Leibniz' intention in writing the memorandum see his Letter to Huyghens, of September 4-14, 1694, in *Hauptschriften* . . . (cited above) pp. 244 ff. The memorandum itself is published in *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*, Gerhardt ed. (Berlin 1849-63) vol. 6, pp. 144 ff. For comment on the question see Cassirer in the previously cited introduction, p. 109.

rooted in its method; (2) the empirical view of the world which results from the application of the method to the partial phenomena of the external world; and (3) the speculative interpretation of the cosmos which expresses the relation of man to the totality of his world experience. In the physics of the seventeenth century these elements still formed an undifferentiated compound; the speculative element was not yet completely eliminated from method, and, as a consequence, the empirical results carried implications which properly belonged to the speculative sphere.

These problems were formidable. Nevertheless, they might have been cleared up quickly; and they were cleared up in principle by Leibniz. The obstacle to a rapid advance toward a theory of relativity in physics arose from the internal problems of the new science. This obstacle was already present in Galileo's theory of motion, but it became fully visible only with Newton's formulation of the general law of gravitation and the consequent elaboration of a general theory of physics in the *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*.<sup>16</sup> Newton found it necessary to assume the existence of absolute space and of absolute motion. In the scholium to Definition VIII he stated: "Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. . . . Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is commonly taken for immovable space." A bit further on in the scholium he explains the reason for his assumption: "Because the parts of space cannot be seen, or distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore in their stead we use sensible measures of them. For from the positions and distances of things from any body considered as immovable, we define all places; and then with respect to such places, we estimate all motions, considering bodies as transferred from some of those places into others. And so, instead of absolute

<sup>16</sup> The following quotations from Newton's *Principia* are taken from Sir Isaac Newton's *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, Cajori ed. (Berkeley, Calif., 1946).

places and motions, we use relative ones; and that without any inconvenience in common affairs; but in philosophical disquisitions we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of them. For it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which the places and motions of others may be referred." Newton envisages absolute space as an absolute order of "places"; this order of places is a "primary" system to which motion ultimately can be referred; only "translations out of those places" are truly absolute motions. Since, however, these absolute places cannot be observed by the senses, the question arises to what purpose we should assume their existence? This delicate question Newton covers by his vague reference to "philosophical disquisitions" which make such deeds necessary.

Embarking on such philosophical disquisition, Newton finds that rest and motion, absolute and relative, can be distinguished by their properties, causes, and effects. "It is a property of rest, that bodies really at rest do rest in respect to one another." This definition of rest holds good in spite of the fact that such absolutely resting bodies, if they exist at all, may only be found in the region of the fixed stars, or even beyond that region, while absolute rest cannot be determined "from the positions of bodies in our region." While empirical observation does not show any bodies at absolute rest, Newton nevertheless introduces this concept. Here we have tracked down the first serious reason that would induce a physicist to make the assumption of absolute space: he needs the assumption for the purpose of defining rest; and he needs this concept in order to maintain the first law of motion that "every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it." Without the assumption of absolute space no meaning can be given to the notion of absolute rest; and absolute rest was for Newton, as it was for Galileo, a fundamental experience that could not be dispensed with in the formulation of the first law of motion.

The second reason for Newton's assumption of absolute places was his belief that he could observe cases of motion without change of place. Absolute motion in this sense had to be distinguished from relative motion. The criterion for this distinction is given through observations with regard to centrifugal forces. "The effects which distinguish absolute from relative motion are, the forces receding from the axis of circular motion. For there are no such forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true and absolute circular motion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of the motion." An important instance of such effects is the polar flattening of the earth due to centrifugal forces.

### *Newton's Religious Motivation*

In the face of such difficulties the theoretically indicated course would have been to revise the fundamental definitions and to drop the concepts of absolute rest and absolute motion. This is the course that was actually followed by Mach in the second half of the nineteenth century. Newton, however, did not contemplate this possibility. His insistence on absolute space seems to have been fortified by motives which appear more clearly in the additions to the Latin edition of his *Optics* (1706), as well as in the "Scholium generale" which he attached to the second edition of the *Principia* (1713). Newton's considerations take account of a problem that had been raised in the debate between Descartes and Henry More, Newton's older friend. Descartes had identified space with matter; as a consequence, the universe was ontologically materialized to the exclusion of a spiritual substance in the cosmos. This outcome had induced More to develop his theory of spatial extension as an infinity which has existed from eternity, and will exist into eternity, independent of our thought. Since extension is a "real attribute," a subject for this attribute must exist. This real subject of absolute space, as well as of absolute time, can only be the divine substance which manifests its own infinity in the double infinity of absolute space and time. More was explicit on the religious motivation of his assumption; his intention was to bring

God  
phil  
In  
own  
"the  
pres  
by t  
pero  
pres  
the  
its s  
editi  
Let  
New  
idea  
stan  
and  
ough  
pore  
cont  
perf  
dom  
dom  
and  
same  
All t  
time  
a Be  
to di  
belo

17 F  
VIII,  
probl  
(Berli  
18 N  
P. 447  
19 S



God back into the world by the same gate through which Cartesian philosophy tried to shut Him out from it.<sup>17</sup>

In the *Optics*, Newton gave the most concise formulation of his own position. From the phenomena of nature it follows that "there exists an incorporeal Being, living, intelligent and omnipresent." This Being uses space "as it were as its sensorium"; and by this sensorium it "sees all things intimately in themselves and perceives them throughout, and in its presence embraces all things present in it." The sentient and thinking principle within us, on the other hand, can perceive only the images of things by means of its *sensorium*, its little sensorium.<sup>18</sup> The position of the second edition of the *Principia* does not differ from that in the *Optics*. Let us quote only one passage that communicates the pathos of Newton: "As a blind man has no ideas of colors, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be worshipped under the representation of any corporeal thing. . . . We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion; for we adore him as his servants; and a god without dominion, providence and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. . . . And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearance of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Henry More, *Enchiridium metaphysicum sive de rebus incorporeis*, Part I, Ch. VIII, §§ 5-7. I am following the presentation of Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin 1922) pp. 443 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Newton, *Optics*, Latin ed. (1740) Quaestio XVIII, quoted in Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

<sup>19</sup> *Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles* . . . (cited above) pp. 545 ff.

The speculations of More and Newton reveal the connection between the new science and the problems of freethinking. The Cartesian materialization of extension would fill the infinity of space in the universe with matter and its mechanism. There would be no mystery left in the existence of the cosmos: into its remotest recesses the universe would be known as a configuration of matter; God, indeed, would be shut out from His creation. If the nature revealed by the new science was the nature of the cosmos, there was, indeed, no use for the "hypothesis" of God. More's device for counteracting this tendency through positing the divine substance as the *fundamentum* of spatial extension was ingenious but fraught with dangers. For a short while the device was able to serve as an argument against atheists and materialists in the literature which tried to prove the existence of God. The very science that at first seemed a danger to religion now furnished the most convincing proof of God. The most important treatise to use this argument was written by Newton's friend, Samuel Clarke.<sup>20</sup>

As could be expected the joy did not last long. The attempt to save God by science soon ran into pantheistic difficulties. An omnipresent God who was the spiritual substance underlying phenomenal extension was a bit too present in the world to retain at the same time his "dominion" as the transcendental Lord of creation. Worse, however, than these difficulties, which dragged on in a long and dreary debate, was the fact that men of a less religious temper simply did not care about the divine substance underlying absolute space. The intellectuals who absorbed the Newtonian system, especially after its popularization by Voltaire, were satisfied with Newton's recognition of absolute space and could dispense with his religious motivation. The system of the *Principia* was complete with the first edition; the "Scholium generale" of the second edition added nothing to empirical physics. Here was a system of the world, legitimated by the genius of the

<sup>20</sup> Samuel Clarke, *A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God* (London 1705-06).

man whose name at this time carried more authority in the intellectual world than any other; and this system showed the world as consisting of nothing but matter obeying a uniform law. The theory of absolute space sealed the system ontologically against God; and by virtue of this character, the Newtonian system became socially effective. The well-intentioned theory of absolute space resulted in precisely the disorder it had intended to avert.

*Berkeley's Psychological Criticism*

The genius of Newton lay in the field of mathematics and physics. When he let his thought wander beyond this province, the results were of doubtful quality. The *Principia* was the great cornerstone for the edifice of science that was to be erected in the following centuries; but the definitions and theoretical excursions in the scholia served only to evoke vehement criticism from philosophers. Newton exposed himself to criticism particularly through his proud declaration of autonomy for the new science. Physics could go its course, as it actually did, without regard for the debates of metaphysicians, conscientiously applying the well-established methods to observed phenomena. The "Scholium generale" had announced the *hypotheses non fingo*: "... whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy." The assumption of absolute space was a glaring contradiction to this declaration; certainly this fundamental "hypothesis" was not deduced from phenomena. We should not be surprised, therefore, on turning to Berkeley and his criticism of Newton's theory, to find some pungent remarks concerning the boundaries between physics and metaphysics. In his *De Motu* (1721) Berkeley wrote: "For the rest, it would be convenient, setting aside that it is a well established custom, to distinguish between sciences in such a manner that each is well circumscribed by its proper boundaries. The philosopher of nature should remain entirely with his experiments, his laws of motion, his mechanical principles and the con-

clusions derived therefrom; if he has something to say on other matters, he should relate what is accepted in the respective higher science." <sup>21</sup> The context leaves hardly a doubt that the remarks about the *philosophus naturalis* are meant to put Newton in his place.

Berkeley's criticism of Newton's theory moves on two planes. With regard to the method of physics he returns to the principle of relativity. A body can be recognized as moving only in relation to another body which is relatively at rest. The idea of absolute motion is incompatible with the conditions of experience. Motion can be measured only by things given to the senses. Since absolute space is not given to the senses, it cannot be used for the distinction of different types of motion. The conception of an absolute motion is impossible.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, in empirical science we do not need such a conception; all that we need is a system of reference which permits us to distinguish between bodies which are relatively at rest or in motion. And such a system we have given in the heaven of the fixed stars. We do not need the assumption of an absolute space for the formulation of the laws of motion because they are valid if we use the fixed stars as the system at rest instead of absolute space.<sup>23</sup> The laws of motion are generalizations from observations and no more. We must "distinguish between mathematical hypotheses and the nature of things." Motion belongs to the world of senses, and we must be satisfied with relative measurements.<sup>24</sup>

Berkeley's second approach to the problem is in the nature of a psychological analysis of the illusions which lead to the assumption of absolute space. The idea of a space without a content is empty; it is a *merum nihil*.<sup>25</sup> We are deceived, however, into the assump-

<sup>21</sup> Berkeley, *De Motu*, § 42, in *The Works of George Berkeley*, Fraser ed., vol. 1 (Oxford 1901).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, § 63.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, § 64.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, § 66.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, §§ 53, 54. The argument of these paragraphs is substantially the same as that of Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) §§ 116, 117, in *Works* (cited above) vol. 1.

tion because in speculating on the problem of space we subtract all bodies but forget to subtract our own. If we imagine space emptied of all content we still have an experience of space because we have the experience of our body and of the movements of its members. The experience in itself is not deceptive, but what we experience is the relative space defined by the parts of our body; the attribution of absoluteness to this space is a fallacy.<sup>26</sup>

The meaning of the somewhat brief passages in *De Motu* becomes clearer in the more discursive analysis in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. As far as the observation of moving bodies is concerned, according to this analysis, we can never observe anything but bodies moving relatively to each other; the physicist is such an observer of moving bodies and hence in physics nothing can be admitted but a concept of relative motion. Nevertheless, we do not only observe motion; we can also experience it. "Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to *move*, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it."<sup>27</sup> Berkeley thus recognizes the experience of absolute motion, but he considers it impermissible to inject this experience into mathematical physics; the laws of science can only describe the observed motions; and observed motions are relative.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Berkeley, *De Motu* (cited above) § 55.

<sup>27</sup> Berkeley, *Principles*. . . (cited above) § 113.

<sup>28</sup> Knowingly or unknowingly, with this argument Berkeley touched upon one of the actual historical roots of the Newtonian conception of absolute space; for Henry More, in his correspondence with Descartes, had advanced the experience of absolute rest and motion as an argument against Descartes' radical concept of "reciprocal" movement: "When I am sitting quietly, and another man who moves away, let us say a thousand steps, becomes red in his face and fatigued, it certainly is he who has moved, while I have been at rest during the time" (Henry More, Letter to Descartes, of March 5, 1649, in *Œuvres de Descartes*, Adam and Tannery ed., vol. 5, Paris 1903, pp. 312 ff.). The argument is directed against Descartes' *Principia philosophiae*, Part II, Art. 29. For Descartes' answer see his Letter to More, of April 15, 1649, in *Œuvres*. . . (cited above) pp. 345 ff. On More's argument against Descartes see Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, 24th ed. (Paris 1928) p. 215, and his *Durée et simultanéité; à propos de la théorie d'Einstein*, 2nd and

*The Deadlock*

A psychological analysis of the Berkeleian type can dispose of the concept of absolute space as a *merum nihil*; it can trace the idea to its origin in the experience of the body; it can show the fallacy of hypostatizing this experience into an objective quality of phenomenal space; and—what is most important for Berkeley—it can by such effective criticism clear the way for the *philosophia prima*. It cannot, however, persuade a physicist to consider his problem solved. When Galileo discovered the law of motion, he did not consider a body at rest in relation to the fixed stars; he considered it absolutely at rest. The laws of science are meant to be valid absolutely. As a follower of Newton expressed it: "From the observation of nature we all know that there is motion, that a body in motion perseveres in that state, till by the action or influence of some power it be necessitated to change it, that it is not in relative or apparent motion in which it perseveres in consequence of its inertia, but in real and absolute space." If we assume with Descartes that the place of a body is determined by the relation to the bodies in its neighborhood, the law of motion would have to announce that a body on which no external force is applied cannot change its position with regard to the surrounding bodies.<sup>29</sup> This law is absurd because obviously the relative position can be changed by applying forces to the surrounding bodies. In brief: the criticism of the philosophers is not constructive. As far as physics is concerned, the only result could be that the physicists would put them in their place, as Berkeley did with Newton. And this is what actually happened in Euler's *Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps* (Berlin 1748). The philosophers were told that the certainty of the laws of mechanics must be the starting point of the

enlarged ed. (Paris 1923) p. 37. For an elaborate analysis of the relation between the experience of motion (in the sense of More and Berkeley) and the experience of space, as well as of the relation between experienced space and the space of geometry, see Henri Poincaré, *La Science et l'hypothèse* (Paris 1908) Part II, "L'Espace."

<sup>29</sup> Colin Maclaurin, *An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries* (London 1748) II, 1, § 9, quoted in Cassirer, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 478.



enquiry. Any criticism that is in conflict with them must be rejected, however conclusive it may be in itself. The metaphysical principles must be chosen in such a manner that they will be compatible with physics.<sup>30</sup>

The physicists and their philosophical critics had come to a deadlock—a deadlock with rather grave consequences. If we take Euler's demand seriously and generalize it, we arrive at the rule that every time an empirical scientist makes a mess of his fundamental concepts—which is a rather ordinary occurrence—the philosophers are faced with the alternative of either clearing up the mess for him or talking nonsense from now on in epistemology and metaphysics. The demand has a touch of the burlesque; nevertheless, it was possible to impose it with a measure of success. The graveness of the situation may be gathered from the fact that even a Kant submitted to it, after some vacillation, at least to the extent of recognizing the *Faktum der Wissenschaft* including Newton's absolute space.<sup>31</sup> Before we elaborate, however, on this curiosity of our intellectual civilization, we must briefly outline the further differentiation of the problem of absolute space and of the solution toward which it tended.

### *Leibniz' Differentiating Analyses*

The differentiation of the problem was, in principle, achieved by Leibniz. We have already reflected on his general relativistic position; we have now to add the principal points of his differentiating analysis.

<sup>30</sup> See on this question Cassirer, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 475 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Kant had made a very successful attack on the problem of absolute and relative motion in his early work, *M. Immanuel Kants neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft* (1758), in *Werke*, vol. 2 (Leipzig 1922). He attacked the crucial point by eliminating the concept of inertia and reformulating the first law of motion. He surrendered, however, this hopeful start and in subsequent work bowed to the authority of Euler. After 1770 the problem lost interest for him, because the epistemologically relevant part of the problem could be solved through his critical philosophy. On the position of Kant see Ernst Cassirer, *Zur Einstein'schen Relativitätstheorie, Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen* (Berlin 1921) Ch. V, "Der Raum- und Zeitbegriff des kritischen Idealismus und die Relativitätstheorie."

First of all, he located the crucial point of the difficulties by differentiating between geometry and phoronomy, on the one side, and mechanics, on the other. The relativity of position and motion is indisputable as long as we deal with them as "purely mathematical" problems. Nature, however, does not offer the spectacle of abstractly shoving bodies which change their relative positions chaotically; it offers the spectacle of a calculable order in the relative movements. This order in the movements cannot be explained within the realm of geometry; for the purpose of its interpretation we have to go beyond the purely mathematical principles and introduce a "metaphysical" principle. "Whether we call this principle Form, or Entelechy, or Force, is irrelevant as long as we remember that only the notion of forces will express it intelligibly."<sup>32</sup> This step of clarification impressed even the physicists to a certain extent, for Euler adopted the relativistic conception of space and motion at least for the phoronomic part of his last presentation of the Newtonian system, the *Theoria motus* of 1765, though in the part on dynamics he reverted to the Newtonian position.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, by localizing the difficulty in the theory of dynamics Leibniz correctly marked the direction in which the solution had to be sought and was ultimately found—that is, the geometrization of physics. That the new physics should be constructed as a science of extension had been Descartes' great idea; it proved impossible, however, to carry out the idea in the system; Descartes' *Principia* shows the famous break between the theory of "reciprocal" motion in the geometrical part of the work and the quiet adoption of the law of motion in its conventional form, with its absolute implications, in the part on mechanics. Leibniz arrived at his own theory of forces through the critique of Descartes' *Principia*; his new dynamics was supposed to solve the problem left open by the geometrical approach of Descartes.

<sup>32</sup> Leibniz, *Specimen dynamicum* (1695), in *Opera omnia*, Dutens ed., vol. 3 (Geneva 1768) p. 321.

<sup>33</sup> See on this episode Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem*. . . (cited above) vol. 2, pp. 482 ff.

Wit  
ultim  
into  
T  
tion  
of th  
lute  
clear  
niz t  
usag  
excl  
phys  
tion)  
of fo  
vis p  
of ar

<sup>34</sup> F  
of mo  
214 ff.  
still su  
excell  
en ph  
gèomé  
matiqu  
auxqu  
Leibni  
cerned  
theory  
of phy  
attemp  
Einstei  
comple  
*Relati  
is succ  
World  
control  
a mech*

<sup>35</sup> Se  
to Cla  
above)  
schrift

Within empirical physics, the problem of relativity was indeed ultimately solved by transforming the crucial problem of "force" into a geometrical problem.<sup>34</sup>

The localization of the difficulty is the first step toward a solution, it is not the solution itself. At first sight, the introduction of the "metaphysical" principle of force seems to inject the absolute problem into theory rather than to eliminate it. Let us be clear, therefore, first about the point that in the language of Leibniz the term "metaphysics" is wider in content than in modern usage. Metaphysics was for him the general science of principles, exclusive of mathematics and geometry only.<sup>35</sup> The principles of physics as a science of phenomena (such as the category of causation) belong to metaphysics in this sense. Hence the introduction of force is immediately followed by the differentiation between *vis primitiva* and *vis derivativa*, that is, between force in the sense of an inherent quality of substance, and force in the phenomenal

<sup>34</sup> For the problem which arises in the transition from the mathematical treatment of motion to the physical proper, see Bergson, *Matière et mémoire* (cited above) pp. 214 ff. This was written before Einstein; the state of the problem at that time was still substantially the same as at the time of Leibniz. See, for instance, Bergson's excellent formulation of the problem on p. 215. "Descartes traite du mouvement en physicien après l'avoir défini en géomètre. Tout mouvement est relatif pour le géomètre: cela signifie seulement, à notre sens, qu'il n'y a pas de symbole mathématique capable d'exprimer que ce soit le mobile plutôt que les axes ou les points auxquels on le rapporte." These pages of Bergson practically adopt the position of Leibniz' *Specimen dynamicum* as far as the differentiation of the problems is concerned; his solution, however, is not the Leibnizian theory of force but a pragmatic theory of motion on the line of the Berkeleyian analysis. After Einstein, the problem of physics comes into clearer view for Bergson; on the historical line from the attempted geometrical physics of Descartes to the realized geometrical physics of Einstein, see his *Durée et simultanéité*. . . (cited above) Ch. II, "La relativité complète." On Einstein's own position see his *Über die spezielle und allgemeine Relativitätstheorie* (cited above). The geometrization of force in Einstein's theory is succinctly formulated by Sir Arthur Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World*, Gifford Lectures 1937, Everyman ed., p. 135. "Einstein's law of gravitation controls a geometrical quantity *curvature* in contrast to Newton's law which controls a mechanical quantity *force*."

<sup>35</sup> See, for the definition of terms in this sense, § 1 of the Third Letter of Leibniz to Clarke, in "Recueil de lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke," in *Opera omnia* (cited above) vol. 2, p. 120. See also Cassirer's footnote on this question in Leibniz, *Hauptschriften*. . . (cited above) vol. 1, p. 133.

sense. Primitive force (whether active or passive) is substantial force and its problems belong to metaphysics in the narrower sense. This primitive force belongs among the "general causes" which "are insufficient for the explanation of phenomena." Derivative force arises "as it were, from a limitation of primitive force through the interaction (*conflictus*) of bodies in various ways."<sup>36</sup> The differentiation between primitive and derivative force and particularly the definition of phenomenal force constitute the decisive achievement of Leibniz. The problem of absoluteness is eliminated through the definition of phenomenal force as force in relation to other forces. Phenomenal force is relative force by definition; and only this phenomenal force is the object of physics. Force has no meaning beyond the meaning which is contained in the differential equations of physics. The laws of nature refer to derivative forces and their phenomena only.<sup>37</sup> In order to avoid all misunderstandings Leibniz adds explicitly that the *entia mathematica* (the meanings contained in an equation) cannot actually be found in nature; "they are only the instruments of abstract and exact calculation."<sup>38</sup>

We have now gained a concept of phenomenal nature as a field of relative forces whose actions are described in the differential equations of physics. To this phenomenal nature refer the ideas of space and time which are used in science. The third step in Leibniz' analysis is the clarification of the ideas of space and time. His most mature formulation of this problem is to be found in the correspondence with Clarke, which was indirectly a correspondence with Newton, for the latter collaborated with Clarke on the answers. The problem of space runs through the whole correspondence. A first formulation is the following: "I have stressed more than once that I consider space something *purely relative*, just as time; it is an order of coexistences, just as time is an order of successions. For space signifies, in terms of possibility, an order

<sup>36</sup> Leibniz, *Specimen dynamicum* (cited above) p. 316.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

of things which exist at the same time, in so far as they exist together, without determining their particular way of existing." <sup>39</sup> Again: "One says that space does not depend on the position (*situation*) of bodies. I answer: this is quite true that it does not depend on this or that position of bodies; nevertheless, it is the order which makes bodies *positionable* (*situables*) and by which they have a position among themselves when they exist together; just as time is this order with regard to successive position." <sup>40</sup> And finally: "I have shown that space is nothing but an order of the existence of things, which is to be noted in their simultaneity." <sup>41</sup> Space and time of physics, thus, are not qualities of reality; they are orders which mind applies to the interpretation of phenomena. The problem of absolute space cannot arise if space is understood as an ideal form which constitutes the order of phenomena. This solution not only eliminates the Newtonian problem of absolute space critically; it also gives the positive answer to the question of "objectivity" in science. We do not have to search for the "absolute" validity of propositions in an absolute reality; the objectivity of science has its source in the order of the mind.

This is the solution that was further developed by the transcendental critique of Kant into the theory of the noetic function as an autonomous source of knowledge. At the time, however, its significance and finality were hardly understood. To the formulations of Leibniz came the pained answer of Clarke (and, behind him, of Newton): "I do not understand the meaning of the words: An order, or a position, which makes the bodies positionable. To me this seems to say that the position is the cause of the position." <sup>42</sup> This complaint carries us beyond the theoretical discus-

<sup>39</sup> Leibniz, Third Letter, § 4 (cited above) p. 121.

<sup>40</sup> Leibniz, Fourth Letter, § 41, in "Recueil de lettres. . ." (cited above) pp. 132 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Leibniz, Fifth Letter, § 29, in "Recueil de lettres. . ." (cited above) p. 148. The position of Leibniz at the time of his correspondence with Clarke does not differ materially from his earlier position. For variant formulations see the *Bemerkungen zum allgemeinen Teil der Kartesischen Prinzipien* (1692), in particular the remarks on Descartes' *Principia*, II, 8-19, in *Hauptschriften*. . . (cited above) vol. 1, pp. 307 ff; see also *Gegen Descartes* (1702), *ibid.*, pp. 330-33.

<sup>42</sup> Clarke, Fourth Replic, § 41, in "Recueil de lettres. . ." (cited above) p. 140.

sion into the human situation. The complaint was sincere: Clarke and Newton did not understand. As far as the physicists are concerned, this ended the debate for the next century and a half.

*The Problem of the Rotating Star*

As we have seen, the several aspects of the problem had been differentiated by Leibniz. Since the concepts of absolute space and absolute motion were inadmissible in physics, the next task was the reformulation of the Newtonian definitions and of the first law of motion in such a manner that they would become compatible with the logics of science. This reforming work, however, did not get under way for more than a century. The principal cause of the stagnation was the fact that the deficiencies of the theoretical structure did not impair the advancement of science. An indigenous incentive for the revision of fundamental concepts arose only in the second half of the nineteenth century with empirical observations like those of the Michelson-Morley experiment.

But besides indifference there was a certain amount of positive resistance to a revision. The motive of this resistance was formulated by Clarke in his Fifth Letter to Leibniz: "One maintains that motion implies of necessity a relative change of position in one body with regard to other bodies; but one does not show how one could avoid the absurd consequence of this assumption: that the movability of a body depends on the existence of other bodies, or that a body which exists alone would be incapable of movement, or that the parts of a rotating body (as for instance the sun) would lose their centrifugal force if all external, surrounding matter were annihilated."<sup>43</sup> We do not know Leibniz' answer to this argument, for the death of the philosopher put an end to the correspondence; but, as we shall see presently, we can form a fairly good idea of what it would have been. In any case, at the time this argument remained unanswered and it continued to be one of the great factors in the resistance to a revision of the Newtonian theory.

<sup>43</sup> Clarke, Fifth Replic, §§ 26-32, in "Recueil de lettres. . ." (cited above) p. 174.



The argument was still alive in 1870 in Carl Neumann's treatise on the Newtonian theory. In almost the same words as Clarke's, Neumann put the case of the rotating star which has assumed the shape of an ellipsoid. If we imagine all other bodies removed from the universe, then the rotating star would have to be at rest according to the relativistic theory; its centrifugal forces would disappear and its body would become spherical in shape. "This insufferable contradiction can be avoided only if we drop the definition of motion as relative, and if we conceive the motion of a material point as something absolute."<sup>44</sup> To this argument came an answer at last from a physicist, Ernst Mach. There is no profit in making a senseless assumption for the purpose of avoiding a contradiction; moreover, in a mental experiment only nonessential circumstances may be modified; that the existence of the surrounding material world is without influence, however, must not be assumed a priori; if the hypothetical elimination of the material world leads to contradictions, then we have to consider this result as proving the importance of the relativity of motion.<sup>45</sup>

The answer is excellent in its firmness and intention, but it is lacking somewhat in theoretical precision. There is a serious unclearness in Mach's reply in that it does not define the criteria for the "essentiality" or "nonessentiality" of circumstances which may or may not be modified in a mental experiment. But we can repair this lack of precision of 1901 by returning to the theoretical culture of 1715. As we have said above, we can construct the answer that Leibniz could have given to Clarke's argument, had not their correspondence been terminated by the former's death. For Leibniz the relativity in physics was not a relativity of space and time only; the relativity extends also to the *vis derivativa*, that is, to phenomenal force; force is not exempted from phenomenality and relativity. Hence, the physical phenomenon as a whole,

<sup>44</sup> Neumann, *Die Principien der Galilei-Newton'schen Theorie* (Leipzig 1870) pp. 27 ff.

<sup>45</sup> Mach, *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung*, 4th ed., revised and enlarged (Leipzig 1901) pp. 290 ff.

in all of its aspects, must be conceived as part of a field of phenomenal relations. Relativity is not an appurtenance of objects which exist in themselves; it is part of the logical structure of a science of phenomena. Hence it is impermissible to isolate a phenomenon and to ask what properties, for instance, a rotating star would have "in itself" after the relational field in which it is a phenomenon is abolished. An experiment can and must abstract from concrete physical circumstances in order to isolate that part of the total phenomenon which can be mathematized and expressed in a law of science; it cannot, however, abstract from the logic of science and still retain an object of science. The argument from the body which rotates in absolute motion makes precisely this epistemological mistake; with the clarification of this error the problem of absolute motion disappears.<sup>46</sup>

### *Science, Power, and Magic*

The further development of the problem of relativity from Mach to Einstein belongs to the history of science; it is not our concern in a study of politics. We can proceed now to an appraisal of the results of our analysis; and we shall begin this appraisal with a few reflections on the relations between power and the advance of science. These general reflections will then be followed by a description of the pattern of ideas that emerges from our analysis of the problem.

The advance of the science of which Newton is the great representative genius has profoundly affected the political and economic structure of the western world. Let us list the principal features of this change: the ramification of science into technology; the industrialization of production; the increase of population; the higher population capacity of an industrialized economy; the transformation of an agricultural into an urban society; the rise

<sup>46</sup> In this construction of Leibniz' answer I am reproducing substantially Cassirer's construction in his Note 158 to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence; see Leibniz, *Hauptschriften*. . . (cited above) vol. 1, pp. 219-21. I have only toned down the neo-Kantian terminology of Cassirer which somewhat veils the original strength of Leibniz' position.

of the new social groups—the industrial proletariat, the white-collar employees, and an intellectual proletariat; the concentration of wealth and the rise of the managerial class; the ever-increasing numbers of men who depend for their economic existence on decisions beyond their influence; the dependence of national power on a highly developed industrial apparatus; the dependence of the industrial apparatus on the political accessibility of markets and raw materials; the power premium on industrialization; the political decline of nations who do not possess the raw materials, or the population figure, or the territorial expansion necessary for the effective utilization of industrial technology; the corresponding political ascendancy of nations who possess these factors; the helplessness of agricultural, especially oriental, civilizations against the economic and political penetration by industrialized civilizations; the rise in the standard of living due to industrialization; the political tensions in the western world due to the differences in the degree of industrialization possible in the various national states; the further increase in the standard of living in some of the industrialized societies through the ruthless exploitation of the industrial power premium in foreign relations, and so forth. This enumeration is far from exhaustive but it is sufficiently long to make it clear that the advance of science after 1700 is the most important single factor in changing the structure of power and wealth on the global scene.

In order fully to understand the interrelation of power and science we must also consider that science is not simply the cause of the enumerated effects; we must rather speak of an interaction between science and the environmental changes. The “usefulness” of science for the increase of power and wealth was quickly seen and became a strong incentive for putting the means of power and wealth at the disposition of scientists for their further pursuit of knowledge; and, more subtly, the advance of science itself is today unthinkable without a laboratory equipment that presupposes a technology of production, which, in its turn, is unthinkable without previous advance of science. This interrelation between

science and power has become so decisive in international politics that, in the wake of modern wars, the conqueror resorts to such measures as prohibition of research, destruction of laboratory equipment, the wholesale abduction of scientists into a more or less gilded slavery, and the deindustrialization of the conquered nation. The strict rationality of the procedure, without regard for human or civilizational values, closely resembles the procedure of the most rational of conquerors, Genghis Khan: when the Mongols conquered a country they took the skilled craftsmen and the shapely women for their personal use and let the rest of the people perish. The advancement of science and the rationality of politics are interwoven in a social process that, in the perspective of a more distant future, will probably appear as the greatest power orgy in the history of mankind.

We must recognize this atmosphere of power in which science advances, for there are certain peculiarities incidental to the process which otherwise would appear as sheer lunacy. The source of these apparent lunacies is the utilitarian rationality of science. The idea of power through science has a rational core: if we have knowledge of causal relations we can form means-end relations; if we have the means we can achieve the end; hence knowledge in this sense is eminently useful. This rational, utilitarian core in itself is of necessity present in all human existence, both personal and social; utilitarian rationality determines a segment of life in primitive as well as in advanced civilizations; in itself it is not the specific determinant of any particular society. Under the impact of the modern advance of science, however, this core has acquired the characteristics of a cancerous growth. The rational-utilitarian segment is expanding so strongly in our civilization that the social realization of other values is noticeably weakened. This expansion is carried by the mass creed that the utilitarian dominion over nature through science should and will become the exclusive preoccupation of man, as well as the exclusive determinant for the structure of society. In the nineteenth century this idea of utilitarian exclusiveness crystallized

in the belief that the dominion of man over man would ultimately be replaced by the dominion of man over nature, and that the government of men would be replaced by the administration of things. At this point we have to guard against the error into which critics of the totalitarian movements have fallen so frequently—the belief that an idea is politically unimportant because philosophically it is stark nonsense. The idea that structure and problems of human existence can be superseded in historical society by the utilitarian segment of existence is certainly plain nonsense; it is equivalent to the idea that the nature of man can be abolished without abolishing man, or that the spiritual order can be taken out of existence without disordering existence. Any attempt at its realization can lead only to the self-destruction of a society. Nevertheless, the fact that the idea is nonsensical has in no way prevented it from becoming the inspiration of the strongest political movement of our age. Here we can see in the raw the fascination of power that exudes from the new science: it is so overwhelming that it blunts one's awareness of the elementary problems of human existence; science becomes an idol that will magically cure the evils of existence and transform the nature of man.

This humanly destructive obsession is found not only in the totalitarian movements in the narrower sense. It occurs, too, in the so-called liberal or progressive movements, where it assumes the form of the belief that the rather obvious calamities which accompany the age of science must be cured by more science. We have gained dominion over nature through science; in order to avoid the misuse of this power, runs the argument, we must now gain control over our social environment through a corresponding advancement of social science. Scientists of more social prestige than human wisdom stand up before large audiences and tell them in all seriousness that social scientists will have to emulate the natural scientists and do their share in order to realize the perfect society. There seems to be no suspicion that the effects of natural science, both beneficial and destructive, are not

due to the genius of scientists but to the objective structure of the realm of phenomena which permits the introduction of human action into the chain of cause and effect once the law of the chain has been discovered; no suspicion that this objective structure does not prevail in the realm of substance, that no wisdom of a Plato could prevent the suicide of Athens and no climactic synthesis of a St. Thomas the end of imperial Christianity. The knowledge of phenomena is certainly the key to their utilitarian mastery, but the understanding of human substance is not the key to the mastery of society and history.

The expansion of the will to power from the realm of phenomena to that of substance, or the attempt to operate in the realm of substance pragmatically as if it were the realm of phenomena—that is the definition of magic. The interrelation of science and power, and the consequent cancerous growth of the utilitarian segment of existence, have injected a strong element of magic culture into modern civilization. The tendency to narrow the field of human experience to the area of reason, science, and pragmatic action, the tendency to overvalue this area in relation to the *bios theoretikos* and the life of the spirit, the tendency to make it the exclusive preoccupation of man, the tendency to make it socially preponderant through economic pressure in the so-called free societies and through violence in totalitarian communities—all these are part of a cultural process that is dominated by a flight of magic imagination, that is, by the idea of operating on the substance of man through the instrument of pragmatically planning will. We have ventured the suggestion that in retrospect the age of science will appear as the greatest power orgy in the history of mankind; we now venture the suggestion that at the bottom of this orgy the historian will find a gigantic outburst of magic imagination after the breakdown of the intellectual and spiritual form of medieval high-civilization. The climax of this outburst is the magic dream of creating the superman, the man-made being that will succeed the sorry creature of God's making; this is the great dream that first appeared imagi-



natively in the works of Condorcet, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche, and later pragmatically in the communist and national socialist movements.

*The Pathos of Science and the Spiritual Eunuchs*

We have spoken metaphorically of the cancerous growth of the rational-utilitarian segment in modern civilization. We must now go beyond the metaphor and indicate the concrete sentiments and ideas which determine this growth in its formative stage.

The sudden and disproportionate expansion of one single element in a total structure at the expense of other elements presupposes a serious disturbance of a previously existing balance. About the nature of the disturbance there is no doubt: it is the disorientation of existence through the weakening and loss of faith. The atrophy of Christianity on a socially relevant scale causes a primitivization of intellectual and spiritual culture—the quite normal consequence of the breakdown of a spiritual order. The sentiments and attitudes which appear in connection with the problem of absolute space are symptoms of primitivization in the wake of a general spiritual disorientation. The absolutism of a Galileo or Newton cannot be labeled and shelved as a theoretical mistake to be corrected in the future; the attribution of “absoluteness” to the new science expresses the will of finding an absolute orientation of human existence through intramundane experience; and the correlate to this new will is the unwillingness to orient existence through openness toward transcendental reality. The new science assumes the function of a new order of existence. In his “Ode to Newton” (printed in the first edition of the *Principia*) Edmund Halley celebrated the achievement of his hero by placing it higher than the civilizing work of the sages and founders of antiquity. What is an ancient lawgiver (presumably a Moses or Lycurgus) who orders nothing more important than human society beside the man who discovers the order of the heavenly polity? Even if we make due allowance for conventions and clichés, and if we discount the generally hyperbolic tone

of the Ode, there still remains the sentiment that a discovery concerning the order of phenomena is an event of the same rank, if not a higher one, than a new spiritual insight.

Intimately related to the sentiment of absoluteness is the pathos of autonomy and self-reliance that animates the advance of science. Exactness of mathematical form and verification through experiment become self-sufficient standards of truth; a scientist need not look left or right in his pursuit of knowledge so long as he abides by his standards; no extraneous speculation can affect the truth of a proposition in science. The Newtonian *hypotheses non fingo* has become the proud expression of this pathos. At this point we touch on one of the most important sources of the modern existential disorder. If this pathos expressed nothing but the peculiar methodological situation of the exact sciences it would be perfectly legitimate; unfortunately, however, it has come to express a good deal more. This expansion of meaning is achieved through a process which we may call the transfer of pathos from a special pursuit to the existence of man. Science as an evolving system of knowledge is the result of an occupation of human beings; if the pathos of science is transferred from the occupation to the existence of the man who is engaged in it, such transfer may result in a serious warping of the individual personality; and if this transfer of pathos from science to the scientist becomes a model that is imitated on a socially relevant scale, it will result in far-reaching civilizational destruction. As a matter of fact, this transfer and its social imitation have occurred on such a scale in our civilization that the destructive effects defy repair in any visible future. Let us briefly characterize the attitudes and ideas through which this work of destruction is effected:

1. The transfer of pathos from science to existence expresses itself concretely in the growth of the belief that human existence can be oriented in an absolute sense through the truth of science. If this belief is justified, then it becomes unnecessary to cultivate knowledge beyond science. As a consequence of this belief, the occupation with science and the possession of scientific knowledge

has come to legitimate ignorance with regard to all problems that lie beyond a science of phenomena. The spreading of the belief has had the result that the magnificent advance of science in western civilization is paralleled by an unspeakable advance of mass ignorance with regard to the problems which are existentially the important ones.

2. Such mass ignorance would be bad enough in itself; nevertheless, mere ignorance could be repaired by learning. Scientific ignorance becomes a civilizational disaster because the substantial ordering of existence cannot be achieved through the acquisition of knowledge in the phenomenal sense. It requires the formation of personality in an educational process; and this process requires institutions. Once the scientistic pathos has penetrated the educational institutions of a society, it has become a social force which cannot easily be broken, if it can be broken at all. The problem is no longer one of mere ignorance; if the belief in the self-sufficient ordering of existence through science is socially entrenched, it has become a force which actively prevents the cultivation of human substance and corrodes the surviving elements of cultural tradition still further. The spiritual desire, in the Platonic sense, must be very strong in a young man of our time to overcome the obstacles which social pressure puts in the way of its cultivation.

Moreover, with regard to the cultivation of substance men are gifted differently (gifted in the Pauline sense of charisma). The active carriers of the scientistic pathos will be the men who are deficient in such gifts; and the penetration of society with the scientistic pathos creates an environment that favors the social success of the deficient human types. Hence, the advance of science and the growth of the rational-utilitarian factor is accompanied by a restratification of society which hitherto seems to have escaped attention because it cannot be expressed in terms of social classes. The restratification through the social prestige and success of the deficient types must be expressed in terms of human substance. We suggest the term "spiritual eunuchism" for the

designation of personality traits which make a man a likely victim of scientistic pathos, as well as for the designation of the traits which a society acquires when this human type gains social ascendancy. The nineteenth century has hardly a parallel in the history of mankind as a period of rapid transformation of a civilization through the eunuch type, preparing the spiritual anarchy of the twentieth century.

3. A further trait connected with the transfer of pathos is the rise of aggressive dilettantism in philosophical matters. Again, this is not a question of simple ignorance or dilettantism as such, which may occur at any time; the new and dangerous element is the readiness of the dilettante to impose his ignorance as a standard on others. Clarke's "I do not understand" in answer to Leibniz' exposition of the problems of time and space is the ominous symptom of the new attitude. He really does not understand—and that settles the argument in his favor. What the scientistic dilettante cannot understand must not be proposed in discussion of a problem; Comte made this postulate one of the formal dogmas of the scientistic creed. Clarke's correspondence with Leibniz is in general a document of first importance for the understanding of the new atmosphere. There are sections in the letters that move on a technical level of philosophizing that would have made a student in the Academy raise his eyebrows with amused contempt.<sup>47</sup> And again, even aggressive dilettantism would be comparatively harmless if it were not, at the same time, socially successful. Newton's theory of absolute space would be a weakness not worth our attention had it not, through the social prestige of Newton the scientist, become determinative in the development of materialistic psychology, philosophical anthro-

<sup>47</sup> In order to measure the technical enormity of the performance the reader should compare, for instance, Clarke's argument concerning space and time (Third Replic, § 4, in "Recueil de lettres. . .," cited above) with the corresponding treatment of the problem in Plato's *Timaeus* or St. Augustine's *Confessions*. Leibniz' answer to this section of Clarke's argument (Fourth Letter, §§ 14-16, in "Recueil de lettres. . .," cited above) is in no way original, but simply represents the tradition of philosophical craftsmanship.

pology, and political ideas. The theoretical dilettantism of the great scientist is socially effective; the argument of the great philosopher is socially ineffective. What Leibniz had to say in his correspondence with Clarke was socially of no visible importance; it did not even noticeably affect the course of theoretical physics. What Newton had to say in his definitions of space had an immeasurable effect on the formation of political ideas. The social success of Newton's theory of absolute space is the first great instance of successful dilettante theories, advanced either by scientists themselves or (after the transfer of the pathos of science on a relevant scale) by the great spiritual eunuchs of the nineteenth century. Without the prestige effect of scientism, such major intellectual scandals as the social success of positivism, or Darwinian evolutionism, or Marxism would be unthinkable.

In conclusion, let us mention the pattern of the civilizational schism that began to emerge in the debate on absolute space and resulted in the situation which we described as a deadlock. The clarification of the problems of space and motion did not induce the physicists to revise their fundamental theoretical concepts. Science went on as if nothing had happened; and Euler even demanded that the philosophers adapt their speculation to the confusion of physics. At the time, such a demand could be only partially successful; the spiritual and philosophical tradition of western civilization did not break down at the first blast of a physicist in the eighteenth century. Instead, a situation developed in which the later schismatic break was preformed, for the philosophers continued their speculation and simply circumvented the problem of physics. We have seen that Berkeley analyzed space and motion critically to the point from which he could safely embark on his own *philosophia prima*; and we have seen that Kant accepted the state of physics and then went off in the direction of his transcendental critique. The schism was already a fact in the eighteenth century, but the fact remained more or less below the threshold of consciousness; that a break between the ascendant scientific and utilitarian segment of

civilization and the spiritual and intellectual tradition had actually occurred became openly apparent only with Schelling; and by that time, the spiritualist was already on the defensive. In the course of the half century after Schelling the conflict was decided in favor of scientism; the spiritual eunuchs became the socially effective formers of ideas for the masses. With the politically effective organization of these masses in the totalitarian movements, the schism assumed the external forms of social suppression and physical extermination of the continuators of the tradition.

That in the end, through Einstein, the foundations of physics were revised in conformance with the position of Leibniz, is an important event in the history of science, but it has, for the moment at least, no visible social or political importance. The damage of scientism is done. As a philosophical friend aptly phrased it, the insane have succeeded in locking the sane in the asylum.<sup>48</sup> From this asylum no physical escape is possible; as a consequence of the interlocking of science and social power, the political tentacles of scientistic civilization reach into every nook and corner of an industrialized society, and with increasing effectiveness they stretch over the whole globe. There exist only differences, though very important ones, in the various regions of the global asylum with regard to the possibility of personal escape into the freedom of the spirit. What is left is hope—but hope should not obscure the realistic insight that we who are living today shall never experience freedom of the spirit in society.

<sup>48</sup> The scientistic-utilitarian dream of transforming society into a prison from which no escape was possible began to take shape after the middle of the eighteenth century in the works of Helvetius and Bentham.

*(Louisiana State University)*



# LANGUAGE

BY KURT RIEZLER

SOME philosophers call language a work of the mind among other such works—myths, religions, science. Others call it a system of signs among other such systems. Both definitions say next to nothing. Language will in no way be subsumed with anything else under a class. It stands alone and only as standing alone can it be understood.

As a system of signs language is all-comprehensive and refuses to be restricted to specific matters or purposes. Language claims to be all-capable and stands ready for any purpose. It refuses to be "explained by any particular function." Signs are signs of something in many and diverse ways. Language cannot be tied rigidly to a specific relationship of the word to the thing or of the sign to the matter it designates.

The relationship varies from word to word, from man to man, from speech to speech. Words are forceful or weak, nearer to or farther from the things they intend to denote. Each one is not just for itself the sign for only its own thing. Words help each other; together they try to approach the things, modestly or in arrogance, gently or roughly. They can be contented with pointing in awe from a distance at the things. They can try to seize them in forceful fists. They can even raise the pretentious claim that the word creates the thing of which it is the sign. But above all they can lose their things; they even lose them again and again and then are mere words.

Though one can say that the single word, no matter which way it is used, denotes a definite thing—each a different one—human speech, interlacing the words, can confuse and conceal the things and can do so intentionally. Language is both the master of mere semblance and the vehicle of truth. Language steps between man and thing, man and man, thing and world. It severs and it

links. It serves any ends of mutable men, the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad.

Thus language, the work of thousands of years, patiently waits for the manner in which man uses or misuses it. Preformed, yet still open to being formed, it yields to mutable man and his societies, moods, and purposes, despite the rigidity of sound systems, words, and rules. Each individual, each age, though speaking the same language, speaks it in a specific way, which is but its own. Nevertheless, language is the one of all man's works that carries the remotest past into the farthest future.

The grammarians of the Middle Ages searched for a *grammatica universalis speculativa*—a fundamental structure of all languages in and behind their diversity. Though we may doubt that such an original grammar can be discovered, one thing is certain: this grammar would be the inner law of a *societas universalis speculativa*. Which, we do not know.

What is language? This question is not answered by a theory of the origin of language, which is beyond memory. It is not answered by our subsuming language under a class, be it of works of the mind, be it of systems of signs. One question claims priority. What is it that, in speaking, happens to man and his things? Expression, some would say; communication, others. But such answers are no answers.

Animals as well as men "express" themselves. They moan, shriek, purr. Man prides himself on the fact that he excels the animal in the range of expression, although he probably fails to credit the animal with any expression man is unable to recognize as expression. Animals, like men, cannot help expressing themselves: any action becomes expression whenever there is anyone able to interpret it; any movement, even a motionless face, is expression, whether we will it or not. In the eyes of animals we read their sadness, their narrow world, and the dumbness they are unaware of and do not intend to express.

There is, however, a stricter sense in which expression occurs for its own sake. A lonely hunter in the night; the lion roars.

Other lions hear him; they too roar. I discard such explanations as "stimulus and reflex," "imitation," "suggestion," "contagion." If a man of purposeful action interpreted the lion's roar as warning to other lions to respect his hunting ground, he would miss the lion's way by a wide margin. And the lion's prey is more likely to heed his warning than are the other lions.

The lion may be roaring for the sake of roaring. Roaring, he compels the air to carry the sound and reverberate the mood of his lion-soul—its fierceness, its greed, its lust. But as it is one and the same lion who does both the roaring and the hearing, his role is twofold; roaring and hearing, he twice enjoys the lion's way.

The nightingale sings. We explain his singing as wooing. But that does not say much unless we say what in such singing and wooing happens to the nightingale in a nightingale's world. The nightingale, too, both sings and hears. The listening ear may even guide the singing throat. The nightingale sends and receives the sound waves—a give and take between the nightingale and his "environment." The bird responds to himself—and the surrounding air returns his response to himself and carries it over the trees as a question seeking the other nightingale. Man should not be too sure that he knows what, in such an occurrence, really happens.

The nightingale's song, so we say, expresses his feelings. Since, however, the nightingale has hardly made a pact with himself to set up sounds as signs of the movements of his little soul, his song cannot be an expression of his feelings unless some qualities of the sounds and their sequences actually correspond to qualities of feelings he feels. Correspond? How can they? Strangely enough, they do. They are indeed qualities that are common to different senses. They are images of movements, attitudes, moods of the human soul.

Up to this point the bird's song is his search for response. But the world, air, and trees return to the nightingale only the nightingale. Answer and question do not differ. The song seeks the

other nightingale and her answer. She hears and "understands." She knows what she would feel were she herself singing such a song. It is not hard for her to take on the role of the singer. In this moment expression is communication, yet remains expression. The singing bird still hears himself, though no longer only himself, and the answer is no longer the question repeated.

Man, too, throwing himself at his foe, roars. Roaring, he expresses his martial mood. In saying that he responds to the stimuli of the situation we say little, if anything. In producing sounds whose sensuous qualities correspond to the movements of his moods, he moves and spurs on his own soul. Thus he responds to his own roar. He may at the same time intend to frighten his foe and sap his resistance—in a kind of psychological warfare. He should, however, be aware that his roaring will not sound convincing unless it be genuine expression. The foe easily discerns fear. Signs that are images, iconic signs, are less suitable for lying than are words. Animals have great difficulty in lying.

In extreme grief men have no words. Aeschylus, in a lost tragedy, shows Niobe after the arrows of the goddess have killed her seven daughters and seven sons. She utters no sound, sheds no tear. The dramatic action proceeds. Human beings, nearer and nearer to Niobe's heart, try harder and harder to break her silence. Finally she begins to cry. We feel that she returns to life. Why? Life is giving and seeking response. When there is no one, man is his own *alter*. The dead alone do not seek or give response. "They hear silence only."

Signs that are iconic signs, be they sounds or gestures, serve man and animal to impart feeling—distinct movements of the soul. The term "soul" denotes here merely that mysterious something, whatever it is, by virtue of which a living being lives as a unity.

Sound and gesture, however, do not reach things or spell their order. The roaring lion and the singing nightingale reach themselves and their kin. Man's word alone reaches the things as well as the other man. Men bare themselves to one another with

respect to things; they bare things with respect to one another. This, and this only, is language.

The word is a late creation. It presupposes a system of sound, elements clearly distinct from one another, yet linkable in syllables according to definite rules. The sounds are a careful selection from a multitude of guttural noises man can produce. The system of sounds of each language has a definite structure. Its mutations follow definite principles. The single sounds and their combinations preserve in their sensuous qualities an affinity to movements, states, moods of the soul. They are open or closed, soft or hard, bright or dark. Thus they remain iconic signs. Poets still know this.

Herder says the first word was a "word of the soul." But the first word of the soul was not yet a word. Only the first word that was a word was still a word of the soul.

The first word? A word of solicitude, anger, surprise, reproach, command? Not yet—and yet already a word? The question is an idle one. Many words struggle forth together from the joyful or miserable soul, respond and seek response from an I and a You. Some are remembered, become the property of a We—a mother and her child, a man and a woman, a circle of friends, a master and his followers. They clutch at, and clench, the qualities of things. In the distinctness of words the distinctness of things becomes the property of the We. This still happens every day within the narrow range of freedom the inherited language leaves for the creation of words. Later the We may neglect the property; words lose their things and their distinctness, though still mouthed by beings who, in speaking, merely move the patient air.

But "thing" is here not "object." Prior to the thing as object is man's relation to qualities and their powers—good and evil, sacred and profane. In words that aim at these powers, man—scared, acting, hoping—opposes the power of the word to the power of the thing. Language calls, bans, conjures, ere it denotes.

But the word is never alone with its thing. The word is a word

amid words, the thing a thing amid things. In the penumbra of the word I use stands a word I might use: silently present in request is command, in admiration contempt, in courage fear—present in the word as well as in the thing. There is always some scheme, however preliminary, of an order of the possible words and things in which any single word or thing is thought to have a potential place. It is within the frame of this scheme that the meaning of words and the nature of things are established with respect to one another. Words for powers, qualities, and relations are spun around the thing.

The name calls a halt to the wavering thing and forces it to remain what it is: endowed with a name, the thing can set itself up as subject of sentences and fetter the hitherto autonomous qualities and powers as adjectives to its grammatical throne. The name discovers the thing as this one and specific thing. It discovers the class to which the thing belongs. Man names a woolly animal and sheep and so distinguishes it from the buffalo; now he fancies he knows what a sheep is. The word is midwife to, not parent of, the thing.

Though the word steps as mediator between man and thing, the name, reaching for the thing, never grasps it. The thing hears not; it remains silently aloof. The word reaches the other man, not the thing (albeit man believes that it reaches the thing). The magic fails; the power of the word is power over men, not over things.

The mere name is but a sign. The thing denoted remains open. It is held fast, not defined. The mere name searches and woos in vain. In the union of sentences only can the word, together with other words, weave a net around the thing and make it mine and yours; and this only so long as my and your words remain our words.

Finally, the image becomes a mere sign, linked to its thing by a conventional agreement about its field of meaning. Yet words and things go on to bestow on each other some of their qualities.

Language  
Sound  
sound  
Rules  
language  
speaks  
the w

It is  
becom  
range  
buffal  
prefix  
query  
anger  
the w  
from  
possib  
Lang  
rocke

As v  
their  
it doe  
to the  
names  
requir  
object  
a relat  
men a  
with r

"Ac  
of eve  
to eve  
is acte  
in the



Language is not an aggregate, a collection of names for things. Sounds, distinct elements—members of an ordered society of sounds—cohere in syllables, syllables in words, words in sentences. Rules for variations of signs and their combinations establish the language as an all-embracing system of potential speech. Now an I speaks and seeks the response of a You to the colorful things and the world.

It is not that a multitude of objects is divided into classes, sheep become sheep, and buffaloes buffaloes; language spells the whole range of the possible relations of man to man and to sheep and buffaloes. In one way or another—through words, inflection, prefixes, suffixes, intonation, pitch—it distinguishes assertion, query, request, command, wish, regret, devotion, astonishment, anger; it disentangles man's tortuous relation to time, distinguishes the ways in which he looks from present into past and future, from past into future, from future into past; it distinguishes the possible modes of his acting and being acted upon—his attitudes. Language does and must do all this, for it is all born in one birth, rocked in one cradle.

As words cling to their things, order them in groups, articulate their relations, the language seems to embrace the universe. But it does that only by articulating man's possible relations to man, to the thing and to the world. Many words, though, seem to be names of objective things; posited as absolutes, they seem not to require any relation to human life. They seem to designate an objective multitude of separable entities. Other words imply a relation to the speaking being. They unfold man's relation to men and things as unity of a structure, and have meaning only with respect to one another, not as signs for separable entities.

"Active," "passive," and "medium" do not establish three classes of events. "Past," "present," and "future" do not merely assign to events a place in time. Man acts in the active as a being that is acted upon; in the passive he is acted upon as a being that acts; in the medium he acts and undergoes action as subject and object

of his own action. In the past he remembers as a being that expects; in the future he expects as a being that remembers.

The personal pronoun does not differentiate men, and groups of men, in an objective world; it articulates the social situation, man's relation to man. In this social situation all the relations indicated by the pronouns are implied in one another.

In all languages, whatever their grammatical structure, human existence and the world of things—the realms of the so-called subjective and the objective—are articulated with respect to each other, in one and the same formative process. Each language performs in its own way this mutual articulation of man's existence and the world. Different languages perform this or that particular task more or less perfectly, subtly or roughly. Each language has a clarity and vagueness of its own. We try to divine in these differences the tale of a society's forgotten history, but we should not deceive ourselves. Though the optative of the verb may disappear, man goes on wishing and hoping. The dual may be forgotten, but we are still able to convey the social character of the couple by saying "we two," "you two." Some languages have different words for cooperation, differentiating types of cooperative human relationship. Such forms may emerge and disappear as the requirements of the social situation change. Yet the difference in the thing itself remains, though we need an entire sentence to express it, and may even, for lack of a word, tend to forget it. The unity of a *grammatica universalis speculativa* is but the unity and sameness of a fundamental function of all language, to be looked for in a *societas universalis speculativa*, that is, the fundamental structure of social life.

We talk of the "spirit" or "genius" or "*Geist*" of a language. A cloud of intangibles hovers about these terms. Whatever their meaning, this "spirit" has to do with the way man compels the things of his world to spell out his existence.

Language, being a system of potential speech, can be used in many ways and different spirits, even in no spirit at all. But this

system of possible speech is not absolutely indifferent to how we use it. Not unlike a field of force, it contains impulses for and against modes of speech, and exerts pressures far beyond all grammatical rules of correct usage. A formative power seems to reside in the structure of language itself. All languages can be spoken well and badly; yet different languages seem to differ in the degree to which they demand to be spoken well and resist mistreatment. This difference in demand and resistance is not merely the respect or disrespect of a society for the form of speaking and writing; it is a structural quality of the language itself. French is conspicuous for its resistance, German for its amenability to mistreatment. The formative principles, which constitute the spirit of a language, are by no means obvious; even academies need some *Geist* not to miss the *Geist* of the language in their care.

A society creates a new word or modifies an old one to fit a certain situation. An unknown I and his You use it first. Others take it up. Its survival depends not merely on the need for a new word to denote a new thing or a new attitude, but also on whether the new word is in key with the formative principle of the language. Only those that survive the circumstances that called them into being; most are dropped after a while.

A word imported from another language lives a lonely life at first. We treat it like an alien. Slowly a thousand invisible threads are woven around it; it changes color and tone; the spirit of the language conquers it. Now it enriches the language.

We cannot isolate the single word. Transplanted to another language it is no longer the same word. By virtue of the spirit of the language which lives in every word, the word tinges its thing. It links the thing to other things and to the soul of man. Thus the word mediates not merely between the human being who uses it and the thing it denotes, but between the society that speaks the language and the whole of its world. The spirit of the language tinges the world. Hence we can hardly hope ever to understand the culture of a people whose language we cannot even read.

Many words are ambivalent: they do not demarcate their things sharply—and not only because men's thoughts are confused and hazy. As the things themselves are linked to other things in diverse ways and transitions, the language surrounds the word with a penumbra of meanings and connotations in which relations to other things become half visible. Therefore the dictionaries often enumerate more than one meaning, even apparently contradictory meanings, for the same word. In the English word "fast," meaning both rapid and firm, the language is aware that things in rapid motion must have a firm grip on themselves. In "discretion," meaning the two gifts of silence and discernment, the language remembers a society in which men needed subtle discernment to know when to keep silent. The main meaning of each word is surrounded by ghosts. They flavor the word and, through the word, the thing. Part of this flavoring is due to the soft or hard, gentle or harsh, open or closed sounds, which carry intangible shades of feelings or movements of what we call the soul. Thus expression, communication, word and thing, man's soul and the climate of the world, pervade one another. The single word, which in its insulated being hides its secret, reveals it in communion with other words—in the speech of those who know how to speak.

Linguists discriminate between the emotive and descriptive function of words. The distinction helps little unless we are told how the two functions are interrelated. This, indeed, is the spirit of all language and its power over man—that it brings to light the movement of the living subject and the persistence of the objective things, each in and through the other. Language is not confronted with two separate worlds, an inner and an outer world, which it occasionally relates. From the beginning the inner world is an outer, the outer an inner world. If language tried to tell the tale of the inward soul apart from the outward world, it would hardly be language. If it severs an outer thing entirely from any relation to inward life, the outer thing dries up—and with it the spirit of the language.

Yet language is an instrument of communication for human beings who busily cooperate for diverse and changing purposes. I am aware of the first man in the first cave using the first language to tell the first woman to put the first pot on the first fire. We use language even to advertise our soaps. But no sum of all such purposes exhausts the language. Much more and something else happens in our speaking. If something the purpose of which we cannot so easily identify did not mix into all these purposes, language would never have become language.

Inquiring into the evolution of languages, we find that each owes the formation and perfection of its unique spirit to poets, orators, and authors of sacred books. Modern man may wonder why. He would not if he still knew what the poet knows. Singing the deeds of men and their lot, he articulates man's existence in and through the world; he builds and lets the human soul permeate the world of things, bestowing visibility on man's inner life and life on the visible things. In such achievement the language attains its spirit. Information about things becomes expression of the soul; the soul's expression becomes report about things. In the poem the qualities of the words and the properties of things seek and find each other. As the words, the images of the things they designate, the shadows of others in their penumbra, succeed one another, the sensuous qualities of vowels and consonants and their movements accompany the movements of images. Thus an agitated world comes to be—a world of things that clang, of sounds full of things.

Less than anything else can poetry be translated. Translation cannot help destroying the mutual relation between sound and thing, between the words and the shadows of their connotations. The main meanings of words may correspond; the side meanings correspond no longer, let alone the sounds and the qualities of things. The great translations of holy books are new creations by men in whose passionate souls the spirit of the language and a sacred tale communed.

The term "spirit" should not suggest that language is the work of a living entity—*Geist*, reason, mind, consciousness—which in the language converses with "nature." The I is a rather humble, poor, and needy Ego which stammers to reach a Tu; and with the Tu, the things; and finally to touch the horizon of a whole that embraces them all.

I turn from the spirit of the language to the situation in which this spirit shows itself. It is still, and yet no longer, that of the lion and the nightingale.

Man longs for response in expression that is communication, in communication that is expression. Now expression and communication, together and in communion, can reach out beyond the movements of the anxious soul for the colorful many-shaped things, their relations to one another and to man. As man masters the signs that are no longer images, expression and communication can part company. Man becomes free to say what is not, and to create the vast realm of semblance and fake. Now he can talk and say a nothing about something that is nothing. He can—in uttering words—hide the things from both himself and others. Yet he can still seek the other man, spell the multifarious things and their stubborn order. He can still force the image of the world he builds to reverberate the misery and joy of human life. With such liberty man uses and misuses the language to all the partial purposes of a tricky and cunning animal. Language acquiesces.

Languages live in being spoken, not in dictionaries and grammars. The fate of spoken languages, as they bloom, decay, turn rank and rude, follows the fate of man's relation to man, thing, and world. When our world grows pale, pale grows the language we speak; when society ossifies, language ossifies. When language is merely artful play, it betrays the artificiality of a world. An empty world has but empty words. The word seeks the thing; and the passion of this search is the source of its power.

Hence we expect the way a society treats its language to betray



this society's mental, moral, or spiritual state. Yet this correspondence is often obscured by the fixation of the inherited language in school and book, by the pressure of habit and tradition on the manner of speaking. Moreover, most speaking is tied to near and limited purposes: we isolate a purpose and find nothing to censure in a speech that satisfies the purpose. Yet language does not disclose its life in isolated purposes. Whenever language is dominated by a partial purpose, it degenerates. Hence the universal phenomenon common to all ages and societies—the professional jargon of bureaucrats and lawyers; the one-sided purpose maims the language.

When an established society inherits an established world, and thought moves only in beaten tracks, speech changes slowly. Some subjects marry their adjectives. Meanings of habitual turns are no longer courted. Everyone speaks as "they" speak. The word loses the halo of its connotations, the penumbra of subtle hints, and finally the thing itself. The inanity of man's relation to man ends in the inanity of the word. Man no longer seeks man, let alone the thing. The word has lost its life and power; no horizon becomes visible; an empty space gulps down the empty word.

Language serves deception and simulation. In this effort to seem what he is not, man may become a past master of sonorous phrases which, to the subtler ear, ring hollow. Many a public speaker would remain mute if he knew he was speaking to philologists. It is as if man could lie, but language could not. Our speech ultimately unmasks us, though not to every ear and not in factual information about this or that. Whenever man pretends to reach the human soul, the nature of things, or the idea that embraces the whole, his language shows him up. The poets lie? The poets cannot lie lest they cease to be poets.

If life's misery and want, chaining man to the truth of man and thing, permitted sham and lie to permeate the entire life of a society, the language such a society would speak would betray it to every ear. Any holder of power who, in order to manipulate

confused masses, keeps lying, must corrupt the language. The official language of despotic power is empty. Hitler would have destroyed the German language as well as the German nation, if, outside the official sphere, the German language had not constantly been restored by men who, wrestling with the truth of things, sought another man's truth.

The corruption of language is not merely unconscious and unwitting expression of the empty and coarse soul; it grows into a technique of power. Before they can be manipulated, the masses must be confused. This is done by the misuse of words which, as carriers of inherited meaning, link men to one another. The universe of response must be destroyed, words be deprived of their meaning. They must lose their things; things must lose their words. Finally man, as Confucius says, no longer knows how to use his hands and feet. He becomes helpless. This happens whenever a conscious technique of manipulation attains a monopoly.

When the universe of response fails to tie man to man and to things, the things to a horizon of a world, the world to an equivalent of gods, a society decays. Language decays with the decay of society. It is regenerated, grows again, regains its life and soul, when a new society builds up a new world. History abounds in examples, none greater than the growth, differentiation, formation of the French, Italian, and Spanish languages as new and elaborate structures out of the Latin of the Roman soldier colonies.

In a stratified society the manners of speech of the higher and lower classes interact. While the language grows pallid in the polished boredom of the drawing room, it regains the color of blood in the laborer's hut. Toil toughens it and gracious leisure refines it; it may fare better in the interaction of the two than in a uniform smugness which lacks both the sweat of the one and the grace of the other. Even the French Academy, though concerned chiefly with defending the language of Voltaire against the slang of the suburbs, occasionally acknowledges the latter's formative power. In the tension between the tragedy of Aeschylus

and the comedy of Aristophanes the language of Attica reached perfection.

The law that rules the relation between the spoken language and its society holds for all languages. It subjects all languages to the same fate, though the more or less established form, revered and transmitted, makes one language more resistant than another, for a while. The unity of this fate stems from the function of language in the pattern of all social life.

Whatever purposes of language we enumerate, language would not have become language were this list a mere sum. The man who commands, commands as a being able to pry or conjure. He distinguishes things as a being who longs for response to his feelings. He does the one with respect to the other. An abstract Adam may restrict himself to telling his Eve to put the pot on the fire; any concrete Adam faces his concrete Eve as a being whom he may love or hate, desire or despise. All this is silently present in his request. The tone, the sequence of his words, reveal his feeling; he must make an effort to hide it. His speech occurs within the unity of a dynamic context we call life. Life binds together command and prayer, love, hate, and indifference. Language lives in this dynamic unity of life, in which all the possibilities of the human soul tacitly accompany the one that happens to be the present actuality.

Here and there human speech reaches perfection. Then man delights in his language. It is as if language itself enjoyed its triumph—English in Shakespeare's verses, German in Goethe's lyrics, Greek in Sappho's songs. Of course, this joy is but man's joy in speaking and hearing perfect speech. A glimmer of this happiness still flickers through the night of human misery that now can at least be told. One and the same principle rules all speaking. It is the same perfection, and for the same reason, whether we speak perfect English or perfect French. In each language "the poet's words softly knock at the gates of paradise" by virtue of the same power, though they lose this power when translated.

The common root of this perfection is what, in such speech, occurs between man, thing, and world. Speaking means "saying something to somebody about something." There is the one who speaks and the one who listens; a something that is said, and a something about which something is said. Perfection of the language, and its deficiencies, too, stem from the interrelation of these four.

In perfect speech the individual shows himself as a distinct, unique, autonomous being. Perfect speech, however impersonal its content, bears the imprint of the speaker; a man speaks—this one man. Gently weaving an invisible net or rushing tempestuously, perfect speech forces the other man to listen as a You by revealing the I as an I. Thus it creates a We—though the speaker and the hearer may be unknown to each other, speaking be writing, and hearing reading. Yet this will not happen unless speech says something about something. The thing, spoken about, was hitherto beclouded. Now its shape and nature become visible. In the shades of color and light that play around it, the I, in showing the thing, shows himself to the You. Thus when in perfect speech the thing begins to shine, it throws a gleam of light on the vault of a sky which, if only for a moment, seems to span a world. Now only does language itself enjoy its supreme happiness.

These criteria of perfect speech are not man-made. They do not depend upon the whim of society. A particular society may forget but it cannot alter them. They spring together with language from life's passion for life in an animal that is able to speak.

## BOOK REVIEWS

COBBAN, ALFRED. *National Self-Determination*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948. xvi & 186 pp. \$3.

The author's purpose is to test the validity of the principle of the self-determination of nations, which is known to have played a prominent role in the peace settlement after World War I and which, he believes, is still held to be true by world public opinion.

Dividing his task into four parts, the author devotes the first to a study of the principle from the historical point of view. Nationalism, the sentiment of which the principle of self-determination is the theoretical expression, climbed rapidly, after its emergence in the course of the French Revolution, to the climax of the years 1848-70. The latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth were a period of decline. In the causation of World War I, nationalism was merely a contributory factor, but in the course of the war both camps used its appeal as one of their weapons. The force of self-determination achieved its triumph in a series of national revolts for which the collapse of the great multinational states provided the opportunity. At the peace conference, the principle was already on the defensive, and after Versailles the initiative passed to the defeated nations, primarily Germany.

In the second part of the book, the principle is studied from the analytical point of view. The author poses the question, What is the self-determination of nations? and looks for an answer in his historical sketch. Quite correctly, he wants to define a real social force, not a mental construct. He finds himself faced with the well-known difficulty of defining a nation, but finally evolves the following: "Any territorial community the members of which are conscious of themselves as members of a community and wish to maintain [its] identity, is a nation." This definition obviously covers communities which are not nations, for example, exclusive residential areas. An additional attribute limiting the definition to the realm of political phenomena is therefore added: "The nation is a community which is, or wishes to be, a state." Subsequently that which is so defined is called a "cultural nation," in contradistinction to the nation-state. The principle of self-determination is finally formulated as the postulate that the cultural nation and the political nation coincide. Thus multinational states and fragmentary states are ruled out.

A number of criticisms of the principle are offered by the author. Triumphant nationalism almost without exception tends to swell into

imperialism. Under the impact of nationalism, the political state tends to impose on its citizens cultural homogeneity. Many multinational states, on the other hand, have succeeded in preserving the cultural values of their components. In consequence, the right of self-determination cannot mean an absolute right to complete national sovereignty. The need for political associations to maintain law and order and to insure efficient defense against attacks may involve the association of different communities within the same state.

The third part shows by concrete examples how values of different cultural nations can be preserved in multinational states, with special reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Soviet Union, and the policies of the United States relating to the small nations of America. There follows a brief survey of the advance of nationalism among non-European nations and of "regionalism."

In the fourth and last part, the correlation between the principle of the self-determination of nations and economic and strategic exigencies is studied. The author proves convincingly that, in our day, strategic boundaries are out of the question and that the postulate of making states coincident with economic provinces is untenable. In consequence, but somewhat in contradiction with the earlier findings, the author claims that frontiers can and should follow national lines where they can be determined. Finally, he returns to his basic thesis and says that "affiliations of many small nations are settled beyond challenge by geographic, economic, historical and other circumstances. Catalonia cannot be other than part of Spain, Wales of Great Britain, the Ukraine of Russia."

The author does not summarize his findings. Were one to do this for him, it would be possible to say: The principle of the self-determination of nations is a relative one. Its applicability is limited by the existence and applicability of other equally valid principles. Under what conditions the individual principles prevail is a problem that can be scientifically solved only in the framework of a study that would not concentrate on any one of them, but would consider all as interdependent elements of a system.

NICHOLAS S. TIMASHEFF

*Fordham University*

VAMBERY, RUSTEM. *Hungary, To Be or Not To Be*. New York: Frederick Ungar. 1946. 205 pp. \$2.50.

The late Rustem Vambery, former Hungarian Minister in Washington, attacked in this book an old chauvinist version of Hungary's



history, though he knew that in consequence he would be accused of being a traitor to his country. Magyar propaganda has pretended that "Hungary is a thousand-year-old country and its constitution is as old as the English constitution." Actually, Hungary was under Turkish domination for two hundred years before the end of the seventeenth century. Then the Austrian army drove the Turks out and Hungary became for the next two centuries a part of the Austrian Empire (from 1867, a part of Austria-Hungary). Another popular slogan has proclaimed that Hungary was always democratic and liberal, whereas Vambery asserted that the country has been ruled by a reactionary class of big landowners. He was convinced that Hungary's future depends on the destruction of this "childish braggadocio" and on wresting the political power from the ruling class.

Vambery tried to replace the usual propaganda with quite a different picture of Hungary's history: the Magyar "squirearchy," some 1,200 owners of big estates, were "willing slaves of their Hapsburg overlords" "in order to retain independence in handling the lower classes, including the national minorities. It was this bargain which brought them to the brink of the abyss" (p. 134). It seems to me that Vambery, after having exploded the chauvinist Magyar propaganda, presented in his over-simplified version another propaganda fallacy. He was aware of the fundamental fact of Hungary's history: "The Magyars are, indeed, a lone people between the Germans and the Slavs" (p. 141). But he ignored this most important fact when he discussed the role of the Austrian Empire in Hungary's history. And yet his hope of Hungary's survival after this last war was built on the expectation that a Danubian federation and customs union, such as the Austrian Empire had created and maintained within its large area, could be established and would "alleviate the doom that threatens the former Axis satellites." "Very much depends on how territorial and minority questions are tackled by the United Nations." But the frontiers of Hungary defined by the new peace treaty are about the same as those set by the Treaty of Trianon. The earlier treaty necessitated the transfer of more than two million Magyars to the neighboring countries. Now the Magyar minorities are being expelled by these neighbors. Thus Vambery's hope that this time Hungary and her neighbors would overcome their rabid nationalism does not seem to be justified.

Vambery further expected that the cooperation of the Danubian countries would lead to a really democratic federation. His criticism of the Austrian Empire's political administration in past centuries

was based on the application of rather inconsistent modern democratic yardsticks. As for Hungary's future independence and democracy, it suffices to quote Vambery: "Hungary's foreign policy and army are de facto going to be controlled by the Soviet Union." "There is no reason to assume that the Soviet Union will interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary to a greater extent than its own military and economic safety demands" (p. 171). Vambery admitted that some recently "purged" members of the Small Holders party "could scarcely be termed reactionaries" (p. 203) and that the newly enacted press law has a ghastly resemblance to the law of "the Horthy regime," but he "would not call this peculiar method of defending democracy inconsistent with efforts to establish Hungarian democracy" (pp. 204, 205).

Despite its shortcomings Vambery's book is an honest, courageous work and contains much well-founded criticism of Hungary's past regimes and of Magyar megalomania. And even his inconsistencies may be useful, because they show how complex the problems of the Danubian countries are and how difficult it is to organize this region tolerably well and to eliminate the threats to the peace of the world that may arise from its conflicts.

RICHARD SCHÜLLER

BARNES, HARRY ELMER, ed. *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948. xvi & 960 pp. \$10.

Sociology has such vast scope and so many diverse aspects that there is particular need of a historical reference book on the thinking of representative sociologists. It would be ideal if the editor of such a work could gather together a group of scholars who agreed on their principles of interpretation, on their conception of the place and function of sociology, and on the classifications and methods to be applied. This is of course out of the question, but Mr. Barnes has made the best of a difficult situation and has shown excellent judgment in his selection of contributors.

Naturally there are omissions and points of emphasis to which one may take exception. It would have been worth while, it seems to me, to have given more specific consideration to Russian scholars. Throughout the nineteenth century there was a provocative variety in Russian sociological thinking, and it would be extremely desirable to know how contemporary Russian sociology has been affected by the Marxian dogma; there are casual remarks in the writings of foreign observers which indicate that the application of the dialectical method has

brought about some interesting changes in the structure of Russian sociological thought. In the discussion of French sociology there is an excellent essay by Emile Benoit-Smullyan on Durkheim and his school, but it is regrettable that there is no mention of the revolt against Durkheim, of Sartre's contribution to sociology, or of Gurvitch's constructive ideas on the sociological aspects of moral and intellectual values. I particularly miss any reference to Groethuysen, whose work was sociological and philosophical alike, and who was, indeed, one of the last encyclopaedic minds in the field of sociological analysis. The division on Germanic countries reveals some astonishing omissions: there are no articles on Hegel, Lorenz Stein, Marx, Lukacs, nothing on Scheler, or on the contributions of the phenomenological school. On the other hand, Talcott Parsons' essay on Weber is the most lucid and penetrating presentation of Weber's thought that I know of in English. Similarly, in the section on American sociology, Speier's article on Sorokin is remarkable, but when there is an article on Sorokin, there should also be essays on MacIver, Znaniecki, Lynd; and the student of sociology could learn something, too, from an analysis of Mead's thinking about sociological theory and practice. This quick survey of virtues and possible shortcomings could be greatly extended, but it is sufficient to emphasize that the volume as a whole demonstrates again the planning and organizational skill of the editor, who is himself an important influence in the teaching of sociology in this country.

ALBERT SALOMON

HAUSSMANN, FREDERICK. *Der Wandel des internationalen Kartellbegriffs: Amerikanische Kartelldoktrin und World Trade Charter*. Berne: A. Francke. 1947. viii & 160 pp. \$3.45.

The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, of March 24, 1948, devotes a chapter to the subject of restrictive business practices, and sets forth not only principles of a general policy toward such practices but also procedures for consultation and investigation. The International Trade Organization will further be authorized to conduct studies relating to general aspects of restrictive business practices affecting international trade, to make recommendations concerning conventions and laws, and to arrange for conferences of members to discuss any matters relating to such practices. All preceding documents on the establishment of an International Trade Organization, beginning with the proposals submitted in 1945 by the United States Department of State, and following the London, New

York, and Geneva drafts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, likewise included chapters on restrictive business practices. These papers demonstrate the important shift in public opinion on international cartel problems that has occurred in recent years—a shift from the somewhat legalistic antimonopoly viewpoint of American practice to a wider commercial approach in international relations. None of the recent writers on international cartels has been more in support of that trend than Dr. Haussmann, whose various valuable contributions, published mainly in Switzerland since 1938, have underlined the necessity for such change.

This new publication on the change in the international cartel concept enlarges on Dr. Haussmann's views on the control of international cartels expressed in earlier writings. (See his review of Edward S. Mason's *Controlling World Trade: Cartel and Commodity Agreements* in *Columbia Law Review*, March 1947, p. 335, and of Erwin Hexner's *International Cartels* in *Social Research*, June 1947, p. 255.) Though the booklet under discussion, which bears the subtitle *Ameri-Cartel Doctrine and the World Trade Charter*, deals with the so-called New York Draft Charter of an International Trade Organization, of March 5, 1947, the comments and considerations have a wider importance because of their interesting approach to the specific international trade problems involved, which are so much neglected in contemporary studies on cartelization. Dr. Haussmann has been primarily concerned with setting forth problems of international cartels as they relate to, and are part of, an international commercial policy. He not only submits new and challenging thoughts, but also supports his views with data drawn from the recent literature on cartels in various countries. Moreover, he includes excerpts from documents covering statutory provisions of American law and resolutions of trade organizations in this country and in Great Britain as well as of the International Chamber of Commerce; and he reprints in full certain recent international agreements like the Tea Cartel of 1938, the European Coal Organization of 1945, and the drafts of an Anglo-American Oil Agreement as proposed in 1944 and 1945. Such material makes it possible to exemplify and compare practical considerations throughout the text. Among the many topics discussed by Dr. Haussmann are an effective control of cartels on the basis of an international cartel policy, general cartel registration, the complex issue of intergovernmental commodity agreements, and transactions with state trading monopolies or "public commercial enterprises," which are defined in Article 54 of the draft charter as "agencies of govern-

ments insofar as they are engaged in trade, and trading enterprises mainly or wholly owned by public authority." The problem of settlement of disputes is referred to by Dr. Haussmann as a self-regulatory process in business relations, a subject which has not yet been fully investigated in the field of either domestic or international cartel practice.

A commercial approach to the problems of international cartelization does not necessarily eliminate the American antimonopoly attitude, which may well serve purposes of domestic economic policy. Sight should not be lost of the fact that forthcoming parliamentary deliberations on ratification of the Charter for an International Trade Organization will make it necessary to consider international cartels as instruments of foreign economic policy. The understanding of these issues is indeed greatly facilitated by Dr. Haussmann's brief and at the same time comprehensive presentation of the problems involved and the solutions sought during the recent past.

MARTIN DOMKE

*New York City*

ZEISEL, HANS. *Say It With Figures*. New York: Harper. 1947. xvii & 250 pp. \$3.

It is difficult in our day to write an elementary book on statistics, since the whole development of this technique has been in a mathematical direction. Such an endeavor is possible only in specific fields where the elementary techniques are often deemed sufficient for the simple conclusions to be reached. This is still the case in opinion and marketing research.

Zeisel's book is devoted to the statistical procedures employed in these fields. It is an original book, it makes good reading, and it is highly suitable for the elementary needs of producers and consumers of such data. Its main advantage is the careful analysis of all examples. For these, it gives all the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the technique employed and within the given frame of reference.

The book is divided into three parts dealing, respectively, with the problems of classification, the methods of numerical representation, and the tools for causal analysis. The first part covers the tabulation of different reactions, the assembling of statistics, and the art (not the science) of formulating questions, with hints on how the answers to statistical questionnaires are governed by the way in which the questions are posed. The main question studied is, "Why do people

prefer one kind of merchandise to another?" The techniques of how to handle the "don't knows" are carefully explained. Control questions designed to get more out of a person than he really wants to reveal and calculated to discover intentional evasions are also discussed. A systematic analysis of the 2 by 2 tables, and the introduction of the simplest criteria for independence would have increased the usefulness of the book.

The second part is concerned with percentage figures and indices. The computations are very clearly stated for the layman, but the problem of when differences of percentages are significant is not sufficiently elucidated. The attentive reader who seeks enlightenment on this score will get no answer, because there is no discussion of the notion of standard error of percentage. The author has occasionally gone a bit too far in "answering" questions that the public might ask. For example, no serious statistician should actually try to measure marital happiness.

The third part of the book deals with the tools of causal analysis.

## LAND ECONOMICS

*a quarterly journal of*

### Planning, Housing and Public Utilities

CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER 1948

A REAPPRAISAL OF FARM TENURE RESEARCH... *Max M. Tharp*

MULTIPLE FUEL NEEDS OF THE AMERICAN

ECONOMY ..... *Walter H. Voskuil*

THE NEIGHBORHOOD: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS ..... *Judith Tannenbaum*

HOUSING FOR THE NON-WHITE POPULATION IN

NON-FARM AREAS..... *Douglas Rosenbaum*

CORRELATION BETWEEN VALUE OF DWELLING

UNITS AND ALTITUDE..... *Hans Blumenfeld*

Published in February, May, August, and November  
Subscription — \$5.00 per year      Single copies — \$1.50

Sterling Hall

University of Wisconsin

Madison 6, Wis.



It marks the transition from a merely descriptive tabulation to the search for possible causes. Great care is taken to show the distinction between true and spurious explanations by means of cross tabulations and similar procedures. In general, the terminology is well explained. The author's notion of correlation, however, departs from its technical meaning, and the technique of correlation is perhaps overemphasized. A minor flaw is the use of Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, which is not sufficiently explained. Incidentally, the reviewer doubts whether any causal relation can be detected by correlation alone. The last chapter of the book is devoted to the panel, a procedure that lies somewhere between the purely statistical technique and an individual exploration.

All questions in this study are clearly formulated, and each chapter is followed by a very readable summary. The book entirely fulfils its modest promise to furnish guidance for marketing and public opinion research confined to elementary procedures.

E. J. GUMBEL

## AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

CONTENTS, DECEMBER 1948, VOLUME 38

THE PROBLEM OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION.....	E. D. Domar
PLANNED ECONOMY IN NORWAY.....	L. R. Klein
EXIT BASING POINT PRICING.....	F. A. Fetter
BASING POINT PRICING AND BUSINESS PRACTICES.....	C. D. Edwards
TAXATION AND INFLATION CONTROL.....	Louis Shere
THE BURDEN OF IMPORT DUTIES: COMMENT.....	A. E. Kahn
REJOINDER.....	E. R. Rolph
MARGINAL COST CONSTANCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.....	Hans Apel

### *Communications, Reviews, Periodicals, Notes*

The *American Economic Review*, a quarterly, is the official publication of the American Economic Association and is sent to all members. The annual dues are \$5.00. Address editorial communications to Dr. Paul T. Homan, Editor, *American Economic Review*, George Washington University, Hall of Government, Washington 6, D. C.; for information concerning other publications and activities of the Association, communicate with the Secretary-Treasurer, Dr. James Washington Bell, American Economic Association, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. Send for information booklet.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- ALINGTON, D. A. *Europe: A Personal and Political Survey of 3,000 Years of European History*. New York: Scribner. 1948. xii & 388 pp. \$3.75.
- BERGIN, THOMAS GODDARD, and MAX HAROLD FISCH, translators. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1948. xv & 398 pp. \$5.
- BLACK, JOHN DONALD, and MAXINE ENLOW KIEFER. *Future Food and Agriculture Policy: A Program for the Next Ten Years*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1948. viii & 348 pp. \$3.50.
- CHASE, STUART. *A Proper Study of Mankind: An Inquiry Into The Science of Human Relations*. New York: Harper. 1948. xx & 311 pp. \$3.
- DEUTSCH, ALBERT. *The Shame of the States*. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1948. 188 pp. \$3.
- DUGGAN, STEPHEN, and BETTY DRURY. *The Rescue of Science and Learning*. New York: Macmillan. 1948. xii & 214 pp. \$3.
- GROSS, FELIKS, ed. *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1948. xv & 1075 pp. \$12.
- HERTZ, FREDERICK. *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States: A Study in Economic Nationalism*. London: Victor Gollancz; American representative, Transatlantic Arts. 1947. 223 pp. \$4.50.
- HOLLISTER, WILLIAM W. *Government and the Arts of Obedience*. New York: King's Crown Press. 1948. 139 pp. \$2.
- HSU, FRANCIS L. K. *Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1948. xiv & 317 pp. \$3.75.
- JUENGER, ERNST. *The Peace*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery. 1948. 77 pp. \$2.
- KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE, and HARRY A. MURPHY, eds. *Personality: In Nature, Society and Culture*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1948. xxi & 561 pp. \$6.
- LIPSON, LESLIE. *The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948. xiv & 520 pp. \$6.
- ROBERTS, LESLIE. *Home From the Cold Wars*. Boston: Beacon Press. 1948. 224 pp. \$2.50.
- SLICHTER, SUMNER H. *The American Economy: Its Problems and Prospects*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1948. vii & 214 pp. \$2.75.
- WHITE, WENDELL. *The Psychology in Living*. New York: Macmillan. 1947. xix & 393 pp. \$2.95.
- WINSLOW, E. M. *The Pattern of Imperialism*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1948. xii & 278 pp. \$3.75.

## ERRATUM

In the article entitled "On the Intention of Rousseau" by Leo Strauss, which appeared in the December 1947 issue of *Social Research* (vol. 14, no. 4), the fourth full sentence on page 469 should read: "Nor is our contention at variance with the circumstance that Rousseau revealed in his later writings certain points which he did not reveal in the *Discours*; for by failing to reveal in the later writings certain points which he had revealed in the *Discours*, he succeeded in never revealing his principles coherently and hence fully, and thus in speaking through his publications merely to those whom he wanted to reach."

JAN 11 1949

H

PERIODICAL ROOM  
GENERAL LIBRARY  
UNIV. OF MICH.

# SOCIAL RESEARCH

An International  
Quarterly of  
Political and Social  
Science

DECEMBER • 1948

---

VOLUME FIFTEEN

NUMBER FOUR